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Australia and the United States:
Two Common Criminal Justice Systems
Uncommonly at Odds
Paul Marcus'
Vicki Wayet
At first glance the crimina/justice systems ofAustralia and the United States look strikingly
similar. u-Jth common Jaw roots fivm England, they both emphasize the adversmy system, the role
of the advocate, the presumption ofil1I1ocence, and an appeals process. Upon closer reflection,
however, they appear starkly different From both Australian and US. perspectives, the authors
explore those differences, examining important features such as the exclusion of evidence, rules
regarding interrogation, the entrapment defense, and the open nature of trials. The Article
concludes With an analysis ofthe reasons fbr those differences, reasons that heavily relate back to
the rounding ofthe two nations and the drafting ofdistincdy dissimilar constitutions.
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INTRODUCTION

Australia and the United States of America share a common
heritage including close ties to their mother country of England, the same
language, 1 and a genuine sense of connection to one another even though
separated by a large ocean and thousands of kilometers or miles
(depending on which nation describes the distance). The similarities of
our two respective criminal justice systems are particularly striking in
many ways. One immediately thinks of rules regarding the investigation
of crime, the fact finding process at trial, and the sense of fundamental
fairness required for a just procedure. Equally as striking, however, is the
lack of similarities between the two systems in significant areas.
I.
Well, not exactly the same language. Americans may be surprised to know that, in
Australia, sunnies refer to sunglasses while Jollies may be any sort of candy. Yet, are those terms
any more unusual than the Aussie hearing the Yank say bad when she really means good, or
describing something as phat but not meaning weighty?

2004]

AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES

29

Differing views concerning the limits on law enforcement actions, the
admissibility of evidence in criminal prosecutions, and the roles of the
lawyer and the jury reflect important and noteworthy value judgments
which have been made by the people and governments of the two
countries.
This Article will explore both the similarities and differences found
in the two criminal justice systems. We believe the reader will be struck,
as many professionals in the field are, by the quite distinct roads traveled
by Australia and the United States. At the end of this Article we will
attempt to lay out some thoughts concerning why the two nations have
moved in such different ways in areas of great importance for criminal
justice.

II.

NATURE OF REGULATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A.

In Australia

The regulation of criminal procedure in Australia occurs on two
levels: state and federal. The Commonwealth's Crimes Act of 1914
largely codified federal regulation of criminal procedure. 2 At the state
level, where the majority of criminal activity is investigated and
prosecuted, the regulation of criminal procedure is mixed. 3 Victoria and
Queensland have followed the federal lead by codifying their rules of
criminal investigation and procedure. 4 South Australia and New South
Wales also substantially regulate criminal procedure statutorily. 5 The
other states rely upon a mixture of the common law and statute.
The statutory and common law rules cover diverse matters such as
the power of arrest, 6 detention/ bail,8 interrogation,9 forensic exarnina2.
To the extent that the Crimes Act, 1914 (Austl.) does not apply, section 68(1) of the
Judiciary Act, 1903 (Austl.) applies state and territory laws with respect to arrest, detention, trial
procedure, and appeals to federal offenses. Judiciary Act, 1903, § 68 (Austl.)
3.
Federal jurisdiction is confmed to matters reserved to the Commonwealth under the
Constitution. It includes the investigation and prosecution of narcotics offenses involving
importation, serious fraud against the Commonwealth, international crimes such as war crimes or
trafficking in children for sexual purposes, and terrorism. Other Commonwealth agencies such
as the Australian Securities and Investment Commission, the Australian Taxation Office, and the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission have specific jurisdiction in relation to laws
they were created to regulate.
See Crimes Act, 1958 (Viet.); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act, 2000
4.
(Queens!.). For a comprehensive database of Australian federal and state law, visit the
Australasian Legal Information Institute, athttp://www.austlii.edu.au/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
5.
Crimes Act, 1900, pts. 10, lOA-lOB (N.S.W); Summary Offences Act, 1953, §§ 6583A (S. Austl.).
6.
Eg., Police Act, 1927, § 19 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Crimes Act, 1900, § 352 (N.S.W);
Police Administration Act, 1978, § 123 (N. Terr. Austl.); Criminal Code, 1899, § 546 (Queens!.);
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tion, 10 and search and seizure. 11 These rules are generally enforced
indirectly through the mechanism of excluding evidence attained as a
12
result of their breach at the trial of criminal defendants. At common
law, courts have discretionary power to exclude evidence that is
improperly obtained or that might result in an unfair trial of the accused. 13
14
In federal courts, which do not hear serious criminal cases, New
South Wales courts, Tasmanian courts, and Australian Capital Territory
15
courts, the Evidence Act of 1995 governs admissibility. When passed,
this Act was intended to operate as a uniform law of evidence throughout
16
Australia. Subsequently, however, not all states were convinced of the
need for reform. Although the Evidence Act of 1995 does not
17
incorporate all the common law rules of evidence, it operates as a
18
complete code in relation to the rules of admissibility. In terms of the
regulation of criminal procedure, the Evidence Act of 1995 reflects the

Summary Offences Act, 1953, § 75 (S. Austl.); Crimes Act, 1958, § 459 (Viet.); Criminal Code,
1913, § 564(\v.Austl.).
7.
Eg., Crimes Act, 1900, pt. lOA (N.S.W); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act,
2000, § 19 (Queens!.); Summary Offences Act, 1953, § 78 (S. Austl.); Criminal Law (Detention
and Interrogation) Act, 1995, § 4 (Tas.); Crimes Act, 1958, § 464A (Viet.).
8.
Eg., Bail Act, 1992 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Bail Act, 1978 (N.S.W); Bail Act, 1982 (N.
Terr. Austl.); Bail Act, 1980 (Queens!.); Bail Act, 1985 (S. Austl.); Bail Act, 1994 (Tas.); Bail Act,
1977 (Viet.); Bail Act, 1982 (W Austl. ).
9.
Eg., Crimes Act, 1900, pt. lOA (N.S.W); Police Administration Act, pt. 7, div. 6A (N.
Terr. Austl.); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act, 2000, ch. 7 (Queens!.); Summary Offences
Act, 1953, §§ 78-83A (S. Austl.); Criminal Law (Detention and Interrogation) Act, 1995 (Tas.);
Crimes Act, 1958, §§ 464B-464J (Viet.); Criminal Code, 1985, §§ 570A-570GA (W Austl.).
10.
Eg., Crimes Act, 1914, pt. IC (Austl.); Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act, 2000
(Austl. Cap. Terr.); Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act, 2000 (N.S.W); Criminal Law (Forensic
Procedures) Act, 1998 (S. Austl.); Crimes Act, 1958, §§ 464Z-464ZL (Viet.).
Eg., Crimes Act, 1900, § 349ZY (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Crimes Act, 1900, pt. lOB
11.
(N.S.W); Police Administration Act, § 144 (N. Terr. Austl.); Police Powers and Responsibilities
Act, 2000, pt. 2 (Queens!.); Summary Offences Act, 1953, § 81 (S. Austl.); Criminal Process
(Identification and Search Procedures) Act, 1976 (Tas.).
12. G.L. Davies, Exclusion of Evidence Illegally or Improperly Obtained, 76 A.L.J.R.
170, 180-82 (2002) (arguing that there is no evidence that exclusion has any disciplinary effect on
law enforcement officers or that exclusion protects or remedies breaches of rights).
SeePavicv.TheQueen(l998) 192C.L.R.159, 171.
13.
14. Australian federal courts have no jury facilities. Criminal breaches of federal law are
heard by state courts pursuant to sections 39-398 of the Commonwealth of Australia's Judiciary
Act of 1903. Judiciary Act, 1903 § 39-39B (Austl.).
15. Evidence Act, 1995 (Austl.).
Seeid
16.
17. For example, it does not determine the allocation of the burden of proof, deal with
presumptions, or include the doctrines of estoppel or res judicata. STEPHEN ODGERS, UNIFORM
EVIDENCE LAW, at lvii (5th ed. 2002).
18.
SeeTelstra Co. v. Australis Media Holdings [No 2] (1997) 41 N.S.WL.R. 346, 349-50
(per McLelland, J.).
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common law position: a breach can result in the exclusion of evidence
on the basis ofunfaimess' 9 or impropriety/illegality. 20
Notwithstanding considerable statutory reform at both the federal
and state levels, the meta-themes of criminal procedure are still largely
common law based. These meta-themes include:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

The right to due process2 '
The right to legal counsef2
The right to equal treatment before the laW3
Immunity from involuntary detention without triaf4
Immunity from retrospective operation of criminal laws. 25

The Australian case law has only recently been enunciated. All of
the principles outlined above were pronounced by the High Court in the
1990s.26 During this period, the primary focus of the High Court was
upon the integrity of the criminal process rather than upon the rights of
the accused. While some members of the High Court were prepared to
couch their discussion in terms of rights-based jurisprudence,27 the
majority shied away from that path, preferring to ascribe the development
of this relatively new jurisprudence to the Court's inherent power to
protect its own processes and to ensure the observance of the rule of
law. 28
The High Court's cautionary approach to these principles might be
viewed as the chrysalis of more substantive constitutional criminal
procedure in the future. However, the constitutional basis for such a
development remains weak and almost wholly reliant on the structural

19.
Evidence Act, 1995, §§ 90, 135, 137 (Austl.).
20.
Id §§ 138-139.
21.
See Leeth v. Commonwealth (1992) 174 C.L.R. 455.
See Dietrich v. The Queen ( 1992) 177 C.L.R. 292.
22.
23.
See Polyukhovich v. Australia (1991) 172 C.L.R. 501.
24.
Kable v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions for the State ofN.S.W (1996) 189 C.L.R. 51. This
does not apply in the Territories. See Kruger v. Australia ( 1997) 190 C.L.R. I.
25.
SeePolyukhovich, 172 C.L.R. 501; Kable, 189 C.L.R. 51.
26.
The High Court is analogous to the U.S. Supreme Court. It is the final court of
appeal in Australia, and also exercises original jurisdiction over interstate and federal versus state
matters.
Eg., Dieflich, 177 C.L.R. at 326 (per Deane, J.), 362 (per Gaurdon, J.).
27.
28.
See GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF CONSTITIJTIONAL
DEMOCRACY 1-46 (1988) (discussing various meanings of the "rule of law" from legal constraint
on governmental action to a set of values encompassing the presumption of innocence,
presumption against retroactive legislation, and mandatory trial by jury for serious criminal
cases).
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separation of power between the judiciary, the legislature, and the
executive as set out in the Commonwealth Constitution. 29
Therefore, Australia currently stands outside of mainstream
developments in constitutional criminal procedure that have occurred in
other common law jurisdictions.30 Even Britain, the original source of
Australian criminal procedural rules, enacted a Human Rights Act in
1998.31
B.

In the United States

The bases for the criminal procedure process in the United States
are, in some ways, quite similar to those in Australia. As in Australia, the
U.S. criminal justice system also is overwhelmingly state oriented, with
relatively few crimes prosecuted in the federal courts. 32 Those cases that
are brought forward by U.S. Attorneys tend to be drug oriented, 33 involve
movement across state lines,34 or result from specific nationally focused
35
statutes.
Unlike in Australia, where criminal procedure tends to be state
based, American criminal procedure is federal, 36 is not of recent origin,
and relies overwhelmingly on constructions of the United States
Constitution by federal courts, and-to a lesser extent-state courts. 37

29.
See Kable, 189 C.L.R. 51; Kruger, !90 C.L.R. I.
30.
Eg., U.S. CaNST. amends. IV-VI, VIII; The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(Gerald A. Beaudoin & Ed Ratushny eds., 2d ed. 1989); Bill of Rights Act, 1990 (N.Z.), available
at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/nzO I OOO.html.
31.
Human Rights Act, 1998 (Eng.), RICHARD CLAYIDN & HUGH TOMLINSON, THE LAW
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 125 (2000).
32.
The states typically process more than ninety percent of all serious crimes in the
United States. Jodi M. Brown & Patrick A. Langen, Felony Sentences in the US., 1996, in
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 2 (July 1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fsus96.pdf.
21 U.S.C. section 846 is the standard federal statute outlawing drug distribution. 21
33.
u.s.c. § 846 (2000).
34.
18 U.S.C. section 1952, generally known as the Travel Act, prohibits traveling in
interstate or foreign commerce with intent to commit crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000).
35.
The wide reaching Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, for instance, imposes
criminal sanctions for providing false or misleading statements in connection with the sale or
transfer of securities such as stocks and bonds. 15 U.S. C. § 78fT (2000).
36.
This is not to suggest that states have entirely abandoned the earlier practice of
enacting specific (and quite helpful) rules of criminal procedure. For thoughtful illustrations of
such rules, see the systems in California and Texas. CAL. PENAL CODE § 686 (West 1999); 4A
TEX. CRJM. CODE PROC. ANN. arts. 22, 38 (Vernon 1979). Still, most of the litigation and
guidance regarding the critical issues of criminal procedure are federally controlled.
37.
Many state courts actively apply federal constitutional provisions due to the
concurrent jurisdiction in the two judicial systems. Moreover, many state courts apply their own
state constitutional provisions in state criminal cases. This generally occurs in situations which
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Consider, for instance, three of the more prominent examples of these
procedures relating to the right to counsel, the rules of exclusion, and the
privilege against self-incrimination, as will soon be discussed in greater
detail later in the Article.
For a considerable period of time, various states had conflicting
requirements regarding lawyers for indigent defendants in criminal
cases. 38 It took the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 39 and later cases, to mandate the right to counsel for virtually
all criminal defendants at the critical stages of both federal and state
criminal prosecutions. 40 Similarly, while some states excluded unlawfully
obtained evidence in criminal cases prior to the 1960s, most did not. 4 '
Exclusion became the norm in all criminal cases involving violations of
the search and seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment with the
Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio. 42
The United States Supreme Court's construction of constitutional
rights superseded state law and soon dominated the national debate, as
seen clearly in the confession cases dealing with the right to remain
silent. Once the Court's decision in Miranda v. Anzona was issued in
1966, the debate concerning the application of the privilege against selfincrimination turned almost entirely on issues surrounding Miranda such
as definitions of custody, interrogation, and waiver. 43 Independent state
rules on this important point became almost nonexistent. 44
III. WE ARE So VERY MUCH ALIKE
Whether attending a criminal trial in Melbourne or in Chicago, even
the most casual observer will quickly comment on the commonalities of
the two processes. Apart from robe and wig (and the occasional
those state constitutional provisions provide at least as much protection for the accused as does
the federal constitution.
38. In Gideon v. Wainwn'ght, twenty-two states, led by then Minnesota Attorney-General,
and later Vice President of the United States, Walter Mondale, filed briefs in opposition to the
position taken by the state of Florida in the case. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
These states had requirements similar to those urged by the lawyers for Gideon, and ultimately
adopted by the Supreme Court. See ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 151-55 ( 1964).
39.
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45.
40.
See infi'anotes 305-316 and accompanying text.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658-59 (1961 ).
41.
42.
Id; U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see inffanotes 206-234 and accompanying text.
43. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
44. In a highly unusual move, a few states have taken an innovative approach in this area
by requiring, in addition to Miranda warnings, the electronic recording of interrogations of all
criminal suspects in custody. Without such electronic recording, a resulting confession will
generally not be admissible in evidence at trial. See, e.g., State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn.
1994); Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).
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reference to "Your Worship" as opposed to "Your Honor"), the two
systems' apparent procedures and substantive rules are virtually identical.
This Article now turns to consider a few of the more important
similarities.

A.

The Golden and Silver Threads: Presumption ofInnocence and
ProofBeyond a Reasonable Doubt

Can there be any element more central to criminal justice systems
with English origins than the strong presumption of innocence of the
defendant, expressed through the government retaining the burden of
proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? This feature, more than any
other, constitutes the core of the criminal justice systems in both the
United States and Australia. 45
The United States Supreme Court has been nothing less than
extravagant in its praise of the presumption of innocence, noting that it is
"axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of
the administration of our criminal law.'.-~ It is clear that the burden of
persuasion rests entirely on the prosecutor. 47 This burden, proofbeyond a
reasonable doubt, is a high standard. This requirement, too, plays a key
role in the U.S. criminal justice system:
6

The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of
immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his
liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be
stigmatized by the conviction.
Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to
command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of
the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent
48
men are being condemned.

The Australian High Court also has written of this foundation of the
administration of criminal justice, describing the allocation of the burden
45.
The Supreme Court of Canada captured the significance of the two concepts, building
on the traditional statements found in virtually all common law countries: "If the presumption of
innocence is the golden thread of criminal justice then proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the
silver and these two threads are forever intertwined in the fabric of criminal law." R. v. Lifchus,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 320,332 (Can.).
46. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
4 7. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 4 78, 491 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970). The Court explained further that the
48.
"standard is indispensable, for it 'impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a
subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue."' ld at 364 (internal citations omitted).
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of proof beyond a reasonable doubt upon the prosecution as a
49
"fundamental" or "cardinal principle."50 The government requires this
principle "to eliminate or minimize the chance that an innocent person
might be found guilty," given the grave consequences an erroneous guilty
verdict would have for the accused, the justice system, and for society
generally. 51 Furthermore, the presumption of innocence is a necessary
systemic feature of the adversarial trial. 52

R

Voluntariness, the Taking ofConfessions

The courts in both nations have long written eloquently of the need
to scrutinize carefully the taking of confessions by law enforcement
personnel. While Americans now routinely consider the validity of
confessions in light of the right to counsel and the privilege against selfincrimination, both systems historically evaluated confessions by the
traditional standard ofvoluntariness. 53 As the High Court has written:
The argument is that to be admissible evidence of a confession must be an
expression of the independent will of the confessionalist and, moreover,
must derive from the circumstances in which it is made that assurance of
trustworthiness which the law fmds in the improbability of a false
54
admission being made of incriminating facts.

U.S. judges also are concerned with whether the interrogated
suspect's "will has been overborne and his capacity for selfdetermination critically impaired."55 The government, in questioning the
accused, may not take any action which "breaks the will to conceal or lie
. . . [or] even break[ s] the will to stand by the truth." 56 Law enforcement
officials must perform interrogations in a way that induces only
voluntary statements from suspects; they must conduct themselves
'"consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."' 57

49. Envtl. Prot. Auth. v. Caltex Ref. Co. (1993) 178 C.L.R. 477, 527 (per Dawson, J.,
Deane, J., & Gaudron, J.).
50. Sorby v. Australia (1983) !52 C.L.R. 281,294.
51. Thompson v. The Queen ( 1989) 169 C.L.R. I, 12 (per Mason, C.J. & Dawson, J. ).
52. Envtl Prot Auth., 178 C.L.R. at 550 (per McHugh, J.) (noting that the presumption of
innocence was not necessary in an inquisitorial system).
53. See in/fa notes 286-302 and accompanying text.
54. Sinclair v. The King (1946) 73 C.L.R. 316, 334-35 (per Dixon, J.).
55. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,602 (1961).
56. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,60 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
57. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272
u.s. 312,316 (1926)).
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The voluntariness standard for admissible statements by criminal
defendants has created enormous difficulties in practice ranging from the
lack of precedential value of any one decision58 to the inconsistencies of
courts in making key decisions. 59 Moreover, it has been the subject of
sharp criticism in terms of its extremely narrow focus. 60 It remains,
however, the central standard zealously promoted and protected by both
Australian and American judges.

C

The Role ofthe Tn'al Judge

In a previous discussion, this Article posed whether there could be a
feature more essential to the criminal justice systems than the
presumption of innocence. If there is one, it might well be the role of the
trial judge. Unlike systems in which the judge has prosecutorial
61
responsibilities, or sits with lay people as part of a fact finding team,62
Australian and U.S. judges are viewed as true neutrals with no involvement in the charging process or the fact-determining body. 63
The language of the courts in both countries is remarkably similar
when describing the need to keep judges separate from the other
participants in the criminal justice system. The High Court of Australia
has determined that justice cannot be done where "the parties or the
58.
The point becomes clear when one reviews what is arguably the most important
United States Supreme Court decision on voluntariness. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
( 1959). There the Court struck down the admitted-and reliable-<:onfession but only after
pointing to not less than ten specific factors which supported the conclusion that the statement of
the defendant was not voluntary. Jd at 320-21.
59.
One of the most troublesome problems involves the use of deception by law
enforcement officers in connection with the interrogation. Some courts allow such lies relating to
statements of co-conspirators, possible eyewitnesses, and the general strength of the evidence
against the suspect. Other courts, however, are more concerned about such deceptions,
particularly if they relate to the process in which the defendant is involved (i.e., the crimes to be
charged, the possible sentence, etc.). The Supreme Court has given very little guidance on the
subject. See Welsh S. White, Confessions Induced by Broken Govemment Pronuses, 43 DUKE
L.J. 947, 952-56 (1994); Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28
CONN. L. REv. 425, 451-56 (1996).
60.
Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REv. 2195, 2195-2237
(1996).
In Argentina, for instance, the judge has various prosecutorial tasks such as
61.
conducting interrogation and making charging decisions. See Alejandro Carrio & Alejandro M.
Garro, Aigentina, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 3, 30-47 (Craig M. Bradley
ed., 1999).
62.
See, for example, China, where the judge sits with lay people as part of a fact finding
panel. "[The] lay assessors carrying out their duty have equal rights with judges, they together
decide the facts and apply the law." Liling Yue, China, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE
STUDY, supra note 61, at 81, 87.
63.
Here, of course, this Article refers to trials before a jury rather than to trials in which
the judge serves as fact fmder.
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public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that the judge might
not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the
matter."64 Accordingly, to preserve their neutrality, judges should not
express views about the cases in front of them outside of the courtroom.
Australian judges must never privately confer with the parties or any
other person with an interest in the case while the case is still pending.
Nor should judges direct the parties to present their case in any particular
manner. Judges may not adduce evidence by way of their own motion65
and must defer to the parties' strategic choices regarding the presentation
of their respective cases. 66
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held, in a similar
vein, that the judge in a criminal case must have no "interest in the
67
outcome of his particular case." The trial judge may not have an undue
connection to the prosecution of the case, 68 nor any sort of personal or
financial ties to the parties or witnesses. 69 Such improper connection or
tie "deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law,"70 for
the defendant is entitled to a "fair trial in a fair tribunal." 71
IY.

BUT OH THE DIFFERENCES

This Article will now turn to the aforementioned differences
between the two criminal justice systems. There are a number of sharp
contrasts.

A.

Search and Seizure

Central to any modem criminal justice system is the set of rules and
practices concerning government searches and seizures of citizens. In
this broad area there are considerable differences between Australia and
the United States. These differences are particularly vivid when one
evaluates separately the wide privacy considerations, and the remedies
for dealing with inappropriate government actions, identified by judges
in both countries.

64. Grassby v. The Queen (1989) 168 C.L.R. 1, 20 (per Dawson, J.).
65. The power to call witnesses should only be used in extreme cases to avoid a
miscarriage of justice. See The Queen v. Apostilides ( 1984) 154 C.L.R. 563.
66. Id at 575-77.
67. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899,905 (1997).
68. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974).
69. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
70. Id
71. Bracy, 520 U.S. at 904.
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Australia

A plethora of statutory provisions governs the regulation of search
and seizure in Australia. These provisions range from specific powers
applicable to particular criminal activities 72 or to a particular investigative
body, 73 to broad powers applicable whenever reasonable suspicion IS
aroused. 74
The statutory provisions generally grant powers rather than
protection and result from the common law of trespass that would
otherwise apply to render search and seizure unlawful. 75 Their raison
d'etre is thus to facilitate police investigation rather than to protect
individuals from undue interference. 76
Australia has no constitutional protection against unreasonable
search and seizure like the United States' Fourth Amendment. 77
Consequently, in Australia, the thematic tensions between the right to
privacy and responsible police investigation that dominate U.S.
jurisprudence are sublimated within a process of statutory interpretation.
The High Court premises such statutory interpretation on the idea that
unambiguous statutory language is required in order to abrogate common
72.
See Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Enforcement Act, 1995
(N.S.W); Unlawful Gambling Act, 1998 (N.S.W); Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act, 1966
(N.S.W); Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act, 1985 (N.S.W); Classification of Publications Act,
1991 (Queensl.); Classification of Films Act, 1991 (Queensl.); Classification of Computer Games
and Images Act, 1995 (Queensl.); Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act,
1995 (S. Austl.) (allowing search, warrant, and subsequent seizure for any offense suspected of
contravening the act); Controlled Substances Act, 1984 (S. Austl.) (authorizing search and seizure
of drugs); Firearms Act, 1977 (S. Austl.); Poisons Act, 1971 (Tas.); Firearms Act, 1996 (Tas.);
Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Enforcement Act, 1995 (Viet.);
Lotteries Gaming and Betting Act, 1966 (Viet.); Firearms Act, 1996 (Viet.); Fisheries Act, 1995
(Viet.) (allowing wide ranging powers for police or authorized offices to enter, search, and seize
objects in relation to the act); Betting Control Act, 1954 (W Austl.) (authorizing police to stop,
search, and seize anything in relation to betting); Misuse of Drugs Act, 1981 (W Austl. ); Firearms
Act, 1973 (W Austl.) (allowing police to obtain a warrant and search premises or to stop and
search vehicles). These statutes can all be located through the Australasian Legal Information
Institute, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/.
Eg., New South Wales Crime Commission Act, 1985, § 11 (N.S.W); Health Act,
73.
1937 (Queensl.).
74.
Eg, Police Powers and Responsibilities Act, 2000, §§ 19, 28-29 (Queensl.);
Summary Offences Act, 1953, § 67 (S. Austl.); Police Offences Act, 1935, §§57, 60 (Tas.); Police
Act, 1892, § 49 (W Austl.).
See Plenty v. Dillon (1991) 171 C.L.R. 635, 644; Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 E.R.
75.
807; Semayne v. Gresham (1604) 77 E.R. 194. However, note that the use of sniffer dogs does
not constitute an unlawful trespass. Consequently, no statutory power is required to permit sniffer
dogs to seek the scent of contraband. Question of Law Reserved [No. 5] (1998) 71 S.A. St. R.
222.
76.
SeeGeorgev.Rockett(l990) 170C.L.R.l04, 110.
77.
U.S. CONST. amend. IY.
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law rights to freedom from interference to property and person (provided
78
the legislature's intention to do so is clear). The Court's role largely is
confined to determining whether the investigative activity at issue falls
within the scope of the relevant statutory provision.
Nonetheless, the courts tend to read strictly the statutory provisions
authorizing search and seizure79 so that activity falling outside the scope
of the provisions will be regarded as unlawful, enlivening the discretion
to exclude evidence illegally or improperly obtained. 80
Compared to their approach to the statutory regulation of
interrogation, Australian courts take a fairly pedantic view of the
provisions regulating search and seizure. Thus, the common law tenet
that "a man's home is his castle" appears to have a stronger resonance in
Australian jurisprudence then concerns regarding overzealous police
activity during interrogation.
Depending on context and jurisdiction, searches may be undertaken
without a specific warrant. For example, in South Australia and
Queensland, police have a general power to search persons and vehicles
when they have a reasonable suspicion that they will find evidence of a
criminal offense. 8 ' Statutes in other jurisdictions permit the search of
persons and premises without a warrant following arrest on the basis that
arrest requires police to have a reasonable suspicion of participation in a
criminal offense. 82
However, these general powers fall short of authorizing Australian
law enforcement officials to stop, search, and seize on any pretext. 83
Coleman v. Zanker is a typical example of the court's strict approach to
78.
The High Court has expressed the view that fundamental rights to privacy and other
civil liberties should not be abrogated without clear statutory language. Coco v. The Queen
(1994) 179 C.L.R. 427, 437-38. Carbone v. Police confirmed the constitutional validity of
general powers of search and seizure. Carbone v. Police (1997) 68 S.A. S.R. 200.
79.
Eg., R. v. Turner (2001) 161 F.L.R. 451; Cassaniti v. Croucher (2000) 48 N.S.WL.R.
623; R. v. EID (1999) 46 N.S.WL.R. 116; Fernando v. Conun'r of Police (1995) 36 N.S.WL.R.
567; Swanevelder v. Holmes (1990) 52 S.A. S.R. 549; Esso Austl. Ltd. v. Curran (1989) 38 A.
Crim. R. 157.
80.
See Bunning v. Cross (1978) 141 C.L.R. 54, 64.
81.
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act, 2000, §§ 27-30 (Queensl.); Sununary
Offences Act, 1953, § 68 (S. Austl.); see also Henry Aizen & Rad Saunders, Search Wammts: A
Practical Guide, 9 LAW lNST. J., 48, 49-50 (2000) (containing a list of twenty-four statutory
provisions that permit searches without warrant in the state ofVictoria).
82.
Crimes Act, 1900, § 353A (N.S.W); Criminal Code, 1985, § 712 (W Austl.); Police
Offences Act, 1935, § 58B (Tas.).
83.
See, e.g., R. v. Hudson (1996) 189 L.S.J.S. 522; R. v. Prinz No 1 (2002) 223 L.S.J.S.
299; R. v. Gibson (2000) S.A. Dist. Ct. 80; R. v. Davidson (1991) 54 S.A. St. R. 580. Note that
where police act pursuant to both specific and general statutory powers of search and seizure, the
provisions are to be read together and the use of a specific power does not exclude reliance on the
more general power. See also Gibson v. Ellis (1992) 40 S.A. St. R. 420, 425.
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the requirement of "reasonable suspicion."84 In that case police
approached two men on a street late at night who were in a vehicle. 85 The
police told the defendant, at the time seated inside the vehicle, to get out
of the vehicle.86 As the defendant was alighting the vehicle, one of the
police officers shone her torch into the vehicle and claimed to see a
knife. 87 The police then physically searched the vehicle and produced the
knife. 88 Subsequently, the defendant was charged with and convicted of
carrying an offensive weapon. 89 The defendant appealed to the South
Australian Supreme Court. 90 The appellate judge found that both the
police officer's demand that the defendant leave the vehicle and the
examination of the vehicle by torchlight were unlawful. 9 ' The Court
reasoned that the police officer concerned had no basis for suspecting
that the defendant committed a crime nor did she have any evidence of
the commission of a crime by the defendant other than the fact that he
was in the company of another man and they were on the street late at
nighe2 As a result, the appellate judge found that the evidence of the
knife should have been excluded and quashed the defendant's
conviction. 93
Where there is no general power of search and seizure, a search
warrant authorizing police or other investigative authorities will have to
be issued under Australian law. 94 Magistrates or justices usually issue
warrants. 95 There must be reasonable grounds for believing or suspecting
that the premises or the person to be searched will contain evidence of an

84. Coleman v. Zanker (1991) 58 S.A. St. R. 7.
85. Id
86. Id
87. Jd at 10.
88.
Jd
89. Id at 8.
90.
Id
91.
Id at 15.
92. Jd at 17-18.
93. Jd
94.
Seeid
95. Eg., Crimes Act, 1914, § 3C (Austl.); Search Warrants Act, 1985, § 5 (N.S.W);
Search Warrants Act, 1997, § 5 (Tas.); Police Regulation Act, 1958, § lOOA (Viet.); Criminal
Code, 1985, § 711 (W Austl.); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act, 2000, § 68 (Queens!.)
(stating that where there is structural damage to a building, the warrant must be authorized by a
Supreme Court Justice). The issue of a warrant is regarded as an administrative rather than a
judicial act, and consequently is subject to judicial review. Ousley v. The Queen (1997) 192
C.L.R. 69. The validity of a search warrant may also be challenged collaterally on a voir dire
inquiry during criminal proceedings. See Love v. Attorney-Gen. for N.S.W (1990) 169 C.L.R.
307, 322-23; Coco v. The Queen (1994) 179 C.L.R. 427, 444; Ousley, 192 C.L.R. at 1554-46.
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offense sufficient to justify the issue of the warrane6 Often an applicant
must provide an affidavit setting out the factual details giving rise to the
requisite state of mind in order to satisfy this requiremene'
Exclusion of evidence obtained by way of an illegal search and
seizure remains at the discretion of the court. In exercising this
discretion, the trial judge is required to balance the need to convict the
guilty against the need to condemn police misconduct. Relevant factors
in the balancing exercise include: 98
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

99

Seriousness of the crime
00
Deliberateness of the police miscondud
Relationship between the illegality and the cogency of the
evidence 101
The ease with which evidence could have been obtained if
police had complied with the law
The policy underlying the relevant regulation102

In a recent empirical study of the power to exclude illegally or
improperly obtained evidence, Bram Pressor concluded that Australian
96.
Eg., Crimes Act, 1914, § 3E (Austl.); Search Warrants Act, 1985, § 6 (N.S.W.);
Police Powers and Responsibilities Act, 2000, § 69 (Queens!.); Search Warrants Act, 1997, § 5
(Tas.); Police Regulation Act, 1958, § IOOA (Viet.); Criminal Code, 1985, § 711 (W. Austl.). This
requires the "existence of facts which are sufficient to induce that state of mind in a reasonable
person." George v. Rockett (1990) 170 C.L.R. 104, 112. However, absent sufficient evidence
before the court to demonstrate that the beliefs held were not reasonable, the warrant is presumed
to be valid. Ousley 192 C.L.R. at 1554-56; Carroll v. Attorney-Gen. for N.S.W. (1993) 70 A.
Crim. R. 162.
97.
This will require more than vague references to information received from
anonymous informants. If the information received forms the basis for a reasonable belief or
suspicion, the affidavit should refer to the underlying facts that caused the police officer to
conclude that the information was reliable. See KEITH TRONC ET AL., SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND231-33 (1996); seealsoR. v. Macleod (1991) 61 A. Crim. R. 465;
El-Zarw v. Nikola, Ex parte El-Zarw (1992) I Q.R. 145. Some statutory provisions allow for
emergency telephone applications for warrants, e.g., Search Warrants Act, 1985, § 12 (N.S.W.).
However, these are exceptional and reserved for urgent cases. See Comm'r of Police v. Atkinson
(1991) 23 N.S.W.L.R. 495.
98. These factors are relevant both at common law and pursuant to jurisdictions which
apply the Evidence Act, 1995 (Austl.), i.e., federal courts, New South Wales courts, Australia
Capital Territory courts, and Tasmanian courts. Evidence Act, 1995, § 138 (Austl.).
99. The more serious the crime, the less inclined the court is to exclude illegally obtained
evidence. SeeR. v. Macleod (1991) 61 A. Crim. R. 465, 477; R. v. Addabbo (1982) 33 S.A. St.
R. 84, 98.
I 00. If police have made an innocent mistake in interpreting the breadth of their powers,
the less inclined the court will be toward excluding the illegally obtained evidence. R. v. Nicholas
(2000) I V.R. 356. Conversely, deliberate disregard of statutory rights will more likely lead to
exclusion. R. v. Wilson (1987) 47 S.A. St. R. 287; Pollard v. R. (1992) 110 A.L.R. 385.
101. SeeR. v. Olejarnik(l994) 72A. Crim. R. 542.
l 02. See Edelsten v. Investigating Comm. ofN.S.W. (1986) 7 N.S.W.L.R. 222.

TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP LAW

42

[Vol. 12

judges were generally reluctant to exercise their exclusionary powers
following a finding that evidence had been illegally or improperly
obtained. 103 Pressor found that this reluctance was especially acute in
drug related and serious criminal cases.' 04 R. v. Daley illustrates these
views. 105 Daley involved illegally obtained DNA evidence that linked the
defendant with several rapes. '06 The police pulled over the defendant,
who had already been identified as a suspect for the rapes ostensibly for
the purpose of random breath testing. 107 Under the ruse of pursuing the
matter that the defendant's vehicle was unregistered and uninsured, the
police arrested the defendant and drove him to a local police station
where he performed a breath analysis test. 108 The officers obtained a
sample of the defendant's DNA from the container used to perform the
breath test. 109 The sample yielded a positive link to the rapes and led to
further investigations. 110 The court, however, found that the police had
not acted improperly when using their power to stop drivers and
undertake random breath testing for the extraneous purpose of obtaining
evidence against the defendant.''' Further the court held that even if the
police had acted improperly, the evidence from the breath test should not
be excluded for the following reasons:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

the defendant was in fact guilty of the offenses for which he was
arrested and detained;
the police had reason to believe that there was a danger that he would
attack again;
there was nothing in the manner in which the evidence was obtained
that was likely to affect its cogency adversely;
there was only minimal personal intrusion involved in obtaining the
sample; and
the evidence to be obtained was such that it was likely to conftrm
police suspicions and justifY an arrest on the major charges, or to
112
eliminate the accused from the enquiry.

103.
Discretion
(2001).
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Bram Presser, Public Policy, Police Interest: A Re-Evaluation of the Judicial
to Exclude Improperly or Jllegally Obtained EVIdence, 25 MELB. U. L. REv. 757, 777

Id
SeeR. v. Daley (2001) N.S.W:S.C. 1211.
Id para. 114.
/dpara.94.
Id
Id
Id paras. 95-103.
Id para. 112.
Id para. 118.
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Australian courts have stopped short of adopting the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine applied by their U.S. counterparts.'' 3 Australian
courts require a direct relationship between the illegal or improper
conduct and the evidence adduced to justify its exclusion from the
court. 114 However, there is some overlap between the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine and the discretion to exclude confessional
evidence for unfairness, especially where the search and seizure was
accompanied by an unlawful arrest.'' 5
Thus, although Australian courts tend to strictly read search and
seizure statutes, they often fail to exclude evidence from a criminal trial
that breaches the scope of those provisions.'' 6 This reflects a pragmatic
view that police investigation should not be unduly restricted if it
produces appropriate outcomes. Therefore, Australia gives priority to the
need to maintain law and order over individual rights to privacy.
2.

United States

Over the past forty years, American judges have been far more
sensitive to concerns regarding invasions of privacy by physical intrusion
than at any other time in the history of American jurisprudence. A few
illustrations make the point clearly. Most famous, perhaps, is the
litigation surrounding stop and fiisk" 7 This concept refers to the
situation in which police officers, normally on routine patrol and without
prior warning, come across individuals engaging in suspicious behavior,
but behavior which is not sufficiently troubling to justify arrest.'' 8
Terry v. Ohio is the case in which the United States Supreme Court
dealt directly with the government's contention that actions by law
enforcement which were less intrusive than an arrest simply did not raise
issues under the Fourth Amendment's "right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures."" 9 In Terry, the police officer observed three men engaged
in suspicious behavior; they appeared to be "casing" a store after hours,
113. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433,445-46 (1974); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
114. See Question of Law Reserved [No 1] (1998) 70 S.A. St. R. 281.
115. See F.E. Devine, American Exclusion of UnlawfUlly Obtained Evidence with
Australian Companson, 13 CRJM. L.J., 188, 196 (1989) (citing Director of Prosecutions
Reference [No 1] (1984) Y.R. 727; R. v. Tilev (1983) 33 S.A. St. R. 334; R. v. Lavery (1979) 20
S.A. St. R. 430; McDermott v. R. (1948) 76 C.L.R. 501).
116. See supmnotes 104-113 and accompanying text.
117. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ( 1968).
118. See icl.
119. Tcny, 392 U.S. at 9; U.S. CONST. amend. IY.
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presumably to engage in some sort of break-in. 120 The officer stopped
and questioned the subjects; when they did not give a sensible answer, he
patted them down, felt a weapon, and took out the illegally concealed
pistol. 121
The defendants moved to suppress the pistol and asserted that their
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated because at the time of the
122
stop there was no warrant and no probable cause to stop them.
In
response, the government argued that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply to such limited actions by the officer. 123 The Court dealt harshly
with this argument:
It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual
and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person. And it
is nothing less than sheer torture of the English language to suggest that a
careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his
or her body in an attempt to f"md weapons is not a "search." Moreover, it is
simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a
policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his
hands raised, is a "petty indignity." It is a serious intrusion upon the
sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong
124
resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.

Recognizing the privacy values at the heart of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court fashioned a balancing test which would preserve
the privacy of the individual, yet allow for responsible and safe police
investigation. 125 As long as the intrusion of the suspect was limited to a
stop and a pat down of his outer garments for purposes of discovering
weapons, 126 officers could conduct the frisk without a warrant, based on
an individualized reasonable suspicion, which could be less than
probable cause. 127
The Court's less celebrated opinion, Arizona v. Hicks, 128
demonstrates this sensitivity to privacy concerns. Earlier decisions had
120. The suspects made "roughly a dozen trips" walking up and back in front of the store.
Teny, 392 U.S. at 6.

121. Idat6-7.
122. ld at 8.
123. ld at 16.
124. /dat16-17.
125. ldat30.
126. The courts take the limitation of a pat-down seriously. It is not to be a full blown
search: the suspects cannot be ordered to empty their pockets and the officers cannot scrounge
though bags. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1993). Indeed, the limitation does
not even permit the officers to manipulate contents inside pockets by moving their fmgers on the
outside of the clothing. ld at 379-80 (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. Teny, 392 U.S. at 20-22,27, 30-31.
128. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
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held that officers conducting a valid search could seize clearly illegal
goods found openly-in plain view-during the lawful scope of that
search. 129 The officers in Hicks, while properly executing a valid search
warrant, came upon two sets of expensive stereo components which
seemed out of place in, as Justice Scalia wrote, "the squalid and
otherwise ill-appointed four-room apartment." 130 In order to determine if
the equipment was stolen, one officer moved some of the components to
read the serial number; upon phoning in the number, he was advised that
the equipment was stolen. 131 The officer seized the component and
arrested the defendant. 132 The dissenting Justices dismissed the defense's
view that the movement of the stereo was an improper invasion of
privacy. 133 Calling the action here "a cursory inspection" and not a "fullblown search of evidence," they found no impropriety in the officers'
actions. 134
The majority in Hicks strongly disagreed. 135 They made clear that
officers, even when executing a valid warrant, may not move private,
personal property unrelated to the warrant, for such action
produce[d] a new invasion of ... privacy unjustified by [any] exigent
circumstance. . . . [T]he "distinction between 'looking' at a suspicious
object in plain view and 'moving' it even a few inches" is much more than
trivial for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. It matters not that the
search uncovered nothing of any great personal value to [the suspect]serial numbers rather than (what might conceivably have been hidden
behind or under the equipment) letters or photographs. A search is a
search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a
136
turntable.

Hicks and Terry are not the only cases that recognize substantial
privacy interests that do not necessarily yield to otherwise legitimate
concerns of effective law enforcement, even in cases in which the
intrusion on privacy is minimal. 137 Courts in the United States do screen
129. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
130. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323.
131. Id
132. Jd
133. Jd at 325.
134. Jd at 335 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
135. Id at 325.
136. Id
137. One could, for instance, also discuss the following decisions to support the notion of
the United States Supreme Court's willingness to recognize strong privacy interests in this area:
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (holding defendant may challenge truthfulness of
statements in affidavit relied upon in issuing warrant); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985)
(fmding state cannot compel minor surgery of suspect in order to retrieve evidence); Dunaway v.
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and carefully consider privacy interests, and it may fairly be said that they
are loathe to intrude upon them. Still, it is wise to remember that the
U.S. courts are not always so considerate in recognizing these interests
and not nearly so abrupt in acknowledging concerns of the law
enforcement community.
a.

The Drug War

In recent years especially, U.S. courts have been extremely
solicitous of the executive branch in terms of construing the Constitution
to allow ever more intense battles in the drug war. 138 One of the most
striking examples is the "fly-over" case, CalifOmia v. Ciraolo. 139 Here,
government officers, responding to an anonymous phone tip about
marijuana growing in the defendant's backyard, sought to observe
activities in the yard, but a fence that completely enclosed the yard
thwarted their efforts. 140 Undaunted, the officers secured a private plane
and flew over the house at an altitude of 1000 feet. 141 The officers
"readily identified marijuana plants 8 feet to 10 feet in height growing
. . . in [the] yard" and photographed the property. 142 The defendant
contended that he had an expectation of privacy in his backyard and that
the officers needed to secure a search warrant before looking into the
yard from above. 143 The Supreme Court disagreed, for "[a]ny member of
the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen
everything that these officers observed . . . . [The defendant's]
expectation that his garden was protected from such observation is
unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is prepared to
honor." 144
New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (questioning of suspect at police station must be based on
probable cause); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (holding officers must generally
knock and announce their intentions before executing a search warrant); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S.
266 (2000) (ruling an anonymous tip, by itself, insufficient to justifY stop and frisk).
138. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 601 (1991) (Stevens, J. & Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (stating no warrant needed for search of package in car). The dissenting Justices
complained about this approach. "No impartial observer could criticize this Court for hindering
the progress of the war on drugs. On the contrary, decisions like the one the Court makes today
will support the conclusion that this Court has become a loyal foot soldier in the Executive's fight
against crime." Id at 601.
139. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
140. Id at 208-09.
141. Id
142. Id at 209.
143. /dat211.
144. Id at 213-14. The Court reaflmned the decision in Florida v. Riley. Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989) (allowing surveillance, without a warrant, by use of a helicopter
hovering 400 feet above the defendant's property).
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Organized Crime

One especially useful tool to combat organized crime has been the
"planted informer," the undercover individual sent in to gather evidence
against a crime figure including the individual's own incriminating
statements. Because the activity normally takes place prior to any formal
charge, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply. 145 The key
question, then, is whether the Fourth Amendment search and seizure
provision requires warrant authorization, especially when the suspected
person has been "targeted" by the government. 146
Utilizing an assumption of the risk sort of argument, the Supreme
Court has consistently rejected the defense's Fourth Amendment
147
contention.
In the famous Jimmy Hoffa case, an undercover agent
visited Hoffa on several occasions and reported Hoffa's statements to
federal agents. 148 He later testified against Hoffa at the trial. 149 The Court
affirmed the government's conduct, noting that "[n]either this Court nor
any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth
Amendment protects a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to
150
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it." The
Court later extended its ruling to include recorded conversations between
151
the accused and a government agent.
c.

Drunk Driving

In recognition of the extremely serious problems Americans face
with accidents and deaths caused by intoxicated drivers, U.S. courts have
made accommodations for law enforcement as to stopping and testing

145. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
146. Of course, other legal issues may also apply, such as the entrapment defense if the
agent becomes too entwined in the creation or functioning of the criminal enterprise. See in/Ta
notes 340-354 and accompanying text.
14 7. The assumption of the risk doctrine is standard in the law of torts. As explained by
the court in Frey v. Harley Davidson, 734 A.2d I, 6, II n.8 (Pa. Super. 1999):
A plaintiff has voluntarily assumed the risk where he fully understands it and
voluntarily chooses to encounter it.
... The same policy of the common law which denies recovery to one who
expressly consents to accept a risk will, however, prevent his recovery in such a case.
ld (quoting Childers v. Power Line Equip. Rentals, Inc., 681 A.2d 201,208 (Pa. 1996)).
148. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,296 (1966).
149. Jd
150. Jd at 302.
151. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). The recording in this case took
place on radio equipment concealed on the agent and then transmitted to officers. Jd at 747.
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drivers on the open road. 152 Officers do not need a warrant nor have
formed any level of suspicion prior to the stop. 153 There are limitations on
the officer's discretion. The stops must be done randomly, the stops must
be limited to intoxication bases, and the intrusions must normally be
narrow in time and scope. 154
d.

Searches ofPublic School Children

Considering the growing concerns for the safety of children in
public schools, it is surprising that the Supreme Court has spoken only
once, almost twenty years ago, about searches in such settings. 155 In New
Jersey v. T.L. 0, a school administrator searched a student without a
warrant and with an individualized suspicion that fell below the standard
of probable cause. 156 He found marijuana in the student's purse, and the
prosecution subsequently used this marijuana in the criminal case against
the student. 157 The student claimed that without a warrant, and certainly
without probable cause, the school administrator had violated her
constitutional rights. 158 Once again, the Supreme Court sided with the
govemment. 159 The Court's view was that schools are different from the
usual criminal justice setting, hence a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment should also be different. 160 The Court mandated only a
showing of reasonable suspicion and allowed the warrantless search, the
seizure of the marijuana, and its use in a criminal proceeding unrelated to
the school rules. 161
152. No one can dispute the magnitude of the drunk driving problem or the states' interest
in eradicating it. Media reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation on the nation's roads are
legion. The statistics conftrm this: '"Drunk drivers cause an annual death toll of over 25,000 ...
and in the same time span cause nearly one million personal injuries and more than ftve billion
dollars in property damage."' Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990)
(quoting 4 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON TIIE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ l0.8(d)(2ded. 1987)).
153. Seeid at450-5l.
154. See1d
15 5. This only refers to activities directly related to the functioning of the criminal justice
system, evidence which will be used in criminal prosecutions. It excludes, for instance, the drug
testing of students.
156. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 325 (1985).
157. Id
158. Id
159. Id at 326.
160. Id
161. The reasonable suspicion standard is taken from the earlier Terry stop and frisk
decision. T.L. 0, 469 U.S. at 341 (citing Teny, 392 U.S. at 20); see also supra notes 119-127 and
accompanying text. The Court in T.L.O goes on to state that
[t]he warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the school environment ....
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Plain View Doctrine

The notion of a plain view exception to the warrant and probable
cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment appears to express nothing
more than a common sense reading of the values expressed by the
founders of the United States in the Bill of Rights. After all, if an officer
stumbles across and simply observes incriminating evidence that is
clearly uncovered and in plain view, no reasonable expectation of privacy
would be violated by having the officer testify to what she has seen or, in
some circumstances, has seized. 162 The difficulty, however, relates to the
manner in which the doctrine is construed to apply to an officer who
"stumbles" across the evidence. 163 Suppose that the officer does not
"inadvertently" come across the evidence. Rather, the officer knows that
she may encounter the evidence while conducting a lawful search
directed for other evidence.
This problem normally arises when officers properly executing a
search warrant come upon illegal contraband in plain view. The officers
knew earlier of the contraband (or at least strongly suspected it), but they
did not mention it in the warrant request. In such a situation, the Court
has held, the item could be validly seized and ultimately introduced into
evidence at the defendant's criminal trial. 164 The Court reasoned that
"even though inadvertence is a characteristic of most legitimate 'plain
view' seizures, it is not a necessary condition." 165
f.

Consent

It has always been the rule in the United States that individuals can

give up constitutional rights through consent and/or waiver. 166
Defendants often dispense with the rights to counsel, jury trial, appeal,
and speedy trial, along with the central privilege against self. . . [T]he legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search ....
. . . [S]uch a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted
are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.
T.L.O, 469 U.S. at 340-42.
162. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323-25 (1987); supra notes 128-136 and
accompanying text.
163. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 323-25.
164. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
165. Id at 130.
166. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1962) (relating to consent to
search); Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942) (relating to waiver of jury
trial).
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incrimination on a regular basis. If the right is the individual's, then it is
the individual's decision whether to exercise or relinquish that right, as
long as he does so voluntarily, without hint of coercion or confusion. 167
Therefore, if waiver is permissible for these legal guarantees, it is not
surprising that waiver is also permissible for the search warrant
requirement. With some of these rights, however, before the court will
consider the relinquishment to be valid, the individual must carefully be
advised of the nature of the right so that the decision can be judged as
both voluntary and measured. 168 The question remaining under the
Fourth Amendment is whether an officer must also give such advice or
warnmg.
In contrast to the required warnings for other rights, an officer
conducting a search is not obliged to advise the suspect of the right to
refuse the request for a search. 169 While the trial judge may consider the
failure to advise and the suspect's lack of knowledge in determining
whether the defendant voluntarily gave the consent, it is fair to say that
judges routinely make findings of voluntariness when the suspect has
been told nothing of her constitutional rights. 170 The Supreme Court has
stressed this point.
While knowledge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken
into account, the government need not establish such knowledge as the sine
qua non of an effective consent.
[I]t would be thoroughly impractical to impose on the normal consent
171
search the detailed requirements of an effective warning.
167. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979) (relating to waiver of the right
to counsel).
168. With the right to counsel at trial, the trial judge must inform the defendant, on the
record, of the right to proceed with an attorney and further advise of the risks present with going
forward pro se. See People v. Klessig, 564 N. W 2d 716 (Wis. 1997). A guilty plea, which gives
up the opportunity for a public trial, will only be valid if the defendant appears before the trial
judge and discusses the ramifications of the plea. A detailed mandate found in Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 402 requires the defendant to be informed of the nature of the charge, the minimum
and maximum sentences prescribed by law, the fact that the defendant has the right to plead not
guilty and if she does there will not be any sort of trial. 36 Ill. 2d R. 402. Moreover, all this
information, including any plea agreement, must be laid out in open court on a public record. See
Klessing, 564 N.W2d at 716. And, of course, under Miranda, the privilege against selfincrimination can only be satisfied with a suspect in custody responding to interrogation if that
person has been given the standard four warnings. See 1d; see also in/fa notes 296-302 and
accompanying text.
169. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (holding officers conducting search
need not tell bus occupants that they may choose not to cooperate).
170. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,227,231 (1973).
I 71. ld The position was reatYrrmed in United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 194. It is
difficult to understand the Court's reference in this case to the "detailed requirements of an
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A Pause

While we recognize the Supreme Court's willingness to defer to law
enforcement, we hardly mean to suggest that U.S. courts have been
willing to relinquish their watch dog role. Let us now look to the types of
cases discussed above in terms of the privacy considerations.
Regarding the drug war jurisprudence, while the Court has certainly
accepted the government's requests for broad search authority in many
cases, one certainly does not find this in all cases. For instance, in a
major setback to the drug war push by federal authorities, the Court
recently rebuked efforts to utilize sense enhancing technology to inspect
the interior of a house, without prior judicial authorization. 172 In Kyllo v.
Um'ted States, the Court struck down the warrantless use of a thermal
imaging device on the defendant's house to detect the presence of high
intensity lamps commonly used to grow marijuana. 173 The Court noted:
It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens
by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology. For example, ... the technology enabling human flight has
exposed to public view (and hence, we have said, to official observation)
uncovered portions of the house and its curtilage that once were private.
The question we confront today is what limits there are upon this power of
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.

The Government maintains, however, that the thermal imaging must
be upheld because it detected "only heat radiating from the external surface
of the house," . . . . The dissent ... contend[ s] that there is a fundamental
difference between what it calls "off-the-wall" observations and "throughthe-wall surveillance." But just as a thermal imager captures only heat
emanating from a house, so also a powerful directional microphone picks
up only sound emanating from a house-and a satellite capable of
scanning from many miles away would pick up only visible light
emanating from a house. We rejected such a mechanical interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment in Katz, where the eavesdropping device picked up
only sound waves that reached the exterior of the phone booth. Reversing
that approach would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing
technology-including imaging technology that could discern all human
activity in the home. While the technology used in the present case was

effective warning." Id Presumably, in all but the most unusual cases, an adequate warning would
entail a speech such as: We would like your permission to search your car/house/bag, but you do
not have to give your permission. You can say no and make us get a warrant, and your refusal to
give permission cannot be used against you.
172. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
173. Seeid

52

TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP. LAW

[Vol. 12

relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated
systems that are already in use or in development. 174

Similarly, in terms of the judicial decisions supporting government
actions to combat organized crime, it is true that undercover agents have
been provided great weapons such as "false friends" questioning as seen
in the Hoffa case. 175 However, the Supreme Court's famous Massiah v.
United States decision stands as a reminder that there are clear limits on
the use of these great weapons. 176 In Massiah, the police had formally
charged the defendant with a crime, but he was no longer in custody,
having been released on bail. 177 The police brought in an undercover
agent to befriend the defendant and to elicit incriminating statements
from him. 178 During the course of a lengthy and seemingly friendly
conversation between the two, the defendant made the anticipated
incriminating statements. 179 The Court would not allow the statements to
be admitted into evidence, holding that the actions of the government
180
violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Once that
right has attached, the majority wrote, '"it must apply to indirect and
surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse.
In this case, Massiah was more seriously imposed upon ... because he
did not even know that he was under interrogation by a government
agent."'Isi
The drunk driving roadblocks allowed in the United States
demonstrate both the latitude given to the government to deal with a
serious societal ill and also the care exercised by U.S. judges when
examining privacy claims. That is, the courts allow truly random
roadblocks for the purpose of detecting drunk drivers and thus curbing
highway carnage, without any individualized suspicion or judicial
authorization as they must in order to succeed. 182 Once the government

174. Id at 33-36 (internal citations omitted).
175. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); see also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S.
292 (1990) (imposing a limitation on the Miranda mandate in the jail cell setting where the
defendant is not aware that the cellmate asking questions actually works for the police). In
Perkins, however, the police had not yet formally charged the defendant, as they had the
defendant in Massiah v. Umted States. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 496; Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201 (1964).
176. Mass1ah, 377 U.S. at 201.
177. Id
178. Id
179. Id
180. Id at 206.
181. Id (quoting United States v. Massiah, 307 F.2d 62, 72-73 (N.Y. 1962) (Hays, J.,
dissenting)).
182. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,450-51 (1990).
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strays beyond these boundaries, however, the judicial reception has been
chilly. An example of this is Delaware v. Prouse, where officers made
stops for the purpose of checking drivers' licenses and automobile
183
registrations.
With no individualized suspicion, and no limits on the
officers' ability to make the stops, 184 the Supreme Court concluded that
the actions of the government violated the Fourth Amendment, for
citizens are not "shorn of [privacy] interests when they step from the
sidewalks into their automobiles." 185 The Court reached a similar
conclusion in Indianapolis v. Edmond, where the discretion of the
officers was narrow, but the goal of the roadblock was not only to check
for intoxicated drivers, but also included the seizure of evidence in
narcotics crimes. 186
It is unquestionable that the Supreme Court does not require
rigorous Fourth Amendment protections for searches of public school
children conducted in an education setting. 187 As noted earlier, neither
warrant nor probable cause is required for searches within schools. 188
Nevertheless, while American courts have broadly construed the
constitutional requirements as to other privacy intrusions in the school

183. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
184. In this case the officers did not select vehicles to stop wholly at random, nor did they
conduct a true roadblock where every car or every set number of cars were stopped. Id at 663.
185. Id
186. Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). The Court wrote:
[T]he Indianapolis checkpoint program unquestionably has the primary purpose of
interdicting illegal narcotics. In their stipulation of facts, the parties repeatedly refer to
the checkpoints as "drug checkpoints" and describe them as "being operated by the
City of Indianapolis in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs in Indianapolis."
We have never approved a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to
detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Rather, our checkpoint cases have
recognized only limited exceptions to the general rule that a seizure must be
accompanied by some measure of individualized suspicion. We suggested in Prouse
that we would not credit the "general interest in crime control" as justification for a
regime of suspicionless stops. Consistent with this suggestion, each of the checkpoint
programs that we have approved was designed primarily to serve purposes closely
related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway
safety. Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program
is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the
Fourth Amendment.
ld at 40-42 (internal citations omitted). But see Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004) where
police set up check point to obtain information about an earlier accident. Distinguishing case
from Edmond, the Court allowed the procedure. Id
187. See discussion mtm Part IY.C.2.
188. See New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985); supra note 161 and accompanying
text.
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environment, 189 they have never retreated from the view stated earlier: an
individualized suspicion must be shown to justify a search for evidence
of a crime, and the Fourth Amendment-along with the exclusionary
rule-applies to a search of a minor. 190
The courts have applied the plain view doctrine in an expansive
fashion, particularly showing reluctance to impose any sort of
inadvertent discovery requirement, as noted above. 191 Again, however,
the U.S. judges have been careful to draw particular lines over which law
enforcement cannot cross. One example is the recent case of Bond v.
United States, in which the government argued for a "plain feel"
exception to the Fourth Amendment requirements. 192 In Bond, a border
patrol agent boarded a bus to check the immigration status of its
passengers. 193 After reaching the back of the bus, and deciding that the
passengers were lawfully in the United States, the agent began walking
toward the front. 194 Along the way, he squeezed the soft luggage that
passengers had placed in the overhead storage space above the seats. 195
When the agent inspected the luggage in the compartment above Bond's
seat, he squeezed a green canvas bag and felt a "brick-like" object. 196
Bond admitted that the bag was his and consented to the agent opening
it. 197 In the bag, the agent found a "brick" of methamphetamine wrapped
198
in duct tape rolled into a pair of pants.
The government argued that there was no real invasion of privacy
because the bus aisle was open to the public, the luggage was in full view
of all passengers, and the squeezing of the bag was at most a minimal
intrusion. 199 The majority of the Supreme Court disagreed:
When a bus passenger places a bag in an overhead bin, he expects that
other passengers or bus employees may move it for one reason or another.
Thus, a bus passenger clearly expects that his bag may be handled. He
does not expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of
course, feel the bag in an exploratory manner. But this is exactly what the
189. As in the drug testing of students who participate in after school programs. See
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 ( 1995).
190. See, e.g., M.S. v. Florida, 808 So. 2d 1263, 1264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); People in
Interest ofP.E.A., 754 P.2d 382, 387 (Colo. 1988).
191. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
192. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000).
193. /dat335.
194. Id
195. ld
196. !d at 336.
197. !d
198. !d
199. /dat337.
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agent did here. We therefore hold that the agent's physical manipulation of
200
petitioner's bag violated the Fourth Amendment.

The body of judicial decisions regarding consent to searches and
seizures serves as a good illustration of how U.S. courts have gone quite
a distance in order to accommodate the desires of law enforcement, while
at the same time trying to protect privacy concems. 201 Critics of the
jurisprudence fault the Supreme Court for allowing consent to stand
without evidence that the defendant had been warned of the right to
refuse permission to search, or without a showing that the defendant was
even aware of this righe 02 Even these critics, however, note that the
Court has emphasized that consent must not result from coercion, and
that false police statements about the predicate for the search can serve as
the basis for a successful Fourth Amendment challenge. 203 Moreover, to
answer the question of whether consent was voluntary, courts must look
to all the surrounding circumstances204 to insure that consent was not "the
product of official intimidation or harassment [for such agreement] is not
consent at all. Citizens do not forfeit their constitutional rights when they
are coerced to comply with a request that they would prefer to refuse." 205

B.

Exclusion ofEvidence

The contrast between the Australian and United States criminal
justice systems could not be more pronounced than with respect to
remedies for illegal searches conducted by law enforcement officials.
Simply stated, Australian judges, as noted above, are reluctant to exercise
their discretion to exclude evidence found in such searches. 206 The
evidence rules direct American judges to exclude evidence in a wide

200. Id at 338-39.
201. See discussion inffa Part IVA.2.f.
202. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: Consent, Care,
Pn"vacy, and Social Meaning, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKE 1. GENDER L. & PoL'Y I,
11-13 (2002).
203. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968). In this case, the officers
advised the home owner that they had a warrant to search the house. Upon hearing this, the
owner then consented to the search. Id at 546-4 7. In fact, the officers never showed a warrant
and the court never entered one into the record. Id The Supreme Court found that the consent
under these particular circumstances was not voluntary, and struck down the resulting search. Id
at 550. "When a prosecutor seeks to rely upon consent to justifY the lawfulness of a search, he
has the burden of proving that the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given. This burden
cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority." Id
at 548-49 (footnotes omitted).
204. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996).
205. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,438 (1991).
206. See discussion infia Part IV.A.1.
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range of prosecutions; in many situations they have no discretion to
admit the unlawfully obtained evidence. 207
The U.S. exclusionary rule has been highly controversial. It has
often been noted that eliminating otherwise reliable evidence from a trial
against a culpable defendant is not sensible, for it means that "the
criminal [will] go free because the constable has blundered."208
Moreover, many have argued that if the point of exclusion is to modify
the actions of officers and deter them from engaging in improper
behavior, other less onerous methods could achieve that end.
Suggestions have been made to more broadly utilize civilian review
boards,209 to allow for civil actions against the police, 210 and to promote
employment sanctions against offending officers.m
Having acknowledged these views, 212 nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court established its rule of exclusion in virtually all search and
seizure cases, both state and federal, more than four decades ago in

207. See discussion infia Part IY.A.2.
208. As stated first by then Judge Benjamin Cardozo in People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585,
587 (N.Y. 1926). For broad based critiques of the exclusionary rule, see Guido Calabresi, The
Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y Ill, 111-18 (2003); Christopher Slobogin, My
Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL L. REv. 363, 363-446; Gregory D.
Totten et a!., The Exclusionary Rule: Fix It, But Fix It Right, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 887, 887-922
(1999); William J. Stuntz, The Virtues and V'ices ofthe Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARv. J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 443, 445-55 (1997); Lawrence Crocker, Can the Exclusionary Rule be Saved?, 84 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 310, 310-51 (1993); Pierre J. Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule:
Good Faith Limitations and Damage Remedies, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875, 875-915
(1982). But see Yale Kamisar, In Defense ofthe Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARv.
J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 119, 119-40 (2003); Timothy Lynch, In Defense ofthe Exclusionary Rule, 23
HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 711, 751 (2002).
209. See, e.g., Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for
Civilian Review Boards, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 551, 551-604 (1997); Reenah Kim,
Legitimizing Comrmmity Consent to Local Policing: The Need for Democratically Negotiated
Community Representation on CiVIlian AdvisoJY Counc1ls, 36 HARv. C.R. -C.L. L. REv. 461, 461525 (200 I). The suggestion remains controversial. See Christopher Dunn & Donna Lieberman,
A Review Board in Name Only, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,2003, atA13.
210. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 422-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger argued for allowing suits
against the government in a special tribunal trained to look at evidentiary concerns. Id at 423.
Under his view, the abolition of the exclusionary rule could follow the establishment of such
tribunals. Id at 422-23. For an interesting alternative plan, see Donald Dripps, The Case for the
Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. I, 2-4 (200 I).
211. See Roger L. Goldman & Steven Puro, Revocation ofPolice Officer Certification: A
Viable Remedy for Police Misconduct?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 541, 541-45 (2001); Laurie L.
Levenson, Administrative Replacements: How Much Can They Do?, 26 PEPP. L. REv. 879, 87986 (1999).
212. For a viewpoint which recognizes these views, yet charges that utilizing exclusion as a
general remedy greatly, and negatively, affects the reach given to the substantive content of the
Fourth Amendment, see Slobogin, supra note 208, at 363-446.
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Mapp v. Ohio. 213 This law established in 1961, is still vibrant today and
214
remains virtually unchallenged.
Stated simply, if the police action to
obtain the evidence against the defendant violates the Constitution, a
court will generally deem such evidence inadmissible at trial. 215 In Mapp,
the police acted in a blatantly illegal fashion, yet Ohio determined that
the defendant did not have a viable remedy. 216 Other states, however, and
the federal system, had for many years utilized an exclusionary rule to
217
deal with such situations.
The United States Supreme Court made
clear that it would not tolerate any other alternatives in situations where
Fourth Amendment violations could be proven. 218
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the
people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in
the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right
to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore,
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an
empty promise. . . . [W]e can no longer permit it to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment. 219
213. SeeMapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
214. While most famous, perhaps, for its restriction of evidence in search and seizure
cases, courts use the exclusionary rule in other ways. Another common use is the exclusion of
confessions. Even those statements found to be absolutely accurate will be kept out of evidence if
the statements:
I.
were involuntarily made, under the Due Process Clause. See Spano v. New York, 360
u.s. 315 (1959);
2.
were obtained without warnings being given, against the mandate of the privilege
against self incrimination. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
3.
resulted from a violation of the Sixth Amendment, with questioning occurring after
the formal charge and without the assistance of counsel. See Brewer v. Williams, 430
U.S. 387 (1977).
215. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
216. Police officers pretended to have a search warrant, yet never produced one. Id The
Court even noted that "[a]t best 'there is, in the record, considerable doubt as to whether there
ever was any warrant."' Id at 645 (internal citations omitted). The police officers forcibly
entered the defendant's home after she refused to give consent to a search. Id After "[r]unning
roughshod over appellant, a policeman 'grabbed' her, 'twisted [her] hand,"' and took her upstairs
in handcuffs. Id (internal citations omitted). Ultimately the police found obscene materials and
charged her with possession. Id
21 7. The federal exclusionary rule had been established in Ui'eks v. United States. By
1961 quite a number of states utilized such a rule as well. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (overruling Ui'eks).
218. "There is no war between the Constitution and common sense. . . . Nothing can
destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws." Mapp, 367 U.S. at
657, 659. This protection extended to other constitutional violations as well. See supra note 214
and accompanying text.
219. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
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While the exclusionary rule remains the law in the United States,
changes have occurred in its application. 220 The initial justifications for
the rule were to deter improper police conduct, and to protect judicial
integrity in terms of evidence offered at trial. 221 These dual reasons have
given way to a single rationale for the rule, deterrence of improper police
activity. 222 As a consequence, significant limitations on the exclusionary
rule have developed. Perhaps the most famous is the principle that a
court will not grant an exclusion in situations where the police act in
good faith to obtain a warrant which later turns out to have been
improperly granted. 223 In addition, evidence will only be excluded if
police action violated a defendant's own privacy right, 224 illegal action
taints the evidence, 225 and the prosecution uses that evidence to prove the
defendant's guile26 Finally, the rule only applies if evidence is actually
found. 227 That is, capturing the defendant and bringing her improperly
into the jurisdiction will not give rise to a claim under the rule. 228
Some have argued that these limitations have effectively nullified
the power of the exclusionary rule. 229 The rule, however, remains viable
and courts use it in a wide range of fact situations. For instance, in recent
220. See intra notes 223-228 and accompanying text.
221. "Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives ... to the courts, that judicial
integrity so necessary in the true administration ofjustice." Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660.
222. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984). For a sharp critique of this shift
see generally, Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exc/usionmy Rule Rest on a "Principled
Basis" Rather Than an "Empincal Proposition'?, 16 CREIGHlDN L. REv. 565 (1982).
223. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 924-26. States are, of course, entitled to offer criminal
defendants more protection than given under the federal Constitution. Several states have
rejected the good faith exception set out by the Court in Leon. See, e.g., State v. Marsala, 579
A.2d 58, 60 (Conn. 1990); State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 557 (N.C. 1988); State v. Novembrino,
519 A.2d 820, 825 (N.J. 1987).
224. In order to have standing, each defendant must show 'that police action invaded a
sufficient privacy interest of their own. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89 (1998). It is not
enough to show that the prosecution offered the evidence-obtained illegally as to another
person--against him at trial. /d
225. The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree principle indicates that not all resulting evidence will
be excluded, only that evidence which is not remote and too far removed. See Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The Court gives the doctrine an especially broad application
in regard to live witnesses who will testify at trial. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268,
275 (1978). Also, the government will be relieved of the exclusion burden if it can demonstrate
that the tainted evidence would have been discovered "inevitably" through lawful means. See Nix
v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
226. As opposed to the prosecution offering the evidence to impeach the defendant's
testimony at trial. The impeachment limitation can arise in connection with tangible evidence
obtained through police searches. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954). It can
also pertain to statements from interrogation. See Harris v. New York, 40 I U.S. 222, 232 (1971 ).
227. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952).
228. /d
229. Leon, 468 U.S. at 928-29 (Brennan, l, dissenting).
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years, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to exclude evidence in cases
involving anonymous tips, 230 the pat down of luggage, 231 road blocks, 232
improper frisking of individuals who have been lawfully detained, 233 and
the taking of a statement after an illegal arrest. 234

C

Rules ofInterrogation

1.

In Australia

Traditionally, common law rules governmg the interrogation of
suspects in Australia have developed to
1.
2.

ensure the reliability of confessional evidence, and
to maintain an accused's right to silence. 235

Judicial rhetoric is to the effect that interrogation rules are not
designed to directly regulate police misconduce 36 Rather, the court
focuses on the effect that any police misconduct may have on the
reliability of the confession extracted, and whether, as a result of the
misconduct, the accused has been actually or effectively deprived of the
right to speak freely. 237
Nonetheless, it is generally only where interrogating authorities
have behaved improperly that the courts will exclude confessional
evidence. 238 Usually, the authorities must demonstrate some form of
external pressure over and above ordinary interrogation techniques to
justify excluding a confession. 239 Consequently, unless categorized as
persons of special vulnerability, 240 the courts expect those suspected of
crimes to conduct themselves robustly during interrogation. 241 Australian
courts have admitted confessions where:

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
Bond, 529 U.S. at 334-35.
See Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,378 (1993).
See Kaupp v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 1843, 1847 (2003) (applying the rule despite the fact
that Miranda warnings had been given).
235. The King v. Lee (1950) 82 C.L.R. 133, !53; McDermott v. R. (1948) 76 C.L.R. 501,
511.
236. Question of Law Reserved [No I] (1998) 70 S.A. St. R. 281, 288 (per Doyle, C.J.); R.
v. Azar (1991) 56 A. Crim. R. 414,418 (per Gleeson, C.J.); Collins v. R. (1980) 31 A.L.R. 257.
237. SeePavicv.TheQueen(1998) 192C.L.R.159.
238. See mihlnotes 245-247.
239. See, e.g., Pfitzner v. R. (1996) 66 S.A. St. R. 161, 173 (per Doyle, C.J.).
240. See, e.g., M v. A.J. (1989) 44 A. Crirn. R. 373, 381 (referring to children); Collins, 31
A.L.R. 257 (referring to Aborigines); Dixon v. McCarthy (1975) I N.S.W.L.R. 617.
241. JILL HUNTER & KATHRYN CRONIN, EVIDENCE, ADVOCACY AND ETHICAL PRACTICE: A
CRIMINAL TRIAL COMMENTARY 454 ( 1995).
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the suspect experienced psychotic episodes
questioning; 242
the suspect was very drunk:; 243 and
the suspect was under the influence of drugs. 244

[Vol. 12
during

On the other hand, the courts have excluded confessions where:
1.
2.
3.
a.

the police failed to properly caution the suspect pnor to
interrogation; 245
the police held the suspect illegally for the purpose of
interrogation; 246 and
the police importuned admissions by offering benefits such as
reduced sentence, bail, or witness protection. 247
Voluntariness

As noted above, at common law a confession must be voluntary to
be admissible. A confession is involuntary if the police obtain it by
overbearing the will of an accused due to violence, threats of violence, or
inducements. 248
While section 84 of the Australian Evidence Act is not cast in terms
ofvoluntariness, it operates in a broadly similar fashion. 249 In New South
Wales, Tasmania, and the Australian Capital Territory, courts must
exclude admissions if they were influenced by violence, the threat of
violence, oppressive, inhuman, or degrading conduceso Unlike the
common law, however, there is no need to establish a causative link

242. Sinclair v. the King (1946) 73 C.L.R. 316, 328; R. v. Pfitzner (1996) 66 S.A. St. R.
161; R. v. Starecki (1960) V.R. 141, 151; see also R. v. Munce (2001) N.S.WS.C. 1072 ~ 13. In
Munce, the accused was under the influence of alcohol and drugs, and also suffered psychiatric
problems. Jd at 1072 ~ 27. The court found that the authorities most likely did not compromise
the truth of the confession. Jd The court found this because the accused voluntarily went to the
police station and because the interrogation was scrupulously fair. Id Nor did the court fmd that
the circumstances rendered it unfair to use the confession against the accused. Id
243. The Queen v. Ostojic (1978) 18 S.A. St. R. 188, 197; R. v. Ainsworth (1991) 57 A.
Crim. R. 174, 179. Contm R. v. Smith (1992) 58 S.A. St. R. 491, 495-97.
244. See Munce, N.S.WS.C. at 1072; Regina v. Frawley (2000) N.S.W. Ct. Crim. App. 340
~ 33; R. v. Reinders & Widdison ( 1993) N.T. Sup. Ct. 73; R. v. Ella (1990) 100 F.L.R. 442.
245. R. v. Dolan (1992) 58 S.A. S.R. 501, 501; Walkerv. Vmey (1965)T. R. 96, 97.
246. Foster v. The Queen (1993) 67 A.L.J.R. 550, 557.
247. R. v. Ye Zhang (2000) N.S.WS.C. 1099, ~ 40-41.
248. R. v. Lee (1950) 82 C.L.R. 133; McDermott v. R. (1948) 76 C.L.R. 501; Cornelius v.
R. (1936) 55 C.L.R. 235,245.
249. Evidence Act, 1995, § 84 (Austl.).
250. See generally id The Communication Act has been adopted in all three territories.
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between the violence or oppressive conduct and the making of an
admission. 251
Section 85 renders an admission inadmissible if it is likely that any
relevant condition or characteristic of the accused adversely affected the
truth of the admission. 252 Section 85 only applies during questioning by
investigating authorities, 253 whereas section 84 applies if violence, threat
of violence, or oppression occurs under any circumstance. 254
b.

Exclusion

The majority of the High Court in Pavic v. The Queen, attempted to
reformulate the common law position in relation to discretionary
exclusion. 255 Under that reformulation, Australian courts applying the
common law have discretion to exclude evidence of confessions:
1.
2.

where the confession is unreliable; 256 or
where, in all the circumstances including unfairness to the
defendant and the impropriety of investigating officials, the
confession was obtained contrary to community standards. 257

The facts of Pavic v. The Queen illustrate the distinction between
unreliability and unfairness/impropriety. 258 Swaffield refused to answer
questions concerning his involvement in an arson during a formal police
Subsequently, however, he made admissions to an
interview. 259
undercover police officer investigating drug offenses. 260 The officer
recorded the admissions without Swaffield's knowledge, and without
Swaffield receiving any warning concerning his right to silence. 261 There
251. Seeid
252. Relevant conditions or characteristics include age, personality, education, or mental,
physical, or intellectual disability. Id § 85.
253. Hence, section 85 of the Evidence Act, would not apply to the confession obtained in
Pavic v. The Queen. Pavic v. The Queen (1998) 192 C.L.R. 159, 165; see also R. v. Truong
(1996) 86 A. Crirn. R. 188, 193; R. v. Donnelly (1997) 96 A. Crim. R. 432, 437 (discussing
admissibility of admissions by defendants).
254. Evidence Act, 1995 § 84 (Austl.).
255. Pavic, 192 C.L.R. at 194 (perGaudron, J., Toohey, J., & Gummow, J.J.).
256. ld
257. ld Community standards in this context means the standards required to maintain the
rule of law in a liberal democracy, to ensure the proper administration of justice and to ensure the
due requirements of law enforcement. R. v. Suckling (1999) N.S.W. Ct. Crirn. App. 36, 40. But
see criticisms of Brad Selway, Principle, Public Policy and Unfairness-Exclusion of Evidence
on Discretionary Grounds, 23 ADEL. L. REv. 1, 26 (2002) (raising "the danger of using 'the
community' as part of a quasi-factual test which can never be analysed or tested")
258. Pavic, 192 C.L.R. at 168-80.
259. ld at 165.
260. Id at 165-66.
261. ld
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was nothing to suggest that Swaffield 's admissions were untrue.
Nonetheless, the High Court determined that obtaining admissions from
Swaffield surreptitiously, following his decision not to speak to the
police, was unfair and improper.263 The Court held that the police
obtained the admissions at "an unacceptable price" and excluded them. 264
Although the High Court decided Foster v. R. prior to Pavic, it is a
good example of a combination of unfairness and police impropriety
leading to the exclusion of a confession. 265 Foster was a twenty-one-yearold Aboriginal man with little education, who the police charged with
arson. 266 The police who arrested Foster admitted their motive for the
arrest was to pressure him into making a confession. 267 The manner of
arrest was very high-handed, removing Foster from a family gathering,
placing him in the caged section of a police van, and driving him some
distance away to the isolation of a police cell. 268
When arrested Foster had asked if he could bring a friend with
him. 269 Foster claimed that the police denied this requese 70 According to
Foster, the confession was a fabrication and the police extracted his
signature on the typed document by threats of violence against him and
his brother. 271
Even putting aside Foster's claims regarding the fabricated
confession and threats of violence, the high-handed nature of his arrest
made it clear to him that he was completely powerless in the face of
police authority. 272 There exists a possibility that Foster may have
confessed merely to be released from custody. Subsequently, the High
Court determined that the confession should have been excluded on the
basis of unfairness and impropriety. 273 The unfairness to Foster arose
because he could not corroborate his version of the events leading up to
the confession, and was therefore put at a forensic disadvantage when he
274
challenged the confession at trial. The court also held that the police

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

ld
!d at 159-60.
ld at 160.
SeeFosterv.R.(1993) 113A.L.R.l.
ld at 2-3.
ld at 8-9.
ld at 3.
ld
ld
/dat7-11.
ld
ld at 8-11.
ld at 7-8.
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improperly obtained the confession because the police deliberately
abused their powers of arrest and detention. 275
When reformulating the common law approach to discretionary
exclusion, the majority of the High Court in Pavic did so on the basis that
they were taking into account the provisions of Australia's Evidence Act
of 1995. 276 However, it is not immediately evident from the structure of
the Evidence Act, how this might be so. Section 85 of the Evidence Act
renders unreliable confessions obtained during the course of police
questioning inadmissible. 277 If a confession obtained in this manner is
likely to be untrue the court must exclude it. 278 Similarly, evidence
adduced by the prosecution that is unfairly prejudicial to an accused in
criminal proceedings must be excluded under section 13 7. 279 Section 90
creates a specific discretion to exclude confessions for unfairness. 280 It is
not limited to confessions obtained during the course of official
questioning. 281 In addition, section 138 allows evidence to be excluded,
whether confessional or not, where the police improperly or illegally
obtain ie82 An approach consistent with Pav1c would require that section
90 be confined to situations that affect the reliability of confessional
evidence, and section 138 to be read so as to combine both impropriety
and unfairness. 283 While there is some lower level case law supporting
this approach, 284 others have opined that, following Pavic, principles
governing discretionary exclusion in common law and Australia's
Evidence Act of 1995 jurisdictions are divergeness

275. ld at 8-11.
276. Pavic, 192 C.L.R. at 194 (considering Evidence Act, 1995 (Austl.)).
277. Evidence Act, 1995, § 85 (Austl.).
278. Id
279. Id § 137.
280. Id § 90.
281. Id
282. ld § 138. The discretion under section 138 is cast differently from the common law
discretion. Under the common law, evidence illegally obtained is admissible, subject to a
discretion to exclude it. Under section 138, evidence illegally obtained is inadmissible, subject to
the discretion to allow its admission if the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the
undesirability of admitting the evidence.
283. Pavic, 192 C.L.R. at 194 (interpreting Evidence Act, 1995, §§ 90, 138 (Austl.)).
284. Eg., R. v. Taylor (1999) Austl. Cap. Terr. Ct. 34, 47; R. v. Munce (2001) N.S.WS.C.
1072, 36-37; R. v. Suckling (1999) N.S.W Ct. Crirn. App. 36, 40-43; R. v. Helmhout (2001)
N.S.W Ct. Cr. App. 251,259.
285. Eg., Selway, supra note 257, at 25 (citing R. v. Sotheren (2001) N.S.WS.C. 204,24147); R. v. Smith (2000) N.S.W Ct. Crirn. App. 202; R. v. Walker (2000) N.S.W Ct. Crirn. App.
130; R. v. Douglas (2000) N.S.W Ct. Crirn. App. 275).
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In the United States

As seen above, one can quickly identify three key features present
in the Australian criminal justice system relating to the interrogation
process. The first is the use of the voluntariness standard as the linchpin
of analysis to determine the propriety of actions by law enforcement
officers that result in admissions made by criminal suspects. The second
is the considerable discretion given to trial judges to determine the
validity of particular incriminating statements, in ruling on the
admissibility of improperly made statements. The third is that much of
the law in this area has not developed as a way to have judicial oversight
or supervision of potential police misconduct.
The American criminal justice system has moved away from these
views in terms of deciding whether incriminating statements are
admissible at trial to prove the guilt of criminal defendants. On each of
these three features U.S. courts have taken a distinctly contrary view.
While the voluntariness standard remains viable, 286 the United States
Supreme Court's concerns about the limited precedential value of court
decisions in the area, along with the broad and not easily definable
standard itself, led the Court to adopt far more specific and identifiable
standards than those provided by the voluntariness tese 87 The Court's
initial move was to look to the right to counsel, found in the Sixth
Amendment of the Constitution. 288 Finding that this right meant that a
defendant could not be questioned289 by a police agent without the
presence of a lawyer,290 the Court held that any resulting incriminating
statement by the accused, made without counsel, could not be admitted
into evidence. 291
286. See, e.g., Trice v. Ward, 196 FJd 1151, 1170 (lOth Cir. 1999). The court there
explained that the analysis is to view a "totality of circumstances" including:
"[T]he crucial element of police coercion," "the length of the interrogation" and "its
continuity," "the defendant's maturity," "education," "physical condition," and "mental
health," and "the failure of the police to advise the defendant of his rights to remain
silent and to have counsel present during the custodial interrogation." Ultimately, the
question is whether the confession was "the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice."
Id at 1170 (internal citations omitted).
287. For a sharp critique of the U.S. system, in comparison to the Australian, see Michael
R. McCoy, Is There a Need fbr Miranda: A Look at Australian and Canadian Interrogation, 7
ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 627, 638-49 (2000).
288. SeeMassiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201,206 (1964); U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
289. This applies even when a defendant does not realize he is being questioned, as with
the involvement of an undercover officer. Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
290. The defendant can waive this right, but the standard is high. See Brewer v. Williams,
430 u.s. 387,404 (1977).
291. Id at404-05.
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The Sixth Amendment clearly defines a standard. 292 It is, however,
limited in scope, for the rule only applies if the government has formally
charged the defendant. 293 As a consequence, the standard applies to
relatively few interrogations since most occur after arrest, but prior to any
formal charge. 294 Therefore, it is the Fifth Amendment standard, as
enunciated in the famous Miranda v. Aniona decision, which has had the
greater impact on the criminal justice system. 295
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that if the police interrogate an
accused while in custody, any resulting incriminating statements may
only be used at trial to prove her guilt if the police gave the defendant
four specific warnings, after which she affirmatively waived her right to
avoid the interrogation. 296 Under the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination the suspect must be informed:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Of the right to remain silent;
That any statement made can be used against her at trial;
Of the right to have an attorney present during questioning; and
That the government will provide a lawyer if she is unable to
afford one on her own. 297

This fairly concrete standard has not eliminated all uncertain
issues. 298 Still, there is little doubt that, as the Supreme Court has stated,
it provides much greater guidance to all parties, as "[the voluntariness
test] is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to
conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner."299
Under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment standards set forth, if a
violation occurs the trial court has no discretion as to which remedy to
292. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
293. The Sixth Amendment provides that the right to counsel shall be present "in all
criminal prosecutions." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. That phrase has been construed to mean the
stage at which a formal charge, not simply an arrest, has taken place. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406
U.S. 682, 690 (1972). Commonly, that includes indictments issued by grand juries, and
preliminary hearings conducted by judges. See id at 688-89.
294. Seeid
295. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); U.S. CONST. amend. V.
296. MirandiJ, 384 U.S. at 478-79.
297. The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CoNST. amend. V; see also MirandiJ, 384 U.S.
at 471.
298. Much litigation has been centered on defming terms such as "custody" and
"interrogation." See PAUL MARcus, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN PRACTICE ch. 4 (2d ed. 2003).
Also, there has been some confusion regarding the evidence necessary to demonstrate a willing
waiver. Id Plus, cases have grappled with whether exceptions to the rule are allowed (two are
most noteworthy: for public safety and the use of confessions to impeach). Id
299. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,444 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
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use; it must exclude the resulting incriminating words.
Moreover,
much of the rationale for this holding is in sharp contrast to Australian
decisions. That is, Americans believe there is a need for courts to
intervene here in order to curb excessive law enforcement behavior
which could adversely impact an affirmative constitutional right. 301 See,
for instance, this language from Miranda:
[C]oercion can be mental as well as physical, and ... the blood of the
accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.
Interrogation still takes place in privacy. . . . The police [may] persuade,
trick, or cajole [the defendant] out of exercising his constitutional rights.
Even without employing brutality, [or] the ''third degree" ... the very
fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and
302
trades on the weakness of individuals.

D

The Right to Legal Representation

It certainly should be no surprise that adversarial criminal justice
systems, such as Australia and the United States, view the right to
counsel as essential. After all, lawyers represent the government
throughout the criminal process and the defendant is entitled to offer a
defense and to rebut the prosecution's case. For over seventy years,
American courts have consistently acknowledged the need for lawyers to
represent criminal defendants throughout the process. In one of the most
303
celebrated opinions in the area, the so-called "Scottsboro case," the
United States Supreme Court emphasized this point:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill
and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a
300. This principle is also true under the voluntariness standard. The judge must exclude a
statement which he finds to be coerced. See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 529-38 (1963).
30 I. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.
302. /d at 448, 455 (internal citations omitted).
303. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Several black youths were charged with
raping two white girls on a train. /d at 49. The defendants were brought to Scottsboro, Alabama,
and were tried while confronting a "tense, hostile, and excited public sentiment." Id at 51. The
case deeply disturbed the Justices, and they reversed the convictions because the defendants were
young, poor, and illiterate nonresidents who were convicted without attorneys to represent them.
Id at 72-73.
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perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
•
304
mnocence.

In Gideon v. Wainwnght, the Court established the right to counsel
for indigent defendants under the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution. 305 While the Court, here, was more succinct than in Powell,
it was just as forceful. 306 The Court noted, "[I]n our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him."307
American judges have extended this right broadly to include
virtually every stage of the criminal proceeding, such as post-charge
interrogation308 and identification procedures, 309 preliminary hearings, 310
sentencing, 311 and appeals. 312 The right to counsel applies in almost all
criminal cases except for the most trivial. 313 In addition, the indigent
defendant may also have the right to other professional assistance such as
304. ld at 68-69.
305. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,344 (1963).
306. Id
307. Id
308. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The right to a lawyer would not
extend, under the Sixth Amendment, to interrogation which occurred prior to the police formally
charging the defendant. See supra notes 175-l 77. However, under Miranda, the Fifth
Amendment mandates that the accused, if in custody and being interrogated, must be informed of
the right to have a lawyer present during interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
309. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223-27 (1967); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682 (1972) (holding the right to a lawyer would not extend to an identification which occurred
prior to the defendant being formally charged).
310. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. I, 3-20 (1970); see also United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1976) (holding the right to a lawyer would not extend to a
grand jury proceeding, as it is viewed as investigative rather than accusatory).
311. SeeMempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
312. Almost every American criminal defendant is entitled to at least one automatic
appeal. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974). Thereafter, the reviewing court has
discretion over the appeals. Id at 611. If the appeal is automatic, the grant of counsel is also
automatic. Id at 618-19. If the appeal is discretionary, so is the grant of counsel. Id; see also
inJTa notes 334-335 and accompanying text.
313. The trial court makes this determination before the trial in terms of what the likely
sentence will be. That is, the trial court may not constitutionally sentence the defendant to any
term of imprisonment, even the most limited, unless it offered the defendant assistance of
counsel. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). The Supreme Court recently
extended the constitutional rule so that counsel must be provided to indigent defendants facing a
suspended jail term. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 660-74 (2002). Of course, states are
free to go beyond the Court's holdings, and many do, mandating counsel in all criminal cases.
See, e.g., Tracy v. Mun. Court for the Glendale Judicial Dist. of L.A. County, 587 P.2d 227, 230
(Cal. 1978).
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medical or technical experts. 314 The system hardly works to perfection,
and has been subject to rather blistering criticism, particularly regarding
the effective assistance of counsel. 315 Still, it is a system which spends
considerable sums of money to ensure the representation for almost all
criminal defendants in the United States at almost all critical stages of the
case. 316
In Australia, statutes supply the right to legal representation in all
jurisdictions.317 However, this statutory right only exists as a right to
retain legal counsel, not a right to legal counsel per se. 318 Consequently,
legal representation was, up until the High Court's decision in Dietrich v.
The Queen, 319 the prerogative of the rich or those lucky enough to qualify
for legal aid. 320 To remedy that disadvantage, the High Court determined
that the inherent power of the courts to ensure the integrity of their own
proceedings includes, within it, the capacity and responsibility to ensure
a fair trial. 321 Accordingly, where the requirement of a fair trial demands
that the accused have legal representation, the court may grant a stay of
322
proceedings if the accused cannot afford legal representation.
In
discussing this common law discretion, a member of the High Court
commented:
An accused is brought involuntarily to the field in which he is
required to answer a charge of serious crime. Against him, the prosecution
has available all the resources of government. If an ordinary accused lacks
314. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,83 (1985) (explaining that such expert aid is required
if necessary for a fair trial).
315. See Alfredo Garcia, The JUght to Counsel Under Siege: Requiem for an Endangered
JUght?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 35, 81-85 (1991); WilliamS. Geimer, A Decade ofStrickland's Tin
Hom: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining ofthe JUght to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
91, 111-14 (1995); McNulty & O'Fahey, Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: JUght to
Counsel, 88 GEO. L.J. 1317, 1329-34 (2000).
316. The cost is truly enormous. In 1999 the government spent an estimated $1.2 billion
to provide counsel to indigent defendants in just 100 of the nation's most populous counties. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE STATISTICS I (1999), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/id.htm
(last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
317. Judiciary Act, 1903, § 78 (Austl.); Crimes Act, 1900, § 402 (N.S.W:) (as applied in
Austl. Cap. Terr.); Criminal Procedure Act, 1986, § 96 (N.S.W:); Criminal Code, § 360 (N. Terr.
Austl.); Criminal Code, § 616 (Queens!.); Criminal Code Act, § 368 (Tas.); Crimes Act, 1958,
§ 397 (Viet.); Criminal Code,§ 634 (W Austl.).
318. Greg Reinhardt, Legal Representation at Trial: Scope of the Righ~ in THE LAWS OF
AUSTRALIA 11.9 ~ 6 (ii) (1999).
319. Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292.
320. The provision of legal services pursuant to a national scheme administered by state
and territory governments on a discretionary basis is subject to means and assets tests. See also
Don Fleming & Amanda Pearce, Legal Aid, in LAWS OF AUSTRALIA, supra note 318, ch. 11.9
~38.

321.
322.

Dietrich, 177 C.L.R. at 299-300.
Id at 311.
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the means to secure legal representation for himself, . . . he will, almost
inevitably, be brought to face a trial process for which he will be ... unable
effectively to cope. In such a case, the adversarial process is unbalanced
and inappropriate and the likelihood is that ... the forms and formalities of
323
legal procedures will conceal the substance of oppression.

Although the decision in the Dietrich case constituted a radical
improvement in the position of unrepresented accused persons, it falls
short of formulating a right to legal representation. The majority view
that the duty to ensure a fair trial derives from the court's inherent power,
exposes it to several weaknesses. First, the decision to grant a stay
depends on a finding that legal representation is necessary for the fair
trial of an accused and is not focused upon rights belonging to the
accused. The High Court determined that in the absence of "exceptional
circumstances" the trial of an unrepresented accused will be unfair if
(a) the accused is indigent, (b) the offense charged is a serious offense,
and (c) the inability to obtain legal representation did not result from
fault on the accused's part. Limiting the right to a stay to the trial of a
serious offense has led later case law to decide that the conduct of
committal proceedings,324 summary trials in magistrate's courts,325 and
appeals without legal representation will not be unfair. 326 Second, the
court has discretion to grant a stay of proceedings. The right to a fair trial
is not necessarily negated by the lack of legal representation. A court
may refuse to grant a stay of proceedings on the basis of the availability
of amicus curiae, or because there is evidence that the accused has
adequate knowledge and skill to conduct his or her case properly. Third,
the court's common law powers are subject to statutory alteration. Thus,
state legislation such as section 360A of the Victoria Crimes Act can
significantly cut into the power to grant a stay. Section 360A(l) provides
that the fact that "an accused has been refused legal assistance in respect
of a trial is not a ground for an adjournment or stay of a trial."327
In Dietrich, two judges of the High Court, Judge Deane and Judge
Gaudron, were prepared to go further, holding that the right to a fair trial
derives from the separation of judicial power within the Commonwealth
Constitution. 328 However, even under that view, it is likely that a
constitutional right to a fair trial would only operate as an immunity from

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id at 335 (internal citations omitted).
Statev.Canellis(1994) 181 C.L.R.309,311-12.
Weinel v. Fedcheshen (1995) 65 S.A. St. R. 146.
Simanovic v. R. (1998) 72 A.L.J.R. 1050; R. v. Rich (1998) 4 VR. 44.
Crimes Act, 1958, § 360A (Viet.).
Dietrich, 177 C.L.R. at 326, 362.
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legislative interference rather than as a source of personal rights. 329
Moreover, notwithstanding the hopes of some that a more widely
accepted constitutional guarantee of the right to a fair trial would develop
further, 330 subsequent courts have declined to adopt this course. 331

E

The Appeals Process

Both Australia and the United States subscribe to the belief that the
appeals process is essential to a fair criminal justice system. In neither
nation, though, is there a strict requirement mandating criminal
appeals. 332 In the United States, the ability of the indigent defendant to
appeal her conviction is far more powerful. In fact, for criminal
defendants, in all but the most trivial cases, the right to appeal is
automatic. 333 Moreover, the right cannot be unduly restricted or limited. 334
In the United States, counsel must be provided to the indigent on the first
appeal, 335 and financial requirements cannot limit the record presented to
the appellate court. 336
In Australia, the right to legal representation for indigent defendants
has not been extended to appeals or applications for leave to appeal. 337
However, this position may soon be reconsidered given that article 14(2)
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights incorporates
329. See Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 C.L.R. 1 (per Brennan, C.J.), 46 (per
Dawson, 1), 61 (per Gaudron, J.), 93 (per Toohey, J.), 125-26 (per McHugh, J.), 177 (per
Gummow, 1).
330. Eg., The Honorable Justice K.P. Duggan, Refonn ofthe Criminal Law with Fair Tnal
as the Guiding Star, 19 CRIM. L.J. 258, 272-73 (1995); James Miller, Criminal Cases in the High
Court ofAustralia: Kable v. The Director of Public Prosecutions for New South Wales, 21 CRIM.
L.J. 92, 101 ( 1997) (expressing the view that the decision in Kable made it more likely that state
courts would refuse to apply state laws that led to the denial of a fair trial); John Toohey, A Matter
of Justice: Human Rights in Australian Law, 27 U.W AUSTL. L. REv. 129, 129-30 (1998); see
also Fleming & Pearce, supra note 320, ~ 12.
331. Eg., Frugtniet v. Victoria (1997) 71 A.L.J.R. 1598, 160 1-02; Chau v. Dir. Pub.
Prosecutions (1995) 37 N.S.WL.R. 639,653-56.
332. Almost a century ago, the United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution
does not require states to grant appeals as a right to criminal defendants seeking to review alleged
trial court errors. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 ( 1985).
333. Only a few American states do not have automatic appeals in all criminal cases. See
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (discussing the discretionary review system in the United
States). After the first appeal, the appeal is discretionary. See id
334. SeeGriff"m v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956).
335. Jd With later, discretionary appeals, however, the granting of counsel for indigents
also is discretionary. Id
336. See, e.g., Gnffin, 351 U.S. at 12. The Supreme Court found that the constitution
required that indigents be given free trial transcripts for the purpose of establishing an appellate
record. Id at 19-20.
337. New South Wales v. Canellis (1994) 181 C.L.R. 309, 328; see also Sirnanovic v. R.
(1998)72A.L.J.R.1050.
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the right to appeal, and has been characterized by at least one High Court
judge as a feature of the right to a fair trial. 338

F.

The Entrapment Defense

Most of the important substantive criminal law defenses are quite
similar in the United States and Australia. They both find their origin in
the English common law, and the two different court systems generally
apply them in a similar fashion. With regard to defense of others, self
defense, necessity, or duress, there are no major differences in the two
criminal justice systems. 339 With the entrapment defense, however, there
is a world of difference. In short, the defense is quite vibrant in the
United States, but does not exist in Australia.
1.

The United States

Federal judges almost a century ago created the entrapment defense
out of concerns regarding governmental overreaching in the investigation
340
of crimes. As stated by Justice Brandeis's dissent, in one of the earliest
decisions in the field, courts need to intervene when a "crime [is]
instigated by officers of the Government ... [when the crime] is the fruit
of their criminal conspiracy to induce its commission."341 While the
evolution of the defense has seen the development of two distinct
substantive tests, two features of the defense are present everywhere
throughout the United States. 342

338. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14(2), Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, and ratified by the United States
June 8, 1992); see also Sinanovic, 72 A.L.J.R. at 1051-52.
339. This does not mean that the two systems are identical. With self-defense, for
instance, the application in terms of appropriate evidence appears to differ. In the United States,
the courts view the defense as being objective, looking to the true reasonable person standard
regarding the need for the use of force and also the degree of force to be used. The Australian
courts allow greater evidence of the defendant's own individual characteristics and traits,
consistent with a more subjective standard. Compare People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 47 (N.Y.
1986), with Conlon (1993) 69 A. Crim. Rev. 92, 93. Even here, however, the differences are not
stark. With the battered victim's syndrome, for instance, both jurisdictions allow considerable
expert testimony as to both objective and subjective considerations in determining if a selfdefense claim would be appropriate. See Osland v. R. (1998) 159 A.L.R. 170; Bechtel v.
Oklahoma, 840 P.2d I (Okla. Crim. App. 1992).
340. See generally Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Now, however, every state in the United States has the defense, either by statute or by judicial
order.
341. Id at 423.
342. The subjective test, used by a majority of the states and in the federal system, asks
whether prior to the first contact by the government agent, the defendant was otherwise predisposed to commit the crime. The objective test, used by several of the larger states such as
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The first is the remedy available if the defendant sufficiently shows
governmental overreaching. 343 While some nations may act to limit
particular items of evidence if they find improper governmental
involvement in the creation of crime,344 in the United States, courts treat
entrapment as a true defense. And, as with any true defense, if the
defendant prevails the court must dismiss all charges and they cannot be
reinstated. Illinois's state statute provides a fairly typical example of an
unambiguous entrapment rule: "A person is not guilty of an offense if
his or her conduct is incited or induced by a public officer or employee,
or agent of either, for the purpose of obtaining evidence for the
prosecution of that person."345
The second feature is the distaste courts have for unseemly
government behavior in connection with the investigation of crime, and
the concomitant willingness of American judges to intervene to prevent
successful prosecutions in such cases. The two most famous opinions of
the United States Supreme Court emphatically make this poine46
The defendant in Sherman v. United States was an individual
known to be a recovering narcotics addict. 347 Preying on his weakness
and prior addiction, a government agent vigorously and frequently
pursued the defendant urging him to find illegal narcotics. 348 When the
defendant finally responded and found such drugs, the police arrested
and charged him with (and later convicted him of) a federal drug
violation. 349 The Supreme Court in striking down the conviction was
unforgiving of the government's behavior.
The case at bar illustrates an evil which the defense of entrapment is
designed to overcome. The government informer entices someone
attempting to avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an illegal sale but
also into returning to the habit of use. Selecting the proper time, the
California, Texas, and Michigan, asks whether the inducement of the government agent was so
extreme as to make it likely that a law-abiding person might have committed a crime in response.
343. In most jurisdictions following the subjective test, government overreaching has to be
found by jury. But see Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992); Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958) (deciding as a matter of law because the evidence was clear that the
defendant was not pre-disposed to commit the crime). In most jurisdictions following the
objective test, overreaching by the government can be found by a trial judge. However, in states
such as Iowa and Utah, the matter is given to the jury to decide. For further discussion, see
MARcus, supra note 298, ch. 5.
344. As in Australia, where a successful entrapment like claim may result in certain
narrowly defmed pieces of evidence being excluded at trial. See discussion inffa Part IVF.2.
345. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.§ 5/7-12 (1993).
346. Shennan, 356 U.S. at 376; Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553-54.
347. See Shennan, 356 U.S. at 374-75.
348. See id at 370-71.
349. Seeidat370-72.
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informer then tells the government agent. The set-up is accepted by the
agent without even a question as to the manner in which the informer
encountered the seller. Thus the Government plays on the weakness of an
innocent party and beguiles him into committing crimes which he
otherwise would not have attempted. Law enforcement does not require
350
methods such as this.

The Court in Jacobson v. United States also condemned the
government's behavior. 351 In that case, over a period of more than two
years, two agencies (through five fictitious organizations and a phony
pen pal) sought to determine the defendant's willingness to violate the
law by ordering child pornography through the mail. 352 At the end of this
intensive operation, the defendant bought an illegal magazine from
government officials that had been sent through the mail. 353 Here, too,
the Court reversed the conviction, noting:
Law enforcement officials go too far when they "implant in the mind of an
innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce
its commission in order that they may prosecute." [W]e are ''unable to
conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting this statute
that its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the
instigation by government officials of an act on the part of persons
otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to punish
them." When the Government's quest for convictions leads to the
apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own
devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law, the courts should
354
intervene.

2.

Australia

In Australia, the use of entrapment is largely a matter of internal
control for police organizations. The government implemented limited
reporting requirements when it introduced the Controlled Operations
legislation at the federal level and in Queensland, South Australia, and
New South Wales. 355 Otherwise, there is a very limited monitoring of
investigative entrapment strategies.

350. Id at 376.
351. See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 541.
352. Id at 542.
353. Id at 543-44.
354. Id at 553-54 (internal citations omitted).
355. Crimes Act, 1914, (Austl.); Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act, 1997,
§ 23 (N.S.W); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act, 2000, § 172A (Queens!.); Criminal Law
(Undercover Operations) Act, 1995, § 5 (S. Austl.).
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The Controlled Operations legislation followed the High Court
decision in Ridgeway v. R. 356 By a majority of six-to-one, the Court
decided that when law enforcement officers engage in undercover
operations, and as a result, commit an element of the offense with which
the defendant is charged, a court should normally refuse to admit the
357
evidence of that element against the defendant.
The court convicted Ridgeway of importing heroin contrary to
358
section 233B(1)(c) of the Commonwealth's Customs Act of 1901.
Chong, a member of the anti-narcotics branch of the Royal Malaysian
Police Force as part of a joint Malaysian-Australian operation, imported
the heroin. 359 Ridgeway had initiated and arranged the importation
360
The government
through Lee, whom he had met while in prison.
361
deported Lee upon his release from prison to Malaysia.
Following
362
contact from Ridgeway, Lee reported to the Malaysian police.
Chong flew in from Malaysia with the heroin, and by special
363
arrangement with Australian Customs cleared customs restrictions.
Several days later Chong and Lee met with Ridgeway and handed over
the heroin. 364
Ridgeway appealed to the High Court against his conviction on the
following grounds:
1.

2.

The evidence of the heroin importation should be excluded on
the ground of public policy because the police had illegally
imported it; and
Ridgeway was entitled to a substantive defense of entrapment
365
as the prosecution was an abuse of process.

The Court quashed Ridgeway's conviction on the basis of his first
argument. 366 In relation to his second argument, the High Court held that
there is no substantive defense of entrapment in Australia. 367 The
majority also held that the fact that the police procured the offense by

356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

Ridgeway v. R. (1995) 184 C.L.R. 19.
Id
/d at 24.
Id at 25.
/d
/d
/d at 25-26.
/d at 26.
/d at 26-27.
/d at 25.
/d at 52-53.
/d at 46.

2004]

AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES

75

unlawful means was insufficient to stay proceedings as an abuse of
368
process.
Following Ridgeway there was a flurry of applications to have
evidence in drug stings and prostitution cases excluded. 369 Although it
appears that very few of these applications were successful, significant
pressure was exerted by law enforcement agencies to overturn the High
Court's position in Ridgeway 370 It was feared that Ridgeway would
unduly inhibit the use of undercover operations and undermine drug law
enforcement in particular. 371 In response, the Commonwealth Parliament
passed part lAB of the Crimes Act of 1914, and the South Australian
Parliament passed the Criminal Law (Undercover Operations) Act of
1995.372
Later, New South Wales passed the Law Enforcement
(Controlled Operations) Act of 1997 and Queensland passed the Police
Powers and Responsibilities Act of 2000. 373
The aim of the complementary state and federal legislation is to
exempt law enforcement officers from legal liability when engaged in
374
The state provides
'covert operations that involve unlawful conduct.
immunity where senior police authorized the unlawful conduct or, in the
375
This
case of Queensland, a controlled operations committee.
authorization, however, may only be provided on specified grounds. 376
The legislation requires that the senior officer or committee must be
satisfied that the target of the investigation is engaging or about to
engage in serious criminal behavior, and that the nature and extent of the

368. ld at 48.
369. SeeR. v. Marashi & Jaksimoni (unreported S.A. Dist. Ct. Jt. No. D3262 May 30,
1994); R. v. Gidgeon (1995) Q.C.A. 506; Emmanuele v. Dav (1995) A.C.T.S.C. 23; Massey v. R.
[No. I] (1994) S.A. St. C. 4787.
370. SIMON BRONm & BERNADETIE MCSHERRY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 873
(2001).
371. Australia, Senate Legal and Constitutional Committee, Report Crimes (Controlled
Operations) Bill, Sept. 1995; Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives 1996, at
2510-21.
372. Crimes Act, 1914, § lAB (Austl.); Criminal Law Undercover Operations Act, 1995
(S. Austl.).
373. Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act, 1997 (N.S.W); Police Powers and
Responsibilities Act, 2000 (Queensl.).
374. See Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act, 1997 (N.S.W); Police Powers and
Responsibilities Act, 2000 (Queensl.).
375. Crimes Act, 1914, § 151 (Austl.); Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act,
1997, § 16 (N.S.W); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act, 2000, § 179 (Queensl.); Criminal
Law (Undercover Operations) Act, 1995, § 4 (S. Austl.).
376. Crimes Act, 1914, § 15M (Austl.); Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act,
1997, § 6 (N.S.W); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act, 2000, § 177 (Queensl.); Criminal
Law (Undercover Operations) Act, 1995, § 3 (S. Austl.).
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serious criminal behavior justifies the undercover operations. 377 The
Commonwealth legislation is limited to the investigation of offenses
relating to narcotic goods. 378 The state legislation is broader in
application and covers "serious criminal behaviour."379 Section 15R of
the Commonwealth's Crimes Act of 1914 requires the Minister to be
notified when the Police Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, or
Assistant Commissioner authorizes a "controlled operation."380 Reasons
must be given for the authorization. 381 The action taken pursuant to the
authorization must also be reported to the Minister under section 155. 382
The Act requires the Minister to report every year to Parliament on the
number of authorizations and the reasons given for the authorizations
under section 15T. 383 Similar reporting requirements apply at the state
level. 384
Apart from Queensland, the legislation elsewhere does not have the
effect of overturning Ridgeway 385 The principle enunciated in Ridgeway
continues to operate where the Controlled Operations legislation applies,
except that it has the effect of altering the balancing of public policy in
favor of admission. To the extent that the legislation does not apply or
that authorization is not obtained, the balance of public policy remains in
favor of accepting the evidence, unless the investigating authorities
procured the offense via their own unlawful or improper conduct. 386
Consequently, the discretion created in Ridgeway is not a
significant means to regulate entrapmene87 Apart from the fact that it
377. In South Australia and Queensland, the authorizing officer/committee must ensure
that the undercover operation will not incite those without previous criminal predisposition.
Criminal Law (Undercover Operations) Act, 1995, § 3(d)(ii) (S. Austl.); Police Powers and
Responsibilities Act, 2000, § 177(2)(d) (QueensI.).
378. Crimes Act, 1914 (Austl.) (discussing generally the relationship between state and
federal criminal investigations).
379. Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act, 1997, § 6 (N.S.W); Police Powers and
Responsibilities Act, 2000, § 173 (Queensl.); Criminal Law (Undercover Operations) Act, 1997,
§ 3 (S. Austl.).
380. CrimesAct, 1914,§ 15R(Austl.).
381. Id
382. /d § 15S.
383. Id § 15T.
384. Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act, 1997, § 23 (N.S.W); Police Powers
and Responsibilities Act, 2000, § 172A (Queens!.); Criminal Law (Undercover Operations) Act,
1995, § 5 (S. Austl.).
385. Section 194 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act of 2000 provides that
evidence is not inadmissible when the police obtain it as a result of a controlled operation. Police
Powers and Responsibilities Act, 2000, § 194 (Queens!.).
386. See; R. v. Giaccio (1997) 68 S.A. St. R. 484, 499; R. v. Martelli (1995) 83 A. Crim. R.
550.
387. Ridgeway v. R. (1995) 184 C.L.R. 19.
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operates on an ad hoc basis, according to whether it is raised before a
judge, it is very limited in scope. The discretion only applies to cases
where the police or police agents participate in the offense with which
they charge the defendaness According to the High Court, if the police
have not engaged in an activity which itself creates an essential
ingredient of the offense, it is unlikely that mere inducement will justify
an exercise of the discretion to exclude, because the weight of public
policy will be in favor of convicting the guilty. 389 Further, the discretion
to exclude is limited to evidence directly related to police illegality. 390 If
there is other evidence such as a confession (even where derivative of the
illegal undercover operation) the defendant may still be convicted
notwithstanding that the defendant's participation in the offense occurred
as a result of police instigation. 391 Even where the police conduct
constitutes an essential element of the offense, there is little evidence that
the discretion has been widely applied. 392
The subsequent South Australian Court of Appeal decision in R. v.
Ridgeway illustrates the reluctance to limit the police use of covert
techniques. 393 Following the High Court decision and his release from
prison, Ridgeway later was charged with possession of heroin for the
purpose of sale in breach of section 32(1)(e) of South Australia's
Controlled Substances Act of 1984.394 ·
The Criminal Law (Undercover Operations) Act of 1995 was given
retrospective application in South Australia and provided immunity
where the undercover operation was approved by a law enforcement
authority. 395 The RldgewayCourt held that the controlled importation had
been approved by the Australian Federal Police and accordingly,
immunity applied. 396 Once that had been determined, the Court held that

388. Id at 39.
389. See id; see also R. v. Bijkerk (2000) 111 A. Crim. R. 443; R. v. Martelli (1995) 83 A.
Crim. R. 550; The Queen v. Haughbro (1997) Austl. Cap. Terr. S. Ct. 112; R. v. Richards (2001)
N.S.W. Ct. Crim. App. 160; R. v. Giaccio (1997) 68 S.A. St. R. 484.
390. Pavic v. The Queen, (1998) 192 C.L.R. 159, 172-73.
391. Simon Bronitt & Declan Roche, Between Rhetonc and Reality: Sociolegal and
Republican Perspectives on Entrapment, 4 INT'L J. EVID. & PRooF 77, 80 (2000).
392. See id (discussing how the judicial approach to investigative impropriety and
entrapment remains permissive). Their study of reported and unreported cases revealed that in
every case (except one) in which the court considered Ridgeway, the court exercised the
discretion in favor of admitting the evidence of unlawful conduct. Jd
393. R. v. Ridgeway (1998) 71 S.A. St. R. 73.
394. Jd at 25-27.
395. As was the Commonwealth's legislation. Crimes Act, 1914, § 15x (Austl.) It was
enforced by the High Court in R. v. Mcholas. R. v. Nicholas (1997) 151 A.L.R. 312.
396. Ridgeway, 71 S.A. St. R. at 45.
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the balance of public policy was in favor of admitting the evidence. 397
The Court also held that even if the Criminal Law (Undercover
Operations) Act of 1995 did not apply, the exercise of the discretion
favored admission of the evidence of importation against Ridgeway
because the investigating police officers had not participated in an
essential element of the offense. 398 Consideration favoring admission
included the difficulty of relying on mere surveillance to detect the
offense, the seriousness, and prevalence of the offense, and that the state
prosecuting authority had not participated in the illegality. 399
The High Court's approach in Ridgeway and subsequent Australian
cases reflects an "official-centered model" of entrapment that focuses on
objective standards of probity in law enforcement. 400 Under this
approach, due process is defined objectively by considering whether the
police engaged in criminality, rather than by considering the fairness of
the process to a particular defendant within the system or the values that
might provide some guidance as to the appropriate constraints on the use
of covert techniques. 401 In fact the High Court in Ridgeway determined
that fairness was not particularly relevant, provided the police did not
engage in illegal activity, and the use of deceit and subterfuge were
legitimate even where they led to the incitement of an offense. 402 It was
only in cases where the harassment or manipulation was clearly
inconsistent with minimum standards of policing and when balanced
against other factors (such as the seriousness of the crime, the extent of
the known criminal activity, the difficulty of effective investigation, and
imminent danger to the community) that the High Court recommended
exercise of discretion to exclude evidence obtained as a result of
entrapment. 403
Consequently, following the passage of the controlled operations
legislation, judicial oversight of entrapment in Australia is extremely thin.
This is consistent with the Australian judicial attitudes toward the
admissibility of confessional material. Australian courts reject the role of
regulating police conduct and tend to focus far more on the reliability of
the material presented to them, as seen earlier.
397. Jd at 43.
398. Jd (stating it was not essential to the crime of possessing for sale to establish that the
drugs had been imported).
399. Seeid
400. Andrew Ashworth, Mat Is Wrong with Entrapment?, 1999 SING. J. LEG. Sruos. 293,
297-317 (1999).
401. Ilidgeway, 184 C.L.R. at 50-51.
402. Id at 19, 38.
403. /dat50-51.
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Open Trials

Both Australia and the United States are fully committed to
maintaining open criminal trials, proceedings at which the defendant can
put the government to the test of proving, in front of the community, guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. One can trace this commitment directly to
the English system of presumptively open criminal trials. 404 Both nations
have always viewed openness in the criminal justice system as central, a
point well made by philosopher Jeremy Bentham:
Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of
publicity, all other checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal,
whatever other institutions might present themselves in the character of
checks, would be found to operate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks
405
in reality, as checks only in appearance.

Beyond those basic and indisputable philosophies, however, the
differences between the United States and Australia regarding open trials
are significant. This Article now turns to three distinct, but related,
subjects to demonstrate those differences.
1.

Prior Restraints
a.

The United States

Trial judges in important criminal cases are often faced with serious
questions of undue pretrial publicity and related concerns about the
defendant's ability to receive a fair trial from an impartial jury and the
difficulty of closing a trial to the public. One solution that has often been
considered in the past is the entry of an order forbidding the media from
publishing certain key pieces of information about the trial, prior to its
termination. 406 After all, if the media can be ordered to withhold stories
about confessions or witness statements, both jurors and witnesses may
be spared the seemingly impossible task of trying to avoid being
influenced by highly material information.
Although prior American jurisprudence may have considered this
407
response, it is rarely discussed today, but not because it is ineffective.
404. See EDWARD JENKS & P.B. FAIREST, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73-74 (6th ed. 1967)
("[O]ne of the most conspicuous features of English justice, that all judicial trials are held in open
court, to which the public have free access, . . . appears to have been the rule in England from
time immemorial.").
405. 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 ( 1978).
406. See generally ALFRED FRIENGLY & RONALD L. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PuBLICITY, THE
IMPACT OF NEWS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 113-120 (1967).
407. For a comprehensive account of United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with
the press and the right to a fair trial, see, DoUGLAS S. CAMPBELL, FREE PRESS V. FAIR TRIAL:
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To the contrary, it can be most effective in curbing the media. Restricting
publication of this information is no longer a serious option because the
courts have consistently found this to be in violation of the free speech
and free press guarantees found in the First Amendment of the
Constitution. 408
Such a prohibition against the media is labeled a prior restraint,
because it restricts speech before it occurs, rather than allowing the
speech to take place and then providing punishment for the act. 409 Prior
restraints include "all government actions that result in the physical
interception and suppression of speech prior to its public expression.'>4 10
Because it is a prior restraint, it is, and has been historically, 4 ' ' considered
a more drastic infringement on free speech than later punishment. 412 If
information relevant to the trial cannot be heard, it cannot be evaluated
by the people. As a consequence, the courts scrutinize such orders with
strictness, for "liberty of the press ... has meant, principally although not
exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship."413
This principle was well stated by the United States Supreme Court
in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart. 414 The defendant was charged
with the commission of a series of grisly murders. 415 Not surprisingly, his
arrest, charge, and trial proceedings attracted tremendous media attention
in the area. 416 Lawyers for both the defense and the government asked the
court to enter an order limiting information being conveyed to the
public. 4 ' 7 In response, the trial judge prohibited anyone who attended the
pre-trial proceedings from "releas[ing] or authoriz[ing] the release for
public dissemination in any form or manner whatsoever any testimony
given or evidence adduced" before the commencement of the trial. 418 The
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS SINCE 1807 (1994) (listing and relating highlights of the
developments in this area of law from 1807 through 1991 ).
408. See Murphy v. State of Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 798 (1975); Press-Enter. Co. v.
Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 507 (1983); U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...." U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
409. Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Di/krence: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of
Prior Restraint, 68 N.C.L. REv. 1, 30-31 (1989).
410. Id
411. This dates all the way back to Cooley and Blackstone. See generally 3 RONALD
ROTIJNDA & JOHN NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE,
§§ 20.16, 20.25.
412. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1930).
413. Idat716.
414. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
415. Idat542.
416. Id
417. Id
418. Id
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trial judge justified the ruling saying that '"because of the nature of the
crimes charged in the complaint that there is a clear and present danger
that pre-trial publicity could impinge upon the defendant's right to a fair
trial.""'' 9 The state supreme court agreed with the trial court, but altered
the order, limiting the prohibition to the defendant's purported
confession, statements made by the defendant to others, and anything
else "strongly implicative" ofthe defendant. 420
The United States Supreme Court recognized that the state trial and
appeals judges attempted to act responsibly, "out of a legitimate concern,
in an effort to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.'"' 2 ' The Justices,
however, unanimously rejected the orders which had been entered by the
state judges. 422 To satisfy the Constitution, the Court held, the trial judge
must make particular findings as to three areas: the problem of pre-trial
publicity was intense, other alternatives would not limit the publicity,423
and the prior restraint would be effective in limiting the publicity. 424 The
Justices made clear that trial judges would have an extremely difficult
time in justifying restrictive orders using this three-part analysis:
[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and least
tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights . . . . A prior restraint
has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of
criminal or civil sanctions after publication "chills" speech, prior restraint
"freezes" it at least for the time ....
[The government must show that] further publicity, unchecked, would
so distort the views of potential jurors that 12 could not be found who
would, under proper instructions, fulfill their sworn duty to render a just
425
verdict exclusively on the evidence presented in open court.
Since the Nebraska Press decision, few trial judges have been
willing to enter such "gag orders" out of concern for the free speech and
press implications present with such direction. 426 Recognizing the
419. ld at 543 (internal citations omitted).
420. Id at 540.
421. Id at 555.
422. All nine Justices agreed that the pre-trial order was unconstitutional; however, three
Justices would have gone further and held that no prior restraint could ever be validly directed
against the media. Id at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring).
423. See inffa notes 427-428 and accompanying text.
424. Neb. PressAss'n, 427 U.S. at 562.
425. ld at 559, 569.
426. One notable exception is the odd situation found in the CNN/Manuel Noriega case.
United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543 (II th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, Cable News Network, Inc.
v. Noriega, 498 U.S. 97 (1990). During the criminal prosecution of Noriega, the former
Panamanian leader, CNN obtained tapes of conversations he had with his lawyers while in prison.
Id at 1545. The trial court ordered that CNN not broadcast the tapes on television. Id
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severity of the problems involving pre-trial publicity, trial courts have
developed a series of steps, just short of a prior restraint, designed to
lessen the impact of such publicity.427 These steps include continuances,
change of venue, intense examination of potential jurors as to the impact
of publicity, sequestering of jurors, detailed instructions to jurors
regarding the need to focus exclusively on the in-court testimony, and
orders limiting statements made by parties to the litigation, including
lawyers. 428 The only notable exceptions here relate to cases in which the
court orders new trials, or prosecutions which empanel anonymous
jurors, a relatively rare occurrence. 429
b.

Australia

The Australian approach to the concept of a fair trial is much more
institutionally orientated than in the United States where the courts place
greater weight on the rights to free speech and open justice. Australian
jurisprudence concerning fair trials tends to be cast in terms of the
necessary structural and procedural features that will protect the integrity
of the trial process. 43° Courts regard the principle of open justice as an
important adjunct to the fair trial insofar as it inhibits the arbitrary
exercise of judicial power. 431 However, it does not trump other principles
that also protect the integrity of the trial process such as maintenance of

Ultimately the trial judge vacated his order fmding that the broadcast did not threaten the
defendant's right to a fair trial. The initial order was upheld on appeal and the Supreme Court
refused to stay the restraining order. Cable News Network, Inc., 498 U.S. at 976. CNN never
paid the levied fme, but instead covered court costs and apologized on air for broadcasting the
tapes. CNN is Sentenced for Tapes and Makes Public Apology, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1994, at
B7.
427. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,723 (1961). In Irvin, the Court found that the trial
judge had substantial obligations to limit pre-trial publicity where the defendant was "tried in an
atmosphere ... [with a] huge wave of public passion and by a jury ... in which two-thirds of the
members admit, before hearing any testimony, to possessing a belief in his guilt." Id at 728. The
pre-trial publicity there was overwhelming, affecting virtually every citizen called as a potential
juror. Id at 723.
428. See generally Paul Marcus, The Media in the Courtroom: Attending, Reporting,
Televising Criminal Cases, 57 IND. L.J. 235, 235-44 (1982).
429. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907
(1980); United States v. Thornton, I F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 1993); People v. Goodwin, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d
576 (Cal. Ct.App. 1997); Commonwealth v. Angiulo, 615 N.E.2d !55 (Mass. 1993).
430. See Jago v. N.S.W Dist. Court (1989) 168 C.L.R. 23, 30-31 (per Mason, C.J.), 47-48
(per Brennan, J.), 71-72 (per Toohey, J.); Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292,299-300
(per Mason, C.J. & McHugh, J.), 363 (per Gaudron, J.); Kable v. Dir. Pub. Prosecutions New
South Wales ( 1995) 189 C.L.R. 51.
431. See Dickason v. Dickason (1913) 17 C.L.R. 50; Russell v. Russell (1976) 134 C.L.R.
495, 505; Nicholas v. The Queen (1998) 193 C.L.R. 173, 208-09 (per Gaudron, J.); John Fairfax
Publications v. Attorney-Gen. New South Wales (2000) 181 A.L.R. 694.
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the impartiality of the fact finder. 432 As one would expect from
institutionally based jurisprudence, unbridled media power is regarded as
433
more of a danger than arbitrary exercise of judicial power.
Directly contrary to the practice in the United States, Australian
courts are inclined to approach the danger of unbridled media power on
the basis that prevention is better than cure. The remedial techniques
preferred by U.S. courts to redress the actual dangers that may arise when
media coverage undermines a defendant's due process rights, such as
sequestration and questioning of jurors on the effect of pre-trial
publicity,434 are not generally practiced in Australia where they are seen as
an impediment to the efficiency of the trial process.435
The sub judice rule, a branch of contempt law, operates as the major
Australian prophylactic. As outlined by the High Court in Hinch v.
Attomey General (Victona), it is a contempt of court to publish material
that has a tendency to prejudice legal proceedings.436 It is not necessary
to show that actual prejudice has occurred as a result of a media
publication. 437 Prejudice may arise if the material published could affect
the testimony of potential witnesses, embarrass judicial officers
presiding over the trial, or influence members of the jury.438 Examples of
breaches of the sub judice rule include:
1.

2.
3.
4.

Publishing photographs of persons accused of criminal offenses
when it is likely that the identity of the assailants may come
into question439
Disclosure of voir dire revelations440
Publication of a pre-trial interview with a witness by one of the
parties441
Publication of past convictions442

432. R. v. Tait (1979) 46 F.L.R. 386, 404; Mirror Newspapers v. Waller (1985) 1
N.S.W.L.R. 1, 12-13.
433. Seeid
434. MICHAEL CHESTERMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIAN LAW: A DELICATE
PLANT 271 (2000).
435. See Murphy v. The Queen (1988) 167 C.L.R. 94, 99-100 (per Mason, C.J. & Toohey,
J.), 123 (per Brennan, J.).
436. Hinch v. Attorney-Gen. (Viet.) (1987) 164 C.L.R. 15, 34 (per Wilson, J.), 46 (per
Deane, J.), 70 (per Toohey, J.), 88 (per Gaudron, J.).
437. Idat46.
438. Id at 55.
439. R. v. ABC; Davies Brothers; Northern Television (TNT 9) & Tasmanian Television
(Unreported Supreme Court ofTasmania 2 Nov. 1983).
440. SeeR. v. Day & Thomson (1985) V.R. 261.
441. SeeAttorney-Gen. v. Mirror Newspapers, Ltd. (1980) 1 N.S.W.L.R. 375,390.
442. See Hinch, 164 C.L.R. at 15.
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Publication of an alleged confession443

It may also amount to contempt if media publications prejudge issues

before the court, regardless of whether the publications have the tendency
to undermine due process. 444
Despite its potential for stifling media commentary upon criminal
trials, the sub judice rule is limited in application. The rule only applies
while the trial is pending and during the currency of the trial. 445 It does
not operate after the trial when a defendant has exhausted all avenues of
appeal. 446 There will also be no contempt if the publication constitutes a
fair and accurate report of court proceedings made in good faith. 447
Furthermore, if the potential prejudice that the publication might cause is
outweighed by the public interest in discussing or disseminating
information about the case, the publication will not constitute
448
For example, in Attorney General v. John Fairfax
contempt.
Publications Pty. Ltd, an investigative article about a new drug boss in
Sydney did not amount to contempt (even though the man in question
was facing drug charges at the time of publication) because the article
did not discuss the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the
449
charges.
The sub judice rule has not been a particularly effective
prophylactic because Australian courts seem resigned to the fact that it is
impossible to hermetically seal juries from the influence of the media.450
As a result, a number of jurisdictions have passed statutory provisions to
suppress the publication of specific information such as the names and
addresses of the victim, witnesses, or accused, and evidence that might

443. See Attorney-Gen. v. TCN Channel Nine (1990) 20 N.S.W.L.R. 368.
444. This rule, known as the "pre-judgment" rule, is of doubtful application, although
some Australian judges have supported the existence of this additional basis for contempt liability.
Eg., Watts v. Hawke & David Syme & Co. (1976) V.R. 707; Commercial Bank of Austl. v.
Preston (1980) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 554; Victoria v. Australian Bldg. Constr. Employees & Builders
Labourers' Fed'n (1982) 152 C.L.R. 25, 167-68 (per Brennan, J.); Hinch, 164 C.L.R. at 54-55
(per Deane, J.) (expressing the view that pre-judging issues have a tendency to prejudice a fair
trial and that accordingly prejudging should be subsumed within the general Hinch test). ld
445. James v. Robinson (1963) 109 C.L.R. 593,608.
446. Seeid
447. See Cassidy v. Mercury Newspapers, Pty, Ltd. (1968) T. St. R. 198; The Queen v.
Pearce (1992) 7 W. Austl. R. 395.
448. Hinch, 164 C.L.R. at 22-25 (per Mason, C.J.), 37-42 (per Wilson, J.), 57 (per Deane,
J.).
449. John Fairfax Publications, 181 A.L.R. at 318, m!l28, 134; see also Sun Newspapers,
Ltd. v. Murray (1992) 58 A. Crim. R. 281, 288-89.
450. Murphy v. The Queen (1989) 167 C.L.R. 94,99 (per Mason, C.J. & Toohey, J.).
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later be excluded at trial. 451 These statutory provisions are related to, but
broader in application than, the sub judice rule as they operate to ensure
the proper administration of justice. The proper administration of justice
not only incorporates the facilitation of a fair trial, but also incorporates
interests such as the need to report crime, facilitate proper law
enforcement, protect victims of crime, and protect national security. 452
The statutory provisions are also much more effective than the sub judice
,rule as they identify and prevent the dissemination of particular
information, while the sub judice rule is usually applied after it is
breached. 453
Nonetheless, apart from South Australia where the basis for
obtaining suppression orders is particularly broad, Australian courts do
not make suppression orders frequently. 454 Even in South Australia which
issues approximately two hundred suppression orders per annum, the
principle of open justice receives primacy.455 The general distress and
suffering associated with involvement in court proceedings has been held
insufficient to justify issuing a suppression order. 456
The prophylactic approach taken under Australian law assumes that
the courts are best placed to regulate media coverage through devices
such as suppression orders and the deterrent threat of contempt
proceedings.457 It also reflects Australian courts' lack of faith in the
efficacy of remedial measures employed by U.S. courts. 458 Whether
Australian criminal trials are less transparent than U.S. criminal trials,
451. Eg. Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, §50 (Austl.); Evidence Act, 1971, §§ 8284 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Crimes Act, 1900, § 578-578A (N.S.W); Evidence Act, 1939, § 57(1) (N.
Terr. Austl.); Evidence Act, 1929, § 69A (S. Austl.); County Court Act, 1958, §§ 80-80AA
(Viet.); Supreme Court Act, 1986, §§ 18-19 (Viet.); Justices Act, 1902, § IOIC (W. Austl.);
Evidence Act, 1906, §§ llA, 36C (W. Austl.). The power of courts to restrict publication at
common Jaw is doubted. See Re 'Mr. C.' (1993) 67 A. Crim. R. 562; Raybos v. Jones (1985) 2
N.S.W.L.R. 47; John Fairfax & Sons Ltd. v. Police Tribunal (New South Wales) (1986) 5
N.S.W.L.R. 465, 477; Rockett v. Smith (1992) I Q.R. 660.
452. CoNTEMPT BY PuBLICATION§ 10.57 (N.S.W. Law Reform Comm'n Discussion Paper
No. 43, 2000) (hereinafter CONTEMPT BY PuBLICATION].
453. The Attorney-General, or a person with a special interest, in the trial may apply for an
injunction to prohibit the publication of specified material under the sub judice rule, but this is
rarely done because of the difficulty of passing the requisite burden of proof. TCN Channel
Nine, 20 N.S.W.L.R. at 368.
454. Evidence Act, 1929, § 69A (S. Austl.); CONTEMPT BY PuBLICATION, supra note 452,
~ 10.72.
455. ArroRNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA, REPORT MADE PuRsUANT TO SECTION 71
OF THE EVIDENCE ACT, 1929 RELATING TO SUPPRESSION ORDERS (JUNE 30, 2000).
456. Advertiser Newspapers Ltd. v. Bunting (2000) S.A. S. Ct. 458, ~ 16.
457. See Johnston v. Cameron (2002) F. Ct. Austl. 251, 2002 WL 1904419; Cheatle &
Sturdy v. Davy (1989) 51 S.A. St. R. 155; G. v. The Queen (1984) 35 S.A. St. R. 349, 352 (per
King, C.J.).
458. See Marcus, The Media in the Courtroom, supra note 428.
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however, ultimately depends on the breadth and quality of the media
scrutiny they receive.
2.

Closure Orders
a.

The United States

Two constitutional principles make it extremely difficult for an
American trial judge to order a criminal trial, or any nontrivial criminal
proceeding, closed to the public and the media. The first is the Sixth
Amendment right to an open trial, and the second is the First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and the press. 459 The former right
is of the accused, the latter is ofthe public. 460 Together, these rights have
been construed by the U.S. courts to create an almost impossibly high
hurdle which must be overcome before any closure order will be
allowed. 461 It is a curious constitutional analysis to see the courts utilize
the two specific rights together in order to create a "presumption of
openness [which] inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial."462
The requirement of an open trial extends to most of the proceedings
attached to the trial itself,463 including almost all pretrial matters. 464 When
459. U.S. CONST. amends. I, VI.
460. Id
461. See infia notes 490-491 and accompanying text.
462. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 556 (1980).
463. The Supreme Court has spoken forcefully of the need for open hearings:
When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest
often follows. Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic
purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. Without
an awareness that society's responses to criminal conduct are underway, natural human
reactions of outrage and protest are frustrated and may manifest themselves in some
form of vengeful "self-help," as indeed they did regularly in the activities of vigilante
"committees" on our frontiers. "The accusation and conviction or acquittal, as much
perhaps as the execution of punishment, operat[e] to restore the imbalance which was
created by the offense or public charge, to reatrrrm the temporarily lost feeling of
security and, perhaps, to satisfy that latent 'urge to punish."'
Civilized societies withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante the
enforcement of criminal laws, but they cannot erase from people's consciousness the
fundamental, natural yearning to see justice done-or even the urge for retribution.
The crucial prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot function in the
dark; no community catharsis can occur if justice is "done in a corner [or] in any covert
manner." It is not enough to say that results alone will satiate the natural community
desire for "satisfaction." A result considered untoward may undermine public
confidence, and where the trial has been concealed from public view an unexpected
outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best has failed and at worst has been
corrupted. To work effectively, it is important that society's criminal process "satisfy
the appearance of justice," and the appearance of justice can best be provided by
allowing people to observe it.
Jd at 571-72 (internal citations omitted).
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a court contemplates closure, even for a portion of the proceeding, the
law requires the court to look to the facts of the specific case and make
465
particular findings which support closure:
[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding
interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than
necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable
alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make fmdings adequate
466
to support the closure.

Very few recent U.S. trials, even notorious prosecutions,467 have been
468
conducted in less than a fully open fashion. To be sure, the trend has
464. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 512 (1984); Press-Enter. Co. v.
Superior Court (II), 478 U.S. I, 14 (1986). Courts view grand jury proceedings as investigatory
rather than accusatory and, thus, are not open. Id
465. The fmdings must show that "there is a substantial probability that the defendant's
right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second,
reasonable alternatives to closure carmot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights."
Press-Enter. Co. II, 478 U.S. at 14.
466. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984). The fmdings must demonstrate "that
closure is essential and narrowly tailored." Bell v. Jarvis, 198 E3d 432, 440 (4th Cir. 1999).
467. Consider, for instance, these trials which were widely publicized, and completely
open:
I.
O.J. Simpson, murder;
2.
Theodore Kaczynski, the "unibomber";
3.
Jeffrey Dahmer, serial killer;
4.
Andrea Yates, pleaded insanity defense after drowning her children;
5.
John Hinckley, attempted assassination of President Reagan;
6.
Timothy McVeigh, Oklahoma City bombing;
7.
Colin Ferguson, mass killings on New York railroad;
8.
Louise Woodward, British narmy accused of killing a child;
9.
John duPont, killing of Olympic wrestler;
I 0.
Marv Albert, television broadcaster tried for sexual battery.
Several recent matters make the point with clarity. In one of the most intense issues of recent
times, sixty-five priests in the Boston area were accused of sexually abusing children. Rejecting a
request by the Archdiocese of Boston, a judge ordered that II ,000 documents regarding the
matters be made available to the public. Pam Belluck, Judge Denies Churchs Bid to Seal
Records on Priests, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26,2002, atA18.
Similarly, the court ordered open hearings in the case involving the daughter of Florida
Governor Jeb Bush (niece of United States President George W. Bush). Responding to claims
that the proceedings should be closed because of the rehabilitative concerns of a drug court status
hearing, the court wrote:
[T]here is a strong presumption that almost all court proceedings are open to the public
and the press. . . . "[P]ublic access to the courts is an important part of the criminal
justice system, as it promotes free discussion of governmental affairs by imparting a
more complete understanding to the public of the judicial system [and] the people have
a right to know what occurs in the courts."
State of Florida v. Bush, Case #48-02-CF-6371-0, Order Denying Motion to Close Drug Court
Proceedings, 8, 14 (Fla. 9th cir. Ct. Oct. 15, 2002) (internal citations omitted). See also the Court
of Appeals ruling reversing the trial judge's decision to close the voir dire examination of
potential jurors in the Martha Stewart case. The court explained the strong need for keeping
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been to open the trials even further, with many stateS469 allowing the
470
During this time, the United States has
televising of court hearingS.
seen the creation of a cable network designed for the purpose of
televising court actions. 471
b.

Australia

Although Australian courts apply both common law472 and statutory
powers473 to restrict access to their proceedings, as a matter of practice,
the courts use these powers sparingly. That 'justice should not only be
done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done" is an
aphorism often repeated within the Australian legal community. 474
Consequently, legislation requiring that proceedings be held in camera
without considering the primacy of open justice would be struck down as
criminal trials open. A.B.C. Inc. v. United States, 360 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2004). In perhaps the most
widely reported criminal case in recent years, involving the Washington, D.C. "snipers"
prosecutions, the judge ordered that preliminary proceedings involving the juvenile defendant be
kept open. See Maria Glod, Malva Case Hearing to Stay Open, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2003, at
B 1; see also inffa notes 491-492 and accompanying text.
468. The trial judge will normally look for an alternative to closure such as the possibility
of a change of venue (as in the Timothy McVeigh prosecution where the case was moved from
Oklahoma City to Denver, or the Washington D.C. "sniper'' prosecutions where the cases were
moved from one area of Virginia to another) or more intense questioning of jurors, the voir dire
process. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (lOth Cir. 1998); see In re Washington Post
Motion to Open Juvenile Detention Hearing, 247 F. Supp. 2d 761 (D. Md. 2003); see also inffa
notes 518-519 and accompanying text.
469. See, e.g., N.Y. Juo. LAW§ 218; Cook v. First Morris Bank, 719 A.2d 724 (N.J. Super.
1998). The federal courts do not, however, permit televisions in the courtrooms.
470. In most states, the matter is given to the trial court's discretion, as the judge can
"forbid coverage whenever satisfied that coverage may have a deleterious effect on the paramount
right of the defendant to a fair trial." Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 566 (1981).
471. Court Tv, when selecting trials for television coverage, looks to factors such as: how
important and interesting the issues in the case are; the newsworthiness of the case and the people
involved; the quality and educational value of the trial; and the expected length of the trial.
COURTROOM TELEVISION NETWORK LLC, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT COURT T.V.,
htpp://www.courttv.com/about/ctvfaq.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2003).
472. Scott v. Scott (1913) C.L.R. 417, 436; Dickason v. Dickason (1913) 17 C.L.R. 50,5051; Russell v. Russell (1976) 134 C.L.R. 495, 503; David Syme & Co. v. Gen. Motors-Holden's
Ltd. (1984) 2 N.S.WL.R. 294, 299-300 (per Street, J.); Raybos v. Jones (1985) 2 N.S.WL.R. 47,
50-53 (per Kirby, J.).
473. Federal Court of Australia Act, 1976, § 17(4) (Austl.); Evidence Act, 1971, §§ 82,
83(2) (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Supreme Court Act, 1970, § 80 (N.S.W); Supreme Court Act, 1979,
§ 17 (N. Terr. Austl.); Evidence Act, 1939, § 57(1) (N. Terr. Australia); Supreme Court of
Queensland Act, 1991, § 128 (Queens!.); Evidence Act, 1929, § 69(1) (S. Austl.); Supreme Court
Act, 1986, §§ 18-19 (Viet.); Bail Act, 1982, § 20 (W Austl.); Criminal Code Act, 1913,
§ 635A(2) (W Austl.).
474. The King v. Sussex Justices Ex parte McCarthy (1924) LR 256, 259; Hon. J.J.
Spigelman, Seen to Be Done: The Principle of Open Justice Part/, 74 AUSTI... L.J. 290, 293
(2000).
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475

unconstitutional. The principle of open justice will prevail, except to
the point where the administration of justice becomes impractical. For
example:
If the very openness of court proceedings would destroy the attainment of
justice in the particular case (as by vindicating the activities of the
blackmailer) or discourage its attainment in cases generally (as by
frightening off blackmail victims or informers) or would derogate from
even more urgent considerations of public interest (as by endangering
national security) the rule of openness must be modified to meet the
476
exigencies of the particular case.
Australian courts generally prefer to use devices such as
pseudonyms to refer to confidential or secret information477 as well as the
use of suppression orders to safeguard specific information rather than
478
using blanket closure. The courts have remained open even where the
evidence before them has been unsavory, or would cause embarrassment
or harm to those involved. 479
Members of the Australian media have no greater array of privileges
than members of the public. Consequently, Australia restricts the media's
access to information more than the United States does. Moreover,
Australian courts tend to manage the media to a greater degree through
the use of public relations officers and media officers. 48° Courts permit
481
members of the media to attend court and to take notes on testimony.
475. See John Fairfax Publications Pty. Ltd. v. Attorney-Gen. New South Wales (2000)
N.S.W. Ct. App. 198 (holding that section lOlA of the Supreme Court Act of 1970 was invalid
insofar as it required that appeals from an acquittal for contempt by the Attorney-General were to
be heard in camera). The New South Wales Court of Appeal, relying on Kable v. DP.P.,
determined that section I 0 I A was incompatible with the exercise of the judicial power of the
Commonwealth. John Fairfax Group Pty. Ltd. v. Local Court of New South Wales (1991) 26
N.S.W.L.R. 131, 141 (per Kirby, J.); see also Cain v. Lars [No 2] (1985) 3 N.S.W.L.R. 230, 246
(stating proceedings were held in camera to protect police informer); R. v. Socialist Worker
Printers & Publishers Ltd., Ex parte Attorney-Gen. (1975) Q.B. 637,651-52 (stating proceedings
were held in camera to protect blackmail victim); Attorney-Gen. v. Leveller Magazine Ltd. (1979)
A.C. 440 (stating proceedings were held in camera to protect national security); R. v. McGrath
(200 I) Q.R. 131 (stating proceedings were held in camera to protect identity of defendant who
had co-operated with the police).
476. John Fairfax Group v. Local Court of New South Wales (1991) 26 N.S.W.L.R. 131,
141 (per Kirby, J. ).
4 77. The Australian media does not have general access to documents kept on file in court
proceedings: Smith v. Harris (1996) 2 V:R. 335; Ex ParteTiteiius v. Pub. Serv. Appeal Bd. (1999)
21 W.A.R. 201.
4 78. See CONTEMPT BY PuBLICATION, supra note 452, ~ I 0.12.
479. See Raybos v. Jones (1985) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 47, 59 (per Kirby, J.), 61-62 (per Samuels,
J.), 63-64 (per Priestly, J.); R. v. Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies (1984) Q.B. 227; The Queen
v. Tait ( 1979) 46 E.L.R. 386;. R. v. Hamilton (1930) 30 (N.S. W.) St. R. 277.
480. CONTEMPT BY PuBLICATION, supra note 452, ~ 1.47-1.61.
481. CHESTERMAN, supra note 434, at 254-55.
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However, the media does not have the right to photograph witnesses or to
482
televise proceedings, and the media has no access to documents that are
483
Should the court proceed in camera,
not read out in open court.
publication of what occurred would constitute contempt of court. 484
3.

Secrecy for Jurors
a.

The United States

As in Australia, the criminal justice system in the United States sees
the jury as a central tenant. While trials do not resolve most criminal
cases,485 virtually all citizens appear convinced that jurors are essential
players in determining the guilt of accused individuals. 486 The right to
trial by jury is an explicit guarantee in the Constitution, and has been
vigorously extolled by virtually every public figure in the nation. 487 As
noted by the United States Supreme Court in perhaps its most famous
statement on the subject:

482. It is in contempt to film proceedings except with the permission of the court, but
courts rarely give permission: Wendy Harris, Don't Rush to Judgment on Court TV in the OJ.
Simpson ADermath, 3 MEDIA L. REP. I ( 1995); DANIEL STEPNIAK, ELECTRONIC MEDIA COVERAGE
OF COURTS: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA ( 1998).
483. Smith v. Harris (I 996) 2 V.R. 335; Ex ParteTitelius, WAR. at 201.
484. ReF(J977)AIIE.R.J14, 122-23.
485. While the numbers vary from state to state, guilty pleas nationwide dispose of
criminal cases about two-thirds of the time. EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2002: A
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT (Brian J. Ostrom et al., eds. 2003),
http://www.ncsconline.org!D.Researchlcsp/2002_Files/2002_Criminal.pdf;
U.S.
DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
govlbjs/pub/pdf/cfjs0004.pdf. A leading criminal procedure treatise states:
[T]he great majority of criminal cases are disposed of by plea of guilty rather than by
trial. Sometimes this plea is the result of nothing more than implicit plea bargaining in
that the defendant enters his plea merely because it is generally known that this is the
route to a Jesser sentence. But more common is explicit bargaining in which the
defendant enters a plea of guilty only after a commitment has been made that
concessions will be granted (or at least sought) in his particular case.
WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 956 (3d ed. 2000).
486. See Janet Stidman Eveleth, Will Jury Reforms Attract More Jurors?, 33 Mo. B.J. 42
(2000): "According to an American Bar Association 1998 public opinion poll, '78 percent of the
public rates our jury system as the fairest way to determine guilt or innocence, and 69 percent
consider juries to be the most important part of the justice system."' Id at 44 (internal citations
omitted).
487. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
However, the guarantee is not absolute. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). A jury
trial is not required in all criminal prosecutions, as the Supreme Court has consistently excluded
prosecutions for "petty offenses" from the mandate. Id at 160.
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[B]y the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in criminal cases had
been in existence in England for several centuries and carried impressive
credentials traced by many to Magna Carta. Its preservation and proper
operation as a protection against arbitrary rule were among the major
objectives of the revolutionary settlement which was expressed in the
Declaration and Bill ofRights of 1689.
Jury trial came to America with English colonists, and received
strong support from them. Royal interference with the jury trial was deeply
resented.
The Declaration of Independence stated solemn objections to the
King's making "Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries," to his "depriving us
in many cases, of the benefits ofTrial by Jury," and to his ''transporting us
beyond Seas to be tried for pretended offenses."
The constitutions adopted by the original States guaranteed jury trial.
Also, the constitution of every State entering the Union thereafter in one
488
form or another protected the right to jury trial in criminal cases.
Even skeletal history provides impressive support for declaring the right
to a jury trial in criminal cases as fundamental to our system of justice.
The Court has noted, for example: "Those who emigrated to this country
from England brought with them this great privilege 'as their birthright
and inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law which had
fenced around and interposed barriers on every side against the
489
approaches of arbitrary power."'
Jury trials continue to receive strong support. The laws of every
490
state guarantee the right to trial by jury in serious criminal cases. No
state has dispensed with it, nor are there significant movements
underway to do so. 491
While both nations recognize the right to trial by jury, the rights in
practice are considerably different. As noted above, Australian lawyers
have limited access to information about jurors and do not participate
extensively in the voir dire process. In the United States, however,
lawyers generally are active in the process, often with considerable pre492
trial information about jurors.
488. Id at 151-53.
489. Id at 154 (internal citations omitted).
490. See 1d at 151-54.
491. SeeJdat151-59.
492. See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 83.5 (3d ed. 1992) (noting accompanying commentary, particularly Standards 8-3.5, 8-3.6). A
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The greatest difference may be the ability of the public to gather
information about the jury determination process after the jury has
reached a verdict. It is routine for U.S. jurors to make public
announcements after major trials, describing their own thought processes
and the evidence presented by both sides.493 Whether in the form of
books written about the O.J. Simpson trial,494 or news conferences held
after the Arthur Andersen prosecution,495 it is not uncommon to hear
about criminal trials from the jurors' viewpoints.
Once again, the influence of the free speech provision of the First
Amendment is evident in the practices adopted in the U.S. criminal
justice system.496 Trial judges rarely issue broad orders prohibiting jurors
from speaking with the media at a trial's conclusion, nor do they direct
media representatives to avoid seeking interviews.497 When courts enter
such orders, they are invariably struck down on the grounds that they
high publicity espionage trial discussed in an Associated Press article demonstrates the point
again, Jwy Pool in Espionage Trial Asked Thoughts About Death Penalty, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 13, 2003, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/cgi-binlbi/gold_print.cgi. For a
broad discussion of the need, generally, to avoid limiting disclosure of jurors' identities, see State
v. Tucker, 657 N.W2d 374 (Wis. 2003).
493. There are many current instances of this occurring. The most specific and obvious
instances of this are the statements recently made by the jurors in the D.C. "sniper'' cases. See
Tamara Jones, Jwy Recommends Death Penalty in Muhammed Trial, WASH. POST Nov. 24, 2003,
at AI; James Dao, Sniper Jwy Cites Lack of Sorrow !Or Death Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
2003, at AI; Adam Liptak, YOung Sniper Given Sentence of Life Tenn, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2003, at AI.
494. A few of the jurors who participated in O.J. Simpson's case wrote books describing
their reactions to the evidence and to the lawyers, as well as to the deliberative process. See, e.g.,
AMANDA COOLEY ET AL., MADAM FOREMAN: A RUSH 1D JUIXiMENT? (1995); MICHAEL KNOX &
MIKE WALKER, THE PRivATE DIARY OF AN O.J. JUROR: BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE TRIAL OF THE
CENrURY ( 1995). In addition, the media conducted numerous press conferences with jurors soon
after the verdict in the case. See Juror: 'QJ. Simpson didn't do it', CNN.COM, Oct. 4, 1995,
available atwww.cnn.com/US/OJ/daily/951 011 0-04/moran/.
495. See Associated Press, Andersen's Conviction Could Kill It, CBSNEWS.COM, June
15, 2002, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/l O/nationaVprintable511769.
shtml.
496. The point was well made in Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990). Florida had
enacted a statute essentially prohibiting a witness from ever disclosing the testimony he had given
to the grand jury. ld While the case involved grand jury proceedings rather that the usual trial
jury deliberations, the point may even be stronger in that context for the Justices recognized that
"the proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of the grand jury
proceedings." Jd at 630. Still, the Court unanimously struck down the law. ld at 624. In
response to the argument that courts require secrecy as a matter of security for the subject of the
grand jury investigation, the Justices wrote, "When an investigation ends, there is no longer a
need to keep information from the targeted individual in order to prevent his escape-that
individual presumably will have been exonerated, on the one hand, or arrested or otherwise
informed of the charges against him, on the other." Jd at 632. One would think that this principle
would apply with equal force to the juror in a criminal case once the defendant has been tried.
497. See infta notes 498-502 and accompanying text.
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"encompassed every possible juror interview situation.'"'98 To be valid,
such orders must "reflect an impending threat of jury harassment rather
than a generalized misgiving about the wisdom of such interviews.'"'99
See, for instance, In re The Express-News Corp., where the trial judge
issued a broad restrictive order concerning interviews of former jurors. 500
The appeals court invalidated the order:
The rule is unlimited in time and in scope, applying equally to jurors
willing and anxious to speak and to jurors desiring privacy, forbidding both
courteous as well as uncivil communications, and foreclosing questions
about a juror's general reactions as well as specific questions about other
jurors' votes that might, under at least some circumstances, be
•
•
501
mappropnate.

Restrictive orders are generally only entered and upheld when they
narrowly restrict discussion either of the views of specific jurors (other
than the person being interviewed), or of the process itself, as opposed to
the reactions and observations of the interviewed person. 502
Perhaps the best illustration of the relative ease with which U.S.
jurors can convey thoughts about their experience may be found in
connection with death penalty prosecutions. Throughout the nation, in
work sponsored by the Capital Jury Project, researchers have spoken at
length with more than a thousand individuals who have served as jurors
in capital cases. 503 One of the authors of this Article pursued the most
recent research in Virginia. 504 There, law students conducted intensive
interviews with sixteen capital jurors concerning the jurors' views about
the process, the evidence, the roles of the lawyers and judges, and the
deliberations that took place. 505

498. Contra Costa Newspapers v. Superior Court Contra Costa County, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d
69, 73 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1998).
499. United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1364 (3d Cir. 1994).
500. In reThe Express News Co., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982).
501. /dat810.
502. See United States v. Cleveland, 128 F.3d 267, 270 (5th Cir. 1997). The court was
careful to note that the order was limited to forbidding discussion about "deliberations" which
refers only to the discussions about the case occurring among jurors within the sanctity of the jury
room. Id "A juror in this case may be interviewed about his own 'general reactions' to the trial
proceedings ... [and the order] does not purport to prevent jurors from speaking out on their own
initiative." Jd
503. See Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt Is
Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REv.
1011, 1017 (2001).
504. See Stephen P. Garvey & Paul Marcus, Virginia Capital Jurors, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 2063 (2003).
505. ld at 2089-98.
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Australia

The criminal trial jury has been described by the High Court as a
"fundamental institution in our traditional system of justice" whose
primary function is to protect citizens from the overzealous exercise of
authority by the governmene06 Paradoxically, however, it is an institution
that operates in secrecy and with little accountability. Nevertheless, an
overwhelming majority of Australians regard trial by jury as the fairest
507
way to judge a criminal trial. That faith rests upon the independence of
the jury, and, consequently, its implicit lack of bias. 508 However, when
comparing the Australian and U.S. systems, the mechanisms for ensuring
impartiality and representativeness seem rather underdeveloped in
Australia. In Australia, the courts select potential jurors at random from
the electoral roll, although a substantial number of occupations are
exempted. 509 There are also grounds to apply to be excused from jury
duty. 510 As a result, the range of persons eligible for jury duty is not
representative of the community at large.
According to Australian practice, the only inquiries made of
empanelled jurors concern:
1.

2.

whether the venireman is related to or knows the
accused/victim/prosecutor/defense counseVprincipal witnesses
involved in the case; and
whether the venireman knows of any reason why he or she
cannot render a verdict in accordance with the evidence. 511

These inquiries are made orally on an informal basis while the
veniremen sit in the body of the court. Individual views on the matter to
be tried cannot be examined, except where a prima facie case has been
established to show cause for challenging a particular juror. 512 Lawyers
506. Brown v. The Queen (1986) 160 C.L.R. 171, 197 (per Brennan, J.); Kingswell v. The
Queen (1985) 159 C.L.R. 264, 301 (per Deane, J.).
507. G. Wilkinson, Majonty Verdict in Favour of System, HERALD SUN, Feb. 3, 1995, at
22-23.
508. Australia also accepts jury nullification of the law. Yager v. The Queen (1977) 139
C.L.R. 28, 38-39 (per Barwick, C.J.).
509. Eg., Jury Exemption Act, 1965 (Austl.); Jury Act, 1977, § 6 (N.S.W.); Jury Act, 1995,
§ 4 (Queensl.); Juries Act, 1927, §§ 12-13 (S. Austl.); Juries Act, 2000, § 5 (Viet.); Juries Act,
1957, § 5 (W Austl.).
510. Eg., Jury Act, 1977, § 7 (N.S.W.); Jury Act, 1995, §§ 19-23 (Queensl.); Juries Act,
1957, § 5 (W. Austl.); Juries Act, 2000, § 8 (Viet.).
511. MARK FINDLAY, JURY MANAGEMENT IN NEW SOUTH WALES 44 ( 1994).
512. Murphy v. The Queen (1989) 167 C.L.R. 94, 104 (per Mason, C.J. & Toohey, J.);
Connell v. The Queen [No 6] (1994) 12 W.A.R. 133, 162-68; Bush v. The Queen (1993) 43 F.C.R.
549, 551.
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rarely make challenges for cause because of the difficulty in obtaining
evidence about jurors. 513 While defense and prosecution counsel retain
the right of preemptory challenge,514 the practice of jury vetting is limited
to matters related to disqualification; therefore, counsel cannot exercise
this right on any rational basis other than a desire to have a jury
composed of people who look like the right sort of people to sit in
judgmene's Indeed, the Australian jury is a relatively anonymous body
to those directly involved with the trial.
The inability to examine jurors' views is consistent with the secrecy
surrounding jury deliberations. Jury deliberations are not recorded nor
are they made available in any Australian jurisdiction. 516 It is an offense
to elicit comments from jurors concerning the trial or their
deliberations. 517 Publication in most jurisdictions of jurors' identities, or
information concerning jury deliberations, is illegal. 518 Evidence from
jurors about their deliberations is inadmissible. 519
Australia inherited the anonymity and secrecy surrounding the jury
from England that remains consistent with current English practice. 520
Historically, anonymity and secrecy originated in the shift from the self521
informing jury to the trial-informing jury. Once jurors changed from
neighbors who investigated the case and formed views on liability prior
513. JOHN BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 498 (2d ed. 1998).
514. The number of preemptory challenges that the defense and prosecution counsel may
exercise varies from state to state:
I.
Juries Act, 1927, § 61 (S. Austl.)- 3 preemptory challenges each;
2.
Juries Act, 1995, § 42 (Queensl.)- 2 preemptory challenges each;
3.
Jury Act, 1977, § 42 (N.S.W)- 3 preemptory challenges each;
4.
Juries Act, 1957, § 38 (W Austl.)- 5 preemptory challenges each;
5.
Juries Act, 2000, §§ 38-39 (Viet.)- 6 preemptory challenges each, if one is accused.
515. See Katsuno v. The Queen (1999) 199 C.L.R. 40, 50-51.
516. Brendan Cassidy, Juries: Speaking Some Thoughts on Removing the "Gag" on Jury
Deliberations, 25 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 9, 9-10 (2000).
517. Juries Act, 1967, § 42C(3) (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Jury Act, 1977, § 68A (N.S.W); Juries
Act, 2000, § 49A-B (N. Terr. Austl.); Jury Act, 1995, § 70(3) (Queensl.); Criminal Law
Consolidation Act, 1935, § 246(3) (S. Austl.); Juries Act, 2000, § 89(J)(b) (Viet.); Juries Act,
1957, § 56C (WAustl.).
518. Juries Act, § 42C(4) 1967 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Jury Act, 1977, §§ 68, 68B (N.S.W);
Juries Act, 2000, §§ 49A-B (N. Terr. Austl.); Jury Act, 1995, § 79(2) (Queensl.); Criminal Law
Consolidation Act, 1935, § 246(4) (S. Austl.); Juries Act, 2000, § 78(1)(a) (Viet.); Juries Act,
1957, § 56D (W Austl. ). Tasmania is the only jurisdiction without this offense.
519. Evidence Act, 1995, § 129(4) (Austl.) (also codified in New South Wales and
Australian Capital Territory); Ellis v. Deheer (1922) 2 K.B. 113, 115-17; R. v. Thompson (1962) I
All E.R. 65, 66; In Re Donovan's Application (1957) V.R. 333, 336-37; In Re Matthews & Ford
(I 973) V.R. 199; R. v. Challinger (I 989) 2 Q.R. 352; Matta v. R. (I 995) 119 F.L.R. 414.
520. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, § 8 (Eng.).
521. NORMAN F. CANIDR, IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMON LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 195 ( 1997).
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to attending court to a body of persons without connection to the matter
determining the issues according to the evidence presented at trial,
secrecy was considered a necessary adjunct to protect them from
importuning or oppression. 522 Secrecy was also considered a necessary
adjunct to the greater democratization of jury selection that followed the
shift to the trial-informing jury. 523 When jurors became selected at
random from large urban populations bringing with them various
backgrounds and views, it was inevitable that factual findings would
become the product of compromise and that some would rest on
premises contrary to legal and moral norms. It was feared that exposure
of such deliberations would undermine public confidence in the criminal
justice system and deleteriously effect the finality of decision-making. 524
The fear that wider community participation in the jury might affect
the quality of jury verdicts provides a partial explanation for the
development of divergent practices in the United States. 525 Whereas the
Anglo-Australian criminal justice system regards secrecy as a necessary
rampart for democratization, ironically openness is seen as a palliative to
democratization in the United States by providing greater
accountability. 526 The incongruity of these positions has been attributed
to "differences in social conditions growing largely out of heterogeneity
of population and extent of territories."527 However, while that might
apply as between the United States and England, it does not apply
between the United States and Australia, which also has a comparatively
heterogeneous population diffusely spread over a large land mass. 528
Constitutional protection within the Sixth Amendment is another
explanation put forward for the development of divergent practices in the
United States on the basis that enshrining the right to a jury within a
democratically-oriented constitution provides a stronger foundation to
develop mechanisms that enhance participation and transparency. 529
522. The Honorable Justice McHugh, Jurors' Deliberations, Jury Secrecy, Public Policy
and the Law of Contempt, in THE JURY UNDER ArrACK 56, 62-65 (Mark Findlay & Peter Duff
eds., 1988) (proposing that secrecy is necessary to facilitate frank discussion in the jury room and
thus encourages better decision-making).
523. The Honorable Justice McHugh argues that to preserve public confidence in the
criminal justice system requires jury secrecy. /d at 62.
524. ControCassidy, supra note 516, at 11-13.
525. CANTOR, supra note 521, at 198.
526. See in/Ta notes 531-532 and accompanying text.
527. Roger D. Moore, l-Vli" Dire Examination ofJurors, 17 GEO. L.J. 13, 36 (1928-1929).
528. Sebastian Clark, Addendum to MANNING CLARK, A SHORT HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA
328,335 (4th ed. 1995).
529. VICT., LAW REFORM COMM., JURY SERVICE IN VICTORIA FINAL REPORT 7.4-7.12
(1997).
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However, again, while that explanation might apply as between England
and the United States, it is not applicable as between the United States
and Australia where section 80 of the Australian Constitution guarantees
a right to be tried by jury at least for serious criminal offenses created by
federal law. 530
A more likely explanation lies in the lurking political distrust
Americans harbor for the establishment (including the judiciary). 531
From independence, the American jury has been seen as a political
weapon. 532 To ensure its efficacy under this premise, accountability
through the examination of jurors' credentials and transparency of
decision-making became a required formality of due process. 533
Although the jury is also valued in Australia by accused persons for peer
empathy, it is not so highly valued as an essential component of the
democratic system. Except for the most serious criminal cases, jury
trials are rare. 534
V.

TRYING TO EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCES

To this point we have reviewed the many structural similarities in
the criminal justice systems of Australia and the United States. This
Article has also analyzed the several highly significant differences in the
judicial systems of the two nations. We now offer two distinct
perspectives on the reasons for those differences.

A.

A US. Point ofV'iew

Seymour Martin Lipset, in his seminal work, Amencan
Exceptionalism, writes that "[t]he United States is exceptional in starting
from a revolutionary event, in being 'the first new nation,' the first
colony, other than Iceland, to become independent."535 It is that
exceptional foundation that helps explain why the American viewpoint of
the criminal justice system is starkly at odds with the views of
530. SeeR. v. Archdall & Roskruge Ex parte Carrigan & Brown (1928) 41 C.L.R. 128.
531. See, e.g., comments from the United States Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial
Reflections, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 74 (1990).
532. Alexis de Tocqueville, Trial by Jury in the United States Considered as a Political
Institution, in DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280-97 (rev. 1948); LYSSANDER SPOONER, AN ESSAY ON
THE TRIAL BY JURY 1-19 (1989).
533. See SPOONER, supra note 532, at 1-19.
534. Wayne Westling & Vicki Waye, Promoting Faimess and Efficiency in Jury Trials, 20
CRIM. L.J. 127, 127 (1996).
535. SEYMOUR MARTIN LlPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 18 (1996) (internal citations
omitted).
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Australians (as well as those of citizens in other common law based
nations). Thus, while all share similar opinions about the stakes present
in crafting a fair criminal justice system, the founding of America more
than two centuries ago, when the need for independence seemed
extremely urgent, heavily influences the stakes present for Americans. 536
This founding based on independence led to an "emphasis on individual
rights," which greatly shaped the rules and policies found today in the
U.S. criminal justice system. 537
Alexis de Tocqueville commented long ago on the role of the
United States Constitution, its preeminent position in American society,
and its influence on all important aspects of that society. 538 While the
notion of rights in the people hardly originated with the American
Founding Fathers, the role of the United States Constitution and its
explicit statement of citizen rights (especially in connection with criminal
prosecutions) can best be understood by looking at the early American
reaction to the period of English rule. 539 As the President of the American
Bar Association put it: "A reading of recent biographies of founding
fathers John Adams, Thomas Jefferson and their junior, John Marshall,
underlines a theme often missed in civics texts-their loathing of the
king 's courts."540
One could easily add to this statement a hatred of the broad powers
of the law enforcement community and the limited right of review of
these powers. As noted earlier, these concerns inspired the Bill of Rights
guarantees, including: limitations on searches; statements as to rules
concerning confessions; and the roles of counsel, judge, and jury, among

536. The United States Supreme Court stated: "[W]e are forced to resolve a conflict
between two fimdarnental interests of society; its interest in prompt and efficient law
enforcement, and its interest in preventing the rights of its individual members from being
abridged by unconstitutional methods of law enforcement." Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
315 (1959).
537. ALFREDO GARCIA, THE FIITH AMENDMENT-A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH 32
(2002); LIPSET, supra note 535, at 21 (noting that the "American revolutionary libertarian tradition
does not encourage obedience to the state and the law").
538. De Tocqueville, supra note 532, at 101.
In the United States the Constitution governs the legislator as much as the private
citizen: it is the first of laws, it cannot be modified by a law; and it is therefore just that
the tribunals should obey the Constitution in preference to any law. This condition
belongs to the very essence of the judicature; for to select that legal obligation by which
he is most strictly bound is in some sort the natural right of every magistrate.

ld
539. "The idea of rights that was formally articulated in America in 1776 had European
roots." Louis Henkin, Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 LA. L. REv. I 023, I 024 ( 1989).
540. Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., Uniquely Amencan, A.B.A. J., May 2003, at 8.

2004]

AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES

99

others. 541 It is this reaction to the British control over the colonists (a
reaction the Australians appeared never to have experienced), which
seems to be chief among the reasons for the U.S. structured system of
criminal justice, complete with numerous important safeguards. 542 In
short, this led in the United States, but not in Australia, as noted later, to a
compact between the state and its people. And, a compact is not simply a
statement of responsibilities and powers of the State, but rather an
agreement or covenant between the State and its citizens.
That compact is based on the idea of rights. One astute observer
has written that in the early days of the nation, "whereas democracy and
representative government grew gradually, rights were fundamental." 543 It
was the notion of rights that became the centerpiece of U.S. society, with
541. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
542. One can also properly offer other reasons. Numerous commentators have explored
the close ties of the Americans and French in the period before the two revolutions, and the great
influence of French philosophers on the Drafters of the Declaration of Independence, the
Constitution, and the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 539, at 1023-34; Terence
Marshall, Human Rights and Constitutional Government: A Franco-American Dialogue at the
Time of the Revolution, in THE LEGACY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 151 (Hancock & Lambert
eds., 1996); Rodolfo Batiza, Origins of Modem Codification of the Civil Law: The French
Expen"ence and Its Implications for Lowsiana Law, 56 TUL. L. REv. 477, 477-601 (1981). See
generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARsH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PuNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 170-73 (2003).
543. Henkin, supra note 539, at 1034; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
287-88 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (exploring the historical basis).
In drafting both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the Framers strove to create a
form of Government decidedly different from their British heritage. Whereas the
British Parliament was unconstrained, the Framers intended to create a Government of
limited powers. The colonists considered the British government dangerously
omnipotent. After all, the British declaration of rights in 1688 had been enacted not by
the people, but by Parliament. Americans vehemently attacked the notion that rights
were matters of"favor and grace," given to the people fivmthe Goverrunent.
Thus, the Framers of the Bill of Rights did not purport to "create" rights.
Rather, they designed the Bill of Rights to prohibit our Government from infringing
rights and liberties presumed to be pre-existing. The Fourth Amendment, for example,
does not create a new right of security against unreasonable searches and seizures ....
The focus of the Fourth Amendment is on what the Government can and cannot do,
and how it may act.
Id (internal citations omitted) [emphasis in original]. The Founders, early in the nation's
beginnings, recognized the need to restrain government. For example, as stated in Federalist
Paper No. 51:
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no
doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the
necessity of auxiliary precautions.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JOHN JAY, & JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST: A COMMENTARY ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, No. 51, 335, 337 (Random House, 1787).
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the inevitable result that "America began and continues as the most antistatist, legalistic and rights-oriented nation." 544 This rights-orientation is
evident in many aspects of the American culture but perhaps nowhere as
clearly as in the criminal justice system. 545 To be sure, it is highlighted in
perhaps the most famous criminal justice decision ever delivered by the
United States Supreme Court, Miranda v. Anzona. 546 In the very first
sentence of the Miranda opinion, the Court made clear that the
government must look carefully at the relevant rights before a successful
criminal prosecution can occur: "The cases before us raise questions
which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal
jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the
Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime."547
The presence of a clear expectation of rights, combined with a
massive mistrust of government, exerts tremendous impact on the
American criminal justice system; an impact, as one can see, that is
simply not present elsewhere in the common law world. 548 There should
not be any doubt; this mistrust is legendary but real, mighty and
omnipresent. Jefferson spoke of it: "[t]hat government is best which
544. LiPSET, supra note 535, at 20. The point is developed further in GARCIA, supra note
537, at 32-33.
545. Indeed, the view of rights being vital can be seen by the creation of rights not
explicitly laid out by the Founders. Riclunond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vrrginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
"For example, the rights of association and of privacy, the right to be preswned innocent, and the
right to be judged by a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial, as well as
the right to travel, appear nowhere in the Constitution or Bill of Rights." ld at 579-80. They are
implicit in enwnerated guarantees. Jd at 580.
546. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
547. Jd at 439; see also Kuk Cho, Reconstruction ofthe English Criminal Justice System
and its Reinvigorated Exclusionmy Rules, 21 LOY. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 259, 299 ( 1999):
Americans view the state with suspicion and the law as their shield against official
transgressions. They expect "total justice": compensation for every harm suffered,
observance of due process when their rights are at stake. . . . The English, on the other
hand, do not yet seem to defme themselves as holders of rights nor do they view their
interactions with others as legal relationships. . . . If Americans want "total justice,"
expectations of justice in Britain, according to one English observer, are at best
"patchy." "Due Process" is not a term which features in an English lawyer's daily
vocabulary, nor is it part of a layman's demands upon life.

Jd at 299 (citing The King v. Warckshall, I Leach C. C., at 1324-25 (footnotes omitted)).
548. The presence pre-dates the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. As
Professor Garcia has carefully laid out, it is found in earlier state constitutions and even in
colonial charters. GARCIA, supra note 537, at 14. Professor Garcia goes on to state:
[The] Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 ... represented an attempt to codifY the
individual rights the colonist deemed essential to liberty ... [it] was the precursor to the
federal Bill of Rights. As such, it was bound up with the rebellion against England and
represented an attempt to shield Americans from arbitrary government power.
Jd
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governs the least, because its people discipline themselves."549 John
Adams railed against the seemingly limitless power of the sovereign,550 it
is routinely a part of the political system "[I]t is almost obligatory for
American politicians of both the right and the left to profess mistrust of
551
govemment."
Mistrust certainly finds its way into the rulings of
American judges in criminal courts: "A right to jury trial is granted to
criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government.
Those who wrote our constitution knew from history and experience that
it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges. . . . [The
right to a jury trial responds to] [t]ear of unchecked power."552
In Brewer v. Williams, an important right to counsel decision, the
Supreme Court spoke of the need "to have the protective shield of a
lawyer between himself and the awesome power of the State."553 The
point is also supported by Coppedge v. Umted States, one of the lesser
known right to appeal decisions. 554 The Court stated, "When society acts
to deprive one of its members of his life, liberty or property, it takes its
most awesome steps .... The methods we employ in the enforcement of
our criminal law have aptly been called the measures by which the
quality of our civilization may be judged."555
The application of the rights catalogued earlier in this Article is
certainly not cost free. It makes the government's task in prosecuting
criminals more difficult, and may result in the release of guilty and
dangerous individuals from custody. 556 Americans have, however, been
549. Jefferson spoke often of the mistrust of government and the need of the people to
control their own destiny. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Dr. Price (Jan. 8, 1789), in THE LIFE
AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 418 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds.,
1993). "[W]henever the people are well-informed, they can be trusted with their own government
...." fd He regularly warned of abuses of constitutional power. See id
550. "They have no other fortification against wanton, cruel power:
no other
indemnification against being ridden like horses, fleeced like sheep, worked like cattle, and fed
and clothed like swine and hounds: No other defense against fines, imprisonments, whipping
posts, gibbets, bastinadoes and racks." John Adams, Clarendon, no. 3 in 1 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITIJTJON 17.12 (1987), available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/
vlchl7sl2.htrnl (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
551. Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth CentuJy Constitutions, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 525 (Geoffrey Stone eta!. eds., 1992).
552. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-66 (1968) (internal citations omitted).
553. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,409 (1977).
554. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 449 (1962).
555. Id
556. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333,342 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
A system of law that not only makes certain conduct criminal, but also lays down rules
for the conduct of the authorities, often becomes complex in its application to
individual cases, and will from time to time produce imperfect results, especially if
one's attention is confmed to the particular case at bar. Some criminals do go free
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willing to pay that price in order to insure the preservation of liberty for
57
citizens and substantial limitations on the governmene Indeed, there is
a substantial body of U.S. judicial writing devoted to discussing the cost
of not applying important individual rights in the criminal justice
setting. 558 One Justice wrote: "[We have] the deep-rooted feeling that the
police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and
liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict
those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves."559
Another commented: "If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart
the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something
very wrong with that system."560
The classic statement of the need for the government to obey the
law remains that given by Justice Brandeis: 561
In a government oflaws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it
fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker,
it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the
criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare that the Government
may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private
criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious
doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face. 562

These views of the limits on the powers of government, and the fear
of unlimited powers, can be seen in the individual criminal justice areas
already discussed. Much has been written in connection with searches
and seizures and the need to control government. In Camera v.
Municipal Court, the Court noted, "The basic purpose of [the Fourth
Amendment] ... is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
because of the necessity of keeping government and its servants in their place. That is
one of the costs of having and enforcing a Bill of Rights. This country is built on the
assumption that the cost is worth paying, and that in the long run we are all both freer
and safer if the Constitution is strictly enforced.
Williams v. Nix, 700 F.2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1983), revi:f on other grounds, 467 U.S. 431
(1984), quoted with approval in United States v. Lebrun, 306 F.3d 545, 554 (8th Cir. 2002).
557. LIPSET, supm note 535, at 49 (quoting Stephen Cole, Crime as the Cost ofAmerican
Creativity, NEWSDAY, Aug. 24, 1983, at Viewpoint Section). Cole went on to write that this
emphasis on individual rights "also gives Americans a degree of civil liberty not found in most
other countries." Jd
558. See inffa notes 559-560 and accompanying text.
559. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,320-21 (1959).
560. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
561. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,491 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
562. Id at 485.

2004]

AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES

103

against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."563 One can easily
find many similar statements:
"The Fourth Amendment to our
Constitution prohibits 'unreasonable' government interference with the
fundamental facet of individual liberty."564 In the same year the Court
stated, "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free
society."565 The Court later went on to elaborate, "A sane, decent,
civilized society must provide some such oasis [from governmental
encroachment], some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated
enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man's castle."566
The statements are similar when the discussion moves toward the
controversial remedy for Fourth Amendment violations, the exclusionary
rule. In the seminal case of Mapp v. Ohio, the Court wrote that applying
the rule to the states was necessary, for "without that rule the freedom
from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral ... as not to merit
this Court's high regard as a freedom 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."'567 This sort of remark had been routinely made prior to Mapp,
for example, the Justices wrote that the "purpose [for the exclusionary
rule] is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
563. Camera v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523,528 (1967).
564. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 202 (1969) (acknowledging the famous
words of Justice Jackson in Brinegar v. United States):
Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the
spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and
seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary
government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people
possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the
human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes,
persons and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the
police.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949).
565. Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,27 (1949).
566. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961) (quoting United States v. On
Lee, 193 F.2d 306,315-16 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting)).
567. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (internal citations omitted). A Justice's view
of the exclusion rule in scholarly form is similar:
To give effect to the Constitution's prohibition against illegal searches and seizures, it
may be necessary for the judiciary to remove the incentive for violating it. Thus, it may
be argued that although the Constitution does not explicitly provide for exclusion, the
need to enforce the Constitution's limits on government-to preserve the rule of lawrequires an exclusionary rule.
Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond· The Origins, Development and Future of
the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1384 (1983)
(internal citations omitted).
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568

it."
The point has been just as routinely made after Mapp, as when
Justice Stevens wrote in his concurring opinion in Dunaway v. New lVrk,
"[J]ustification for the exclusion of evidence obtained by improper
methods is to motivate the law enforcement profession as a whole-not
the aberrant individual officer-to adopt and enforce regular procedures
that will avoid the future invasion of the citizen's constitutional rights." 569
The language of U.S. courts regarding the rights-based doctrine and
the mistrust of government has been especially strong in the many cases
exploring the validity of confessions. Whether analyzing the Due
Process Clauses of the Constitution, or the Miranda view of the privilege
against self incrimination, the judicial attitude is striking. 570 In the
Supreme Court's Jackson v. Denno decision, the majority wrote:
It is now inescapably clear that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
the use of involuntary confessions not only because of the probable
unreliability of confessions that are obtained in a manner deemed coercive,
but also because of the strongly felt attitude of our society that important
human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the
course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused
571
against his will.

The Court had earlier explained that "[t]his insistence upon putting the
government to the task of proving guilt by means other than inquisition
was engendered by historical abuses which are quite familiar." 572 Justice
Brennan went even further, writing that "it is monstrous that courts
should aid or abet the law-breaking police officer."573
To be sure, the Supreme Court destroyed any doubt as to the
continued validity of rights-based jurisprudence with confessions, in
574
Dickerson v. Umted States.
There the defendant asked the Court to

568. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); see also, Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 198 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Here the Court recognized the conflicting
interest:
Of course, this, like each of our constitutional guaranties, often may afford a shelter for
criminals. But the forefathers thought this was not too great a price to pay for that
decent privacy of home, papers and effects which is indispensable to individual dignity
and self-respect. They may have overvalued privacy, but I am not disposed to set their
command at naught.
/d
569. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,221 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring).
570. See Miranda., 384 U.S. at 436.
571. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-86 (1964) (internal citations omitted) (citing
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199,207 (1960)).
572. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199,207 (1960).
573. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,232 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
574. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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limit or overrule Miranda and find that it was not constitutionally based
so that Congress could legislatively alter it. 575 This the Justices refused to
do, concluding that the Miranda Court had
emphasized that it could not foresee ''the potential alternatives for
protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States,"
and it accordingly opined that the Constitution would not preclude
legislative solutions that differed from the prescribed Miranda warnings but
which were "at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right
of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it.',s76

A final example of the degree to which U.S. judges adhere to
concerns regarding government overreaching, as well as a rights based
criminal justice system, may be the most telling of all. 577 The entrapment
defense is a privilege found nowhere else in the community of common
law nations, but one which is well preserved in the United States. 578 It is
striking because it is not a limitation as to evidence, but a certifiable full
defense for a crime the defendant has clearly committed. 579 This is not
constitutionally based, nor is it found in codified form in many U.S.
jurisdictions.580 Still, judges in the United States rely heavily on the
entrapment doctrine: "When the Government's quest for convictions
leads to the apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left
to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the law, the
courts should intervene."581 Indeed, the whole purpose for the entrapment
defense "is to deter impermissible police conduct."582 As stated by Justice
Brandeis, the entrapment defense should stop a prosecution "in order to
protect the Government. To protect it from illegal conduct of its officers.
To preserve the purity of its courts."583

575. Id at 428.
576. Id at 440 (internal citations omitted).
577. Numerous other examples could be offered regarding the anti-government attitudes
which fmd their way into important judicial decisions. See, e.g., Press-Enter. v. Superior Court,
464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court County ofNorfolk, 457 U.S.
596, 606 (1982); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968); Maryland v. Ba1t. Radio
Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912,920 (1950) (dissent fivm denial ofcert.).
578. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
579. See generally id (showing how some states actually require the defendant to admit to
the crime in order to claim the defense).
580. Seeid
581. Id at 553-54.
582. Bradley v. Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002).
583. Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928); see also Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438,485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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An Australian Point ofl--1ew

Although Australia and the United States share a common heritage,
there are fundamental differences between the way Britain colonized
them, founded them, and the relationship that subsequently developed
between state and subject that provides a basis for understanding the
distinct approach to criminal procedure each nation has chosen to adopt.
Complimenting the divergent constitutional history are cultural
differences that stem from a myriad of influences including geographic
isolation and dependence on Great Britain, the so called "tyranny of
distance" 584 within Australian borders, Australia's "lucky" history, its
abundance of natural resources, 585 and the ethos ofmateship. 586
Australia had no revolutionary struggle to gain national independence.587
An amalgamation of independent English colonies
operating on the Australian mainland later became the various states and
territories of Australia. 588 The British designed the amalgamation to
enhance national security, promote free trade, and facilitate economic
efficiency rather than to liberate from an unwanted colonial yoke. 589
There was no battle with an oppressive imperial power. 590 Australia was
isolated from French revolutionary influences of "liberty, equality and
fraternity," which had dominated the thinking of the Drafters of the
United States' Constitution. 591 Rather the Australian constitutional
drafting process essentially served the interests of an agricultural and
commercial elite, which arguably still continue to dominate Australian
society today. 592
Nonetheless, the French Revolution and the American Revolution
were important catalysts in Australian history. 593 These events provided
the motivation for a harsh militarily operated prison system that
584. See generally GEOFFREY BLAINEY, THE TYRANNY OF DISTANCE: How DISTANCE
SHAPED AUSTRALIA'S HISTORY (1983).
585. See generally DONALD HORNE, THE LUCKY COUNTRY: AUSTRALIA IN THE SIXTIES
(1964).
586. Jim Page, Is Mateship a V!itue?, 37 AUSTRALIAN 1. Soc. ISSUES 193 (2002); Tony
Simoes Da Silva, Desire, Mateship, and 'National ljpe': Vance Palmer's Legend for Sanderson,
13 AUSTRALIAN STUDIES 70, 70-81 (1999); H.G. OxLEY, MATESHIP IN LOCAL ORGANIZATION: A
STUDY OF EGALITARIANlSM, STRATIFICATION, LEADERSHIP, AND AMENITIES PROJECTS IN A SEMIINDUSTRIAL COMMUNITY OF INLAND NEW SoUTH WALES I (1978).
587. See CLARK, supra note 528, at 211-12.
588. See 1d at 205-10.
589. See id at 204.
590. See id at 205-12.
591 . See generally id at 19.
592. Dean Jaensch, Remaking the Australian Constitution, 14 CURRENT AFF. BULL 14-15

(1981 ).
593.

SeeCLARK,

supra note 528, at 116-17.
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functioned as an off-shore concentration camp for political dissidents and
criminal misfits from Great Britain. 594 The cruelty within these prison
colonies in New South Wales, Tasmania, and Queensland, founded in the
wake of the American Revolution, was well known and documented. 595
The colonial governments brutally crushed dissension within them. 596
Prisoners that survived and the governments released remained
dependent upon the military for sustenance and protection in a hostile
and alien environmene97 Although the Australian colonies began
attracting yeoman farmers squeezed out of Great Britain by the industrial
revolution from the early 1800s, with the exception of one colony, South
Australia, which was established purely as a colony for the English lower
middle class, early colonization was not characterized by the ideal of a
new utopia. 598 It was not until after the Gold Rush in 1851, and the
consolidation of personal pastoral empires, that the abundance of
Australian natural resources became evident to the outside world such
that people saw Australia as a place of opportunity rather than
ignominious exile. 599
Throughout its early history Australia remained geographically
isolated from the world and heavily dependent on Great Britain for
protection. 600 Great Britain shipped food and materials to enable the
colonies, which lacked the expertise to adapt to the native environment,
to survive. 601 Great Britain also provided military protection from other
imperial powers, especially the Asian hordes to the north, the fear of
which continues to underlie the Australian psyche today and partly
explains Australia's current harsh response to asylum seekers. 602 Up until
the mid-twentieth century, Great Britain was Australia's primary export
market. 603 At the time of federation, Australians viewed Great Britain
more as a loving parent of a child ready to leave the nest, than as an
oppressor unwilling to give up an opportunity for imperial exploitation. 604
594.
595.
15 (1987).
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.
NETWORK,

See 1d at 18-35.
See ROBERT HUGHES, THE FATAL SHORE: THE EPIC OF AUSTRALIA'S FOUNDING chs. 9See CLARK, supra note 528, at 24-25.
See id at 24-26.
See Id at 27-35.
See id at 126-50.
See generally id at 9-35.
Id
Eg., Hamish Fitzsimmons & John Schauble, Good Name Takes a Battering, F2
Aug. 30, 2001, available at http://old.smh.eom.au/news/0108/30/nationaVnational7.

html.

603. CLARK, supra note 528, at 301.
604. See generally id at 204-12.
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Great Britain's authority was benign and the population did not require
protection from it. 605
Because of their dependence on the supply of food and materials
from Great Britain, the Australian colonies settled around the coastal
fringe, and that pattern of settlement continues today. Consequently
there is a considerable distance between the coastal urban centers and the
interior. Prior to the era of airplane travel, reliable road transport
networks, and telecommunications, these distances played an important
role in the formation of Australian character. 606 Despite the highly
urbanized nature of Australian society, mateship and the bush were and
continue as pervasive cultural influences. 607 The combination of these
two influences gave rise to a celebration of rugged individualism and
self-sufficiency similar to those noted in American society, however with
one qualification. 608 Distance and a harsh environment prevented those
living in the interior from pursuing purely selfish agendas. 609 Out of
necessity, those living and working in the outback were dependent upon
each other for support. 610 The outback isolated them from the institutions
of law and order, which were concentrated in the urban centers. 611
Consequently the logic of co-operation rather than the individualized
pursuit of personal claims characterized the way they dealt with each
other. 612 Moreover, those living in the interior remained highly dependent
on the state for the provision of infrastructure (such as roads and
communications) and for the provision of income maintenance through
subsidy, import protection, and market assistance. 613 Consequently, most
of the political unhappiness emanating recently from this sector of
Australian society is the result of the decreasing availability of such state
support, which has gradually dismantled as Australia has embraced
globalization and the ideology of the World Trade Organization. 614
605. Id
606. BLAINEY, supra note 584, at ch. 6.
607. S. ENCEL, EQUALITY AND AUTHORITY: A STUDY OF CLASS, STATUS AND POWER IN
AUSTRALIA Ch. 16 (1970); J.D.B. MILLER, AUSTRALIA 37 (1966); RUSSELL WARD, THE
AUSTRALIAN LEGEND Ch. I (2nd ed., 1965).
608. GEORGE NADEL, AUSTRALIA'S COLONIAL CULTURE 52-56 (1957).
609. Jd at 54; WARD, supra note 607, at 77-87; See N.T. Feather, Value Systems Across
Cultures: Australia and China 21 INT'L J. PSYCHOLOGY 697, 712 (1986) (contending that
although Australians demonstrate a concern toward self fulfillment and enjoyment, they also see
friendship and altruistic and affiliative views as important).
610. R.M. CRAWFORD, AUSTRALIA 135-39 (4th ed., 1979); ENCEL, supra note 607, at 1048; NADEL, supra note 608, at 54; WARD, supra note 607, at 96.
611. W.K. HANCOCK, AUSTRALIA 273 ( 1930)
612. Id at274-75.
613. DAVID MOSLER, AUSTRALIA, THE RECREATIONAL SOCIETY 28 (2002).
614. See CLARK, supra note 528, at 39-46.
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Compared with American society, Australian society has generally
been more heavily dependent on the State. 615 Consequently, while the
Australian population might describe politicians and bureaucrats with a
disdain similar to that expressed by Americans, in reality Australians
look to the State as obligated to protect and promote their personal
welfare. 616 Initially, this arose out of necessity because the Australian
population was too small and too diffusely spread to facilitate the capital
investment in infrastructure necessary to establish and sustain the
standard of living characteristic of modem western economies. 617
Originally, the government established and maintained road networks,
rail networks, telecommunications, water supplies, power supplies and so
on. 618 Infrastructure was publicly rather than privately owned, although
the government has divested itself of much of this role over the past ten
years, as its ideology shifted from supervisor to a more laissez-faire
role. 619
Furthermore, until recently, the State committed to intervening in
the market to ensure that the fruits of economic growth were distributed
fairly; egalitarianism in Australia meant more than equality of
opportunity, it also meant social justice.620 Until about ten years ago,
Australia had a system of centralized wage fixation. 621 The government
heavily subsidized and protected the manufacturing industry through
tariffs and import restrictions. 622 Statutory monopolies marketed export
products, and in some cases continue to market these products. 623
Universal health care (although increasingly under threat due to
diminished resources), remains a commitment of the present government
along with social welfare for many in the community. This includes
plans such as: the age pension, single parents' benefits, veterans'
entitlements, unemployment benefits of unlimited duration, disabled
pensions, and sickness benefits. 624
Consequently the individualism, liberty, and laissez-faire values
(which Lipset argues explain the rights oriented and anti-statist attitude
615. Seegenerallyidat300-27.
616. Seeid
617. See generally id at 178-210.
618. Seeidat206-07.
619. A SOCIOLOGY OF AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY 80 (Jake M. Najman & John S. Western eds.,
3d ed. 2000).
620. KEEPING IT TOGETHER: STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN AUSTRALIA 53-59 (Adam Farrar
& Jane Inglis eds., 1996).
621. ld
622. See CLARK, supra note 528, at 200-01.
623. See generally id at 237-40.
624. Clark, supra note 528, at 333.
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of American society), 625 have not been replicated to the same degree in
Australian society where the populace has traditionally viewed the State
as a source of succor and protection. Australians did not colonize their
country to escape religious oppression. 626 Australia was a military
outpost of Great Britain on whom most Australians were dependent and
to whom most owed allegiance. 627 Australia had no need to articulate
rights within a constitutional context, and moreover, no tradition of
judicial oversight of breaches of human rights in the criminal
investigation process. 628
None of the Australian colonial constitutions incorporated
protection of rights. 629 When Australia became a federated nation in 1901
there was an opportunity to redress this deficiency, and include rights
within the new national constitution. The Constitution included a limited
number of rights, such as the right to freedom of religion, 630 the right to a
jury trial for indictable Commonwealth offenses, 631 and the prohibition
632
against discrimination between persons from different states. However,
the new nation rejected a proposal for equal protection under the law and
a guarantee of due process. 633 The view was that the inclusion of such
rights in the Constitution was unnecessary and that the government and
Parliament should be trusted to abide by the rule of law. 634 Australian
constitutional history was not characterized by the same degree of
distrust of the state and its potential to exercise oppressive power that
635
Some
characterized the formation of the United States Constitution.
625.

LIPSET, supra note 535, at 20-21; see also supra notes 543-545 and accompanying

text.
626. Although that may have been the reason for later emigration by European minorities
such as the Silesians who migrated to the Barossa Valley in South Australia in the mid-nineteenth
century.
627. See general/yCLARK, supra note 528, at 18-35.
628. See GEORGE WILLIAMS, HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 41
(1999).
629. Except Tasmania, which by section 46 of their Constitution provides for freedom of
religion and conscience.
630. AUSTL. CONST. § 116.
631. ld § 80. The inclusion of a right to trial by jury in section 80 was potentially an
important safeguard in Australian criminal procedure. Originally the proposal put forward was a
guarantee of trial by jury for "all crimes cognizable by any court." Id However in successive
drafts, the proposal was watered down so as to apply only to "[t]he trial on indictment of any
offence." Id Because the federal parliament could determine which offenses were indictable, it
could effectively evade this protection by characterizing the offense as summary. Moreover as the
bulk of criminal cases are heard by state courts not federal courts, the protection afforded by
Section 80 has proven illusory.
632. Id § 117.
633. J.A. LA NAUZE, THE MAKING OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 230-32 (1972).
634. See generally id
635. Id
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even thought that the inclusion of such rights in the Constitution would
reflect negatively on Australian civilization because it would imply that
the populace could not trust the government. 636
More sinisterly, the drafters of the Australian Constitution were
aware of the U.S. decisions based on the Fourth Amendment that had
prevented discrimination against African-Americans and ChineseAmericans. A substantial number of delegates to the Australian
Constitutional Conventions wanted to ensure that Australian states were
able to continue to enforce racist laws. Examples of such laws are the
Western Australian legislation that prevented any Asiatic or African alien
from obtaining a miner's licence, and the Victorian factory legislation
that discriminated against the Chinese on the basis of alleged "sweating"
637
practices.
The paucity of protections for civil and political rights in the
Australian Constitution and its emphasis upon the preservation of states'
interests, the need to protect free trade, and the limitation of
Commonwealth power, demonstrates that the Constitution was
essentially a compact between the former Australian colonies rather than
638
a compact between the new national government and its citizens. The
Australian Constitution actually omitted the concept of citizenship
because Australians still saw themselves as British subjects. 639 Australian
society retained British values and structures including the racial views
of its patriarchal Anglo-Saxon dominated society. 640 Aborigines, for
example, were ignored and considered a dying race. 641
While Australia imported the structural separation of the executive,
legislative, and judicial arms of the State found in the Australian
Constitution from the United States, it retained the institution of
responsible government inherited from Great Britain. 642 The records of
the Australian Constitutional Convention and further academic literature,
at least up until the 1960s, indicate that the adoption of responsible
government was regarded as a further panacea for the failure to adopt
constitutionally based human rights. 643
636. /d at 231.
637. /d at 231-32; WILLIAMS, supra note 628, at 41.
638. WILLIAMS, supra note 628, at 26.
639. Seeid
640. HANCOCK, supra note 611, at Ch. III.
641. NICHOLAS PETERSON & WILL SANDERS, CiTIZENSHIP AND INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS
Ch. 1 (1998).
642. Eg., THE RIGHT HONORABLE SIR OWEN DIXON, JESTING PILATE: AND OrnER PAPERS
ANDADDRESSES 101 (1965).
643. Eg., ld at 102; SIR R.G. MENZIES, CENTRAL POWER IN THE AUSTRALIAN
COMMONWEALTH 52-54 (1967).
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Under responsible government, the Executive branch is formed by
reason of its majority in Parliament. 644 In theory, the Executive holds
power as long as it maintains the confidence of Parliament. 645 In turn,
Parliament is directly responsible to the people through the election
process. 646 The accountability of the Executive in Parliament extends to
the acts of ministers, acts undertaken by ministerial departments, and acts
undertaken by government instrumentalities. 647 Responsible government
is further bolstered by the availability of judicial review from an
independent court. 648
To provide an effective check against abuse of power by the
Executive, the theory of responsible government depends upon the
efficacy of parliamentary overview. 649 However, the monopolization of
political influence into the hands of two major parties (Liberal/National
vs. Labor) together with the development of strong party discipline have
resulted in domination of Parliament by the Executive rather than strong
parliamentary accountability. 650 The business of Parliament has simply
become too complex and voluminous to provide an effective check
against individual instances of abuses of civil rights. 651 Moreover, as a
result of the Executive's domination over Parliament, the response to
systemic problems remains the Executive's prerogative. 652
The increasing domination of the Executive and the failure of
Parliament to act as an effective check on abuses of power have provided
653
a rationale for increasingly active judicial review.
That rationale has
been further strengthened as a result of the attenuated role of the state as
a provider of infrastructure, facilitator of commercial exchange, and an
agent of social justice. 654 As the State has become more laissez-faire and
as the Australian economy has become more liberalized so that society is
less egalitarian, Australian courts have begun to develop a form of rights

644. Brian Galligan, Parliamentmy Responsible Government and the Protection ofRights,
4 PUB. L. REv. 100, Ill ( 1993); Marian Simms, Models ofPolitical Accountability and Concepts
ofAustralian Government, 58 AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMIN. 34, 34-37 (1990).
645. See Galligan, supra note 644, at 103-04.
646. Seeid
647. Seeid
648. See1d
649. See generally 1d
650. Id at 111.
651. See id at 102.
652. Seeid
653. Gerald Brennan, The Purpose and Scope ofJudicial Review, in JUDICIAL REVIEw OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACfiON IN THE 1980s: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 18-19 (Michael Taggart ed.,
1986).
654. See generally 1d
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jurisprudence.655 Arguably, when the people regarded the State as a
benefactor, the need for rights based jurisprudence was not pressing. 656
The advent of globalization and the shrinking mandate of the State have
ironically led to a concomitant enthusiasm on the part of the courts to
protect rights more vigorously than in the past. 657 International
covenants, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), have aided this development,658 as well as the constitutional
separation of judicial power. 659
Nonetheless, as outlined in Part II of this Article, the development
of a rights based jurisprudence remains embryonic and constitutionally
unprotected. Furthermore, the development remains limited by the
attitude of Australian courts toward matters of criminal procedure, and
their reluctance to elevate individual rights above considerations of law
and order. Australian criminal procedure is couched in terms of
protecting the integrity of the criminal process, rather than protecting the
individual from unjustified interference by the State. Courts view
criminal procedure rules as a means to protect the integrity and reliability
of evidence needed to ensure they attain proper convictions. Hence,
illegally or improperly obtained evidence or evidence that operates
unfairly against an accused is not subject to mandatory exclusion. Rather
the courts will examine a number of balancing factors outlined in Part IV
of this Article and will only intervene when convinced that the failure to
observe rights threatens confidence in the court and its procedures. This
official centered view of the court's role regarding interference with civil
liberty is also reflected in the common law of entrapment.
As noted above, the cultural context for the Australian courts'
attitude has been the perception of a benign state in contrast to the
distrustful perception of government present in the United States.
Americans might criticize Australian courts for merely paying lip service
to rights. From an Australian standpoint, however, the domination of
65 5. See generally id
656. See Brian Head, The Role ofState Intervention, in AUSTRALIAN STUDIES: A SURVEY
(James Walter ed., 1989).
657. Hon. Ronald Sackville, Continuity and Judicial Creativity-Some Observations, 20
U.N.S.WL.J. 145, 152 (1997).
658. ICCPR, supra note 338; Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 C.L.R. 292, 321 (per
Brennan, J.); Minister of State for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273;
Jago v. District Court New South Wales (1988) 12 N.S.W.L.R. 558.
659. In reTracey Ex parte Ryan (1989) 166 C.L.R. 518, 580 (per Deane, J.). Reliance on
international covenants and judicial decisions from other nations is rarely found in American
court holdings. For two notable exceptions, see Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003)
(invalidating anti-sodomy statutes); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966) (providing the
famous four warnings needed for interrogations).
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rights based jurisprudence is both unnecessary, given the adherence to
the rule of law by the State, and undesirable because it undermines the
community's confidence in the courts to ensure and enforce law and
order.
VI. CONCLUSION

The divergence between criminal procedure rules of the United
States and Australia can thus be summed up as:
1.

2.

a distinct rights-based jurisprudence practiced in the United
States, which seeks to protect individuals from undue
interference by the State;
an "official centred" jurisprudence practiced in Australia,
which looks to the preservation of the integrity of the courts
and the criminal process they administer.

However, it would be wrong to assume that the divergent approaches
necessarily reflect that U.S. courts will always uphold individual rights
over communitarian interests, or that Australian courts will always
uphold communitarian interests over individual rights.
While the U.S. courts have developed mandatory exclusion rules
regarding unlawful search and seizure and improperly obtained
confessional evidence, there is a good deal of jurisprudence which
demonstrates that communitarian interests play an important role in
limiting the scope of those rules. 660 Communitarian interests, for
example, lie behind decisions such as California v. Ciraolo and New
Jersey v. T.L. Q, and show that it is only unreasonable interference with
individual privacy that will give rise to mandatory exclusion. 661 Similarly,
Australian cases such as Coleman v. Zanker, Pavic v. The Queen, and R.
v. Ridgeway demonstrate that the improper restriction of individual rights
will not be tolerated where it results in convictions obtained at too high a
price, consequently undermining the court's role in upholding the rule of
law.662
Nonetheless, it does appear more likely that evidence, that has been
illegally obtained or will operate unfairly against a defendant, will be
more readily excluded in the United States compared with Australia.
Once due process has been breached in respect to a confession or real
660. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325
(1985).
661. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207; T.L.O, 469 U.S. at 325.
662. Coleman v. Zanker (1991) 58 S.A. St. R. 7; Pavic v. The Queen (1998) 192 C.L.R.
159; R. v. Ridgeway (1995) 184 C.L.R. 19.
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evidence obtained without lawful authority, courts mandate exclusion in
the United States. In Australia, the courts are reluctant to exercise their
discretion in favor of exclusion, especially where the evidence is cogent
and the police have acted in good faith, albeit somewhat overzealously.
The entrapment jurisprudence of each jurisdiction is particularly
illustrative. The Australian view is to permit entrapment unless the
government involvement comprises part of the offense with which it has
charged the defendant. If it does, the evidence obtained as a result of the
entrapment can be (but does not have to be) excluded at the court's
discretion. By contrast, the United States approach does not focus upon
the legality of investigating officials, but looks instead to the effect that
the investigating officials' behavior has upon the criminality of the
defendant. In the United States, entrapment is a complete defense where
behavior of investigating authorities has improperly incited or induced a
crime. Entrapment thus operates as a per se prohibition on the behavior
of investigating officials. In Australia, unless the investigating officials
participate in the crime in a more direct and substantial way, the courts
will not intervene. Blanket legislative immunities passed in some
Australian states, and at the federal level, have limited the scope of the
court's discretion even further, so as to preclude them from excluding
evidence obtained by entrapment.
The official centered approach of Australian courts as compared
with U.S. courts is not only echoed in the rules of admissibility. Rules
regarding media scrutiny of the courts and the examination of jurors and
their deliberations also show that Australian courts are far more
protective of their procedures than their U.S. counterparts, who rely upon
greater transparency and accountability as a means of engendering public
confidence. Australian courts express a stronger fear of media
manipulation and will go to greater lengths to prohibit interference with
their processes through the laws of contempt and the use of suppression
orders. On the other hand, U.S. courts rely more upon management of
media influence through the change of venue procedure, the voir dire
process of juror selection, and sequestration, if required.
The continued secrecy of juror deliberations is a particularly
puzzling aspect of Australian justice. It is designed to keep jurors
anonymous and to protect them from fear of repercussion or corruption.
However, continued secrecy also alienates the jury from the community
and makes jurors unaccountable for their decision-making. Despite this
difference, Australians, like their American counterparts, overwhelrnmingly express the view that jury decisions are fair.
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The divergence between the United States and Australia is culturally
based and neither approach could be transposed to the other's
jurisdiction. In Australia, dependence on government, and the culture of
social justice, has reduced the belief in the need for protection from
government tyranny. However, that picture is changing as Australia has
adapted rapidly to globalization and has dismantled state enterprise.
Australian judges seem to think that if they gave individual rights
greater protection, community confidence in courts would diminish. The
current success of politicians using "get tough" law and order campaigns
as electoral bait would appear to confirm that view. 663 In the absence of
constitutional foundation, Australian courts do not see a need to mandate
the introduction of a rights-based jurisprudence. From their perspective,
an approach which balances community expectations for security against
community expectations that police will behave appropriately, will
produce the best outcome.
The American approach is very different. U.S. courts provide a
forum where individuals can assert their rights. The State, which
potentially can repress and harm individuals, is restrained from
encroaching upon those rights. The approach of U.S. courts is embedded
in American culture and history, a history of seeking refuge from
religious persecution, breaking away from an oppressive imperial power,
the promise of a land of individual opportunity, and the celebration of
self-sustained individualism. 664
The criminal trials in Chicago and Melbourne, mentioned earlier in
this Article, appear at first glance to be quite similar. Upon reflection,
however, one sees fundamental differences in the two criminal justice
systems, differences which reflect very basic views about the relationship
of the two governments to their citizens.

663. Jake Skeers, Australia: State Election Descends into Law-and-Order Bidding War,
SOCIALIST WEB SITE, Mar. 14, 2003, available at http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/
mar2003/nsw-m14.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2003).
664. The point is best illustrated in the celebrated, and widely quoted, dissenting opinion of
Justice Brandeis in the Olmstead case, noted earlier decrying government violation of the law.
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see discussion
supra text accompanying note 562.
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